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1 HORIZONTAL OVERVIEW 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
Croatia, Iceland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey and, for the first 
time, Montenegro were invited to submit their annual Pre-accession Economic 
Programmes (PEPs) covering the period 2012-2014. Serbia submitted an Economic and 
Fiscal Programme (EFP). However, as the country was granted candidate status by the 
European Council's decision of 1-2 March 2012, its EFP is being presented and assessed 
together with the five PEPs. Countries were requested to submit their programmes by 
31 January 2012. All countries except Croatia complied with this deadline. All six 
programmes have been made public.1 
The programmes provide a medium-term macroeconomic and fiscal scenario as well as 
an overview of economic policy plans over a broad range of issues.  In particular, they 
show the governments' intentions to further advance structural reforms, enhance 
productivity and align with the EU's acquis and best practices with a view to achieving 
high growth in order to catch up with, and prepare for EU membership. 
1.2 THE 2012 PROGRAMMES  
The programmes were prepared against a background of deteriorating EU and global 
economic conditions which, although they have stabilised in recent months, remain 
uncertain. The exposure of candidate countries to the EU and specifically to euro area 
economies implies that external shocks can be transmitted at varying degrees through the 
financial, remittances and trade and investment channels. Iceland, Montenegro, Serbia 
and Turkey foresee a slowdown in GDP growth in 2012 before rebounding in 2013-14. 
The macroeconomic frameworks of Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia are in line with last year's programmes, expecting a positive economic growth 
in 2012 and a further acceleration in the outer years. Although the fiscal frameworks of 
all countries foresee a continuous decline in fiscal deficits, compared to last year's 
vintage the budget consolidation is less ambitious. Montenegro and Iceland project a 
balanced budget by 2013, instead of in 2012 foreseen in the previous programme. Like in 
previous submissions, the structural reform agendas reveal a varying focus and degree of 
ambition. 
The Presidency's conclusions of the Ministerial dialogue between EU Member States and 
candidate countries of 17 May 2011 called to progressively adapt the Pre-accession 
Economic Programmes to the strengthened economic governance in the EU. Therefore, 
candidate countries were asked by the Commission – as a first step – to put more 
emphasis in their 2012 programmes on the assessment of the sustainability of the 
                                                   
1 Croatia:  http://www.mfin.hr/adminmax/docs/ENG_PEP%202012-2014.pdf 
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: 
 http://www.finance.gov.mk/files/u1/pre_accession_economic_programme_2012_2014.pdf  
Iceland: http://eng.efnahagsraduneyti.is/media/Acrobat/Pre-ccessionEconomicProgramme2012_FINAL.pdf 
Montenegro: http://www.mf.gov.me/en/news/111256/MONTENEGRO-PRE-ACCESSION-ECONOMIC.html 
Serbia:  http://www.mfin.gov.rs/UserFiles/File/dokumenti/2012/EFP%20SR%202012.pdf 
Turkey:  http://ekutup.dpt.gov.tr/ab/kep/PEP_2012-2014.pdf 
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external position and on the main structural obstacles to growth, in line with the Europe 
2020 strategy. 
The 2012 PEPs reveal that 
candidate countries still had 
difficulties to fully adhere to the 
requested alignment of their 
programme, and in particular to 
provide a more forward looking 
assessment on external 
sustainability and growth-
enhancing structural reforms. 
According to the programmes, all 
candidate countries registered 
positive economic growth in 
20112, varying from 0.4% in 
Croatia to 7.5% in Turkey. 
Iceland's GDP growth is estimated 
at 2.6% following two consecutive 
years of output contraction. The 
pace of real GDP growth doubled 
in the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia to 3.5% and in Serbia to 
2%. For Montenegro, economic 
growth remained unchanged at 
2.5%.  
For 2012, most countries expect to 
register lower, but still positive 
economic growth. Turkey is set to 
post a sharp deceleration in real 
GDP growth to 4% before 
increasing to 5% in the outer years. 
Similarly, a slower pace of real 
GDP growth is foreseen in Iceland, 
Montenegro and Serbia. Iceland's 
PEP anticipates growth at 2.4% in 
2012, thereafter accelerating to 
2.8% by the end of the programme 
period. For Montenegro, economic 
activity is set to decelerate to 2% in 
2012 before picking up in the outer 
years, reaching 4% by 2014. 
Following a slowdown in real 
output to 1.5% in 2012, Serbia's 
                                                   
2  Since the submission of the PEPs, revised real GDP growth data for 2011 have been published as follows:  Croatia -
0.0%, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 3.0%, Iceland 3.1%, Serbia 1.6%, Montenegro (Central Bank 
estimates) 3% and Turkey 8.9%. 
2008 2009 2010 2011e 2012 2013 2014
Croatia 2.2 -6.0 -1.2 0.4 0.8 1.5 2.5
Iceland 1.3 -6.7 -4.0 2.6 2.4 2.5 2.8
The former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia
5.1 -0.9 1.8 3.5 3.0-4.0 3.5-4.2 4.0-4.7
Montenegro 6.9 -5.7 2.5 2.5 2.0 3.5 4.0
Serbia 3.8 -3.5 1.0 2.0 1.5 3.0 4.0
Turkey 0.7 -4.8 9.0 7.5 4.0 5.0 5.0
Croatia 8.4 9.1 11.8 13.3 14.0 14.0 13.4
Iceland 2.3 3.0 8.4 7.6 6.4 5.8 5.4
The former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia
33.8 32.2 32.0 30.8 30.1 29.2 28.1
Montenegro 16.8 19.1 19.7 19.5 18.5 16.8 14.9
Serbia 13.6 16.1 20.0 23.2 22.9 22.0 20.8
Turkey 11 14.1 12.0 10.5 10.4 10.2 9.9
Croatia -8.9 -5.3 -1.2 0.2 0.0 0.5 1.1
Iceland -24.5 -11.7 -11.2 -9.3 -4.1 -1.7 -2.4
The former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia
-12.8 -6.8 -2.2 -4.8 -4.8 -4.6 -3.7
Montenegro -51.3 -30.1 -25.3 -22.8 -21.7 -20.8 -19.7
Serbia -20.6 -7.4 -7.2 -7.5 -8.4 -7.7 -7.4
Turkey -5.6 -2.3 -6.4 -9.4 -8.0 -7.5 -7.0
Croatia 6.1 2.4 1.1 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.4
Iceland 12.7 12.0 5.4 4.0 4.2 2.9 2.5
The former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia
8.3 -0.8 1.6 3.9 2.5 2.5 2.5
Montenegro 7.4 3.4 0.5 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
Serbia 8.6 6.6 6.5 11.2 4.1 3.7 4.0
Turkey 10.4 6.3 8.6 5.9 6.6 5.0 4.9
Croatia -1.4 -4.1 -4.9 -5.6 -3.8 -3.3 -2.6
Iceland -13.5 -9.9 -10.1 -3.4 -1.4 0.0 1.2
The former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia
-1 -2.7 -2.5 -2.5 -2.5
up to    
-2.5
up to    
-2.5
Montenegro 0.5 -4.4 -4.9 -3.2 -1.0 0.1 1.0
Serbia -2.6 -4.5 -4.6 -4.6 -4.3 -3.7 -2.9
Turkey -2.2 -5.7 -2.9 -1.0 -0.8 -0.8 -0.4
Croatia 28.9 35.2 41.3 44.9 47.2 48.9 49.4
Iceland 70.4 106.6 92.9 98.4 93.2 89.4 84.8
The former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia
28.8 32.1 24.6 27.0 28.8
up to 
28.8
up to 
28.8
Montenegro 29 38.2 40.9 43.8 46.9 45.4 42.9
Serbia 25.6 31.3 42.7 42.4 44.0 44.9 44.4
Turkey 39.5 45.5 42.2 39.8 37.0 35.0 32.0
S o urce: P re-A cces s io n Eco no m ic  P ro gram m e (P EP ) 2012 fo r 2010-2014, CCEQ fo r 2008 and 2009
Real GDP growth (% change)     
General government debt (% of GDP) 
Pre-Accession Economic Programmes 2012 
Key indicators
Unemployment rate (%, LFS)
Current account balance (% of GDP)
Inflation (CPI, annual % change)
General government balance (% of GDP) 
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programme assumes an acceleration in economic activity reaching 4% by 2014. Croatia's 
PEP foresees steadily increasing economic growth from 0.8% in 2012 to 2.5% by the end 
of programme period. Economic growth in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is 
forecast to be between 3-4% in 2012 and to accelerate to 4-4.7% by 2014.  
All programmes except Serbia's envisage domestic demand to be the main driver of 
economic growth, primarily as a result of private consumption and investment. Serbia 
foresees a more balance growth outlook with the contribution of net exports increasing 
over the medium-term. Current account balances are set to improve in general, although 
at different speeds with Croatia projecting a growing surplus over the programme's 
horizon. Overall, the programmes' macroeconomic scenarios still tend to be somewhat on 
the optimistic side and face downside risks which include a worsening external economic 
situation, slow progress with household and corporate debt restructuring, heightened 
inflationary pressures and the slowdown of capital inflows, notably workers' remittances 
and FDI inflows.  
All candidate countries with the exception of the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia project a reduction in the budget deficit over the programme period. 
Iceland anticipates the largest improvement in the fiscal balance from a deficit of 3.4% of 
GDP to a surplus of 1% by 2014, equivalent to an adjustment of almost 4.6 percentage 
points of GDP. Montenegro is also projecting a budget surplus of 1% of GDP in 2014 
from a deficit of 3.2% in 2012, an adjustment of 4.2 percentage points of GDP. For 
Croatia, the government deficit is set to decline by 3 percentage points of GDP, from 
5.6% of GDP in 2011 to 2.6% in 2014, while Serbia's fiscal deficit is foreseen to decline 
steadily from 4.6% of GDP in 2011 to 2.9% in 2014. In the case of Turkey, the 
government deficit is set to fall from 1% of GDP to 0.4% by the end of the programme 
period. The programme of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia anticipates a 
deficit of up to 2.5% of GDP over the period 2011-2014.  
For all countries, the fiscal adjustment will primarily be driven by a reduction in the 
expenditure-to-GDP ratio. However, providing more detailed information about the 
specific underlying policy measures would certainly improve the credibility of the fiscal 
programmes. The PEPs of Serbia and Turkey project lower public consumption as the 
main source for the fiscal adjustment. Although the budget consolidation in Iceland 
seems to be expenditure-led, the measures spelled out in the PEP are mostly on the 
revenue side. Cuts in the public wage bill, health care spending, subsidies and public 
investment are set to be the main drivers of a lower expenditure ratio for Croatia, while 
Montenegro's budgetary consolidation will be underpinned by a decline in the public 
sector salaries-to-GDP ratio. The sequencing of the fiscal adjustment within the 
programme period varies across countries. For Croatia, Iceland and Montenegro, the 
deficit adjustment is front-loaded taking place primarily in 2012. Serbia and Turkey's 
consolidation is back-loaded and is assumed to accrue mostly in 2014. 
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Similar to previous years, the structural reform agendas spelled out in the PEPs reveal 
a varying focus and degree of ambition and would benefit from being based more 
strongly on an analysis of the structural bottlenecks to growth as requested by the 
Commission for the 2012 PEPs. All programmes fail to identify and analyse in a 
forward-looking way the structural obstacles to growth as requested by the Commission. 
They would in general have benefited from a closer link between reform measures and 
the fiscal framework. The reform priorities and their alignment with accession-related 
priorities, as described in the Commission's progress reports, Opinion and the European 
Partnership documents appear to be addressed at varying degrees by the programmes. 
For Croatia, the programme would have benefited from more emphasis on the measures 
urgently needed to improve the business climate in view of the significant administrative 
and regulatory obstacles. Iceland's structural reform framework as presented in the 
programme is coherent, however the level of detail for some of the measures is 
insufficient while a clear timeline and sequencing of the planned measures, along with 
information about their estimated budgetary impact is missing. Although the programme 
of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia presents a wide array of intended policy 
measures in a broad range of areas, the steps to be taken and their expected outcomes are 
not explicitly spelled out. Montenegro's structural reforms package covers a wide range 
of areas but several measures, including labour law, pension reform and financial sector 
relate to the continuation of previous initiatives and focus on the development of 
secondary legislation. While Serbia's programme acknowledges the need to step up 
structural reforms by, amongst others, strengthening further the rule of law, completing 
privatisation and enhancing the business environment, it fails to provide convincing 
action plans as regards the medium-term priorities. The structural reforms in Turkey's 
PEP cover a broad range of issues, although they are insufficiently linked to the fiscal 
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scenario and are only partly aligned with accession-related priorities. Similar to previous 
submissions all programmes often put emphasis on past developments and would benefit 
from elaborating more on future plans. In addition, the links between the structural 
reforms and the macroeconomic and fiscal frameworks are not always clearly discussed. 
The full and determined implementation of the proposed reforms should strengthen the 
economies of the candidate countries and support deeper integration with the EU.  
1.3 COUNTRY-SPECIFIC SUMMARY 
Croatia's PEP presents a comprehensive, albeit optimistic, medium-term macroeconomic 
scenario projecting a gradual recovery from the recession that hit the economy in the 
previous years. Output growth is set to increase gradually from 0.8% in 2012 to 2.5% by 
2014 mainly on the back of domestic demand. The programme projects inflation to 
remain stable at around 2.4% and a small current account surplus. The analysis of 
external sustainability and of competitiveness is limited. The budgetary strategy remains 
oriented towards fiscal consolidation which the PEP expects to achieve through an 
expenditure-led reduction in the deficit, slowing the upward trend of general government 
debt in the process. The fiscal framework is consistent with the macroeconomic scenario, 
but there are significant risks surrounding the achievement of the deficit targets notably 
related to lower-than-anticipated economic growth, implementation risks of the 
expenditure-reducing measures which the PEP fails to identify and explain, and the 
financing costs for the public debt. The structural obstacles to growth are not identified 
and analysed in the programme. The presentation of structural reforms is mainly 
backward-looking. While the PEP contains estimates of the budgetary cost of some 
measures, it fails to establish a clear link between the structural reform agenda and the 
implementation of the fiscal strategy. 
Iceland's PEP presents a broadly plausible growth scenario anticipating a modest 
recovery primarily driven by private consumption, investment and exports. Inflation is 
expected to peak in 2012 and ease thereafter to reach the inflation target of 2.5% by 
2014, although risks are high over the medium-term. The current account, adjusted for 
the net factor income of banks in winding-up proceedings, is expected to turn into a 
surplus and stay positive over the programme period. The programme does not provide 
an analysis of the current account sustainability and of competitiveness. The fiscal 
framework presented in the programme projects a continuation of budgetary 
consolidation which is set to lead to a balanced budget in 2013 and a surplus in 2014. 
The expenditure-led fiscal adjustment is ambitious and front-loaded. However, while the 
consolidation seems to be expenditure-led, as the spending to GDP ratio is planned to fall 
markedly, this adjustment pattern is not sufficiently reflected by the choice of underlying 
fiscal measures, which are mostly on the revenue side. Moreover, the proposed 
consolidation path counts very much on temporary non-tax revenues and some measures 
remain unspecified or have not been legislated. The credibility of the fiscal programme 
could be strengthened by providing more information about the policies supporting the 
medium-term budgetary framework. The programme identifies the still precarious 
financial sector situation and high household and corporate indebtedness as the major 
obstacles to a sustainable recovery. Although the PEP addresses a broad range of 
structural challenges, the level of detail in presenting key policy measures is insufficient 
and could be improved. Moreover, the link between the structural reform priorities and 
the realisation of the fiscal targets is not sufficiently clear. 
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The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia programme's main objective is to improve 
the country's competitiveness by a broad range of measures. The PEP's optimistic 
macroeconomic scenario is presented in the form of annual ranges which project 
economic growth to rise from 3-4% in 2012 to 4-4.7% by 2014 led primarily by private 
consumption and investment. Inflation is foreseen to remain benign, while strong 
employment growth will lead to a lower jobless rate. The programme fails to provide an 
analysis of the current account and of competitiveness issues. The fiscal deficit is 
projected to reach up to 2.5% of GDP over the programme period which, although 
feasible, is based on optimistic assumptions on output and revenue growth assumptions. 
Tax rates are planned to remain unchanged while a reduction in social contributions is 
expected to reduce the tax wedge. Current spending, with the notable exception of 
subsidies to agriculture, is assumed to decline markedly while capital outlays are set to 
rise as a share of GDP. The PEP does not explicitly elaborate on structural bottlenecks to 
growth while most of the reforms presented are rather backward looking. The 
programme would have benefited from a clearer link between the identified obstacles and 
policy measures and by spelling out in more detail the reform measures and intended 
targets.  
Montenegro's baseline macroeconomic framework foresees a weakening of economic 
growth in 2012 (2%) and a sustained acceleration over the programme horizon. However, 
in light of the uncertain global economic situation the likelihood of the low-growth 
alternative scenario presented in the programme has increased significantly. Following 
the significant decline in the current account deficit in 2011, the PEP anticipates a 
moderate improvement of external imbalances over the medium term. The programme 
does not analyse the sustainability of the external sector and of competitiveness issues. 
The fiscal strategy aims at achieving a balanced budget in 2013 and a surplus in 2014, 
through a front-loaded reduction in the expenditure ratio. The deteriorating external 
environment, increasing liabilities from state guarantees and tax arrears suggest that 
achieving these budget targets may be unrealistic. The programme fails to identify and 
analyse the structural obstacles to growth. It covers a broad range of structural reform 
areas, focusing on further development of reforms already engaged. 
Serbia's programme presents an optimistic macroeconomic scenario, especially for 2012, 
when GDP growth is projected to reach 1.5% and accelerate to 4% by 2014. The current 
account deficit is expected to widen further while inflation is set to fall sharply to some 
4% in 2012 and fluctuate around that level in the outer years. The programme does not 
provide a forward-looking assessment of the external account sustainability and of 
competitiveness and would have benefited from presenting an alternative macroeconomic 
scenario. The fiscal deficit is projected to decline gradually in the medium term and reach 
3% by 2014. The budgetary consolidation is planned to be achieved by restraining 
current expenditure, specifically pension and payroll spending as well as government 
consumption, as a share of GDP. The plausibility of the targets is constrained by the 
outdated macroeconomic scenario. The programme would have benefited from a more 
thorough analysis of bottlenecks to economic growth and from a better elaboration of the 
structural strategy. Roadmaps and timetables for the implementation of key reform 
measures, as well as assessments of their budgetary impact, are largely missing. 
The Turkish PEP presents a comprehensive and broadly consistent medium-term 
macroeconomic framework. Real GDP growth is expected to slow to 4% in 2012 down 
from 7.5% last year before accelerating to around potential of 5% in the outer years 
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driven mainly by investment and to a lesser extent private consumption. The programme 
projects an improved current account deficit and easing inflationary pressures in the 
medium-term, which appear rather optimistic. The analysis of external sustainability and 
of competitiveness is limited. The fiscal strategy is characterised by a continued gradual 
reduction of the budget deficit, although the PEP does not elaborate on the underlying 
measures that would support the consolidation. The programme fails to identify and 
analyse the structural obstacles to growth. The structural reforms appear to be appropriate 
as they aim at enhancing the competitiveness of key economic sectors. Nevertheless, 
concrete implementation measures and timetables remain vague and their budgetary 
impact is not always elaborated. 
This exercise of submitting, assessing and discussing annual PEPs will continue to 
support the countries in preparing for accession. A further integration of pre-accession 
economic and fiscal surveillance with other instruments of pre-accession economic 
policy formulation, in particular the economic chapters of the Progress Reports and 
Accession Partnerships and the bilateral economic dialogues with the countries, can 
enhance the EU's effectiveness in this respect. 
1.4 THE PEPS AND PRE-ACCESSION STRATEGY  
The ECOFIN Council of 26-27 November 2000 requested the Commission to invite 
candidate countries to submit an annual PEP and an annual fiscal notification.  This 
initiative resulted in the so-called Pre-Accession Fiscal Surveillance Procedure, which 
aims at preparing countries for the participation in the multilateral surveillance and 
economic policy co-ordination procedures currently in place in the EU as part of the 
EMU. The PEPs are part of this procedure. Since 2001, acceding and candidate countries 
have submitted such annual medium-term PEPs, comprising notably of a macro-
economic scenario, a fiscal framework and a structural reform agenda.   
The assessment of these programmes complements the policy messages given by the 
Commission in its annual Enlargement Package. While the economic chapters of the 
latter assess only past developments in the countries, the assessments of the PEPs are 
forward looking. They analyse government medium-term plans, crucial for eventual full 
compliance with the Copenhagen economic criteria for accession.  
The PEPs are important platforms for the authorities to develop and communicate 
consistent economic, fiscal and structural policies over the medium term. Their 
preparation serves a twofold purpose: to strengthen economic planning capacity in the 
countries as such and to specifically prepare them for participation in the economic 
policy co-ordination and budgetary surveillance mechanisms of Economic and Monetary 
Union. The development of the institutional capacity to co-ordinate between the various 
ministries, government agencies and the central bank is a particularly important aspect 
ensuring the success of the Pre-Accession Fiscal Surveillance Procedure. The PEPs and 
their assessments are therefore discussed in a multilateral policy framework with 
Member States and candidate countries, ending with the annual policy dialogue of the 
ECOFIN Council with candidate countries.  
The experience with the PEPs has shown that the positive results in terms of building up 
administrative and policy planning capacity and of designing conducive and consistent 
policies are powerful, but that they take time to accumulate and to materialise. 
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The programmes lay out policy strategies which are to a large degree compatible with 
and conducive to the economic priorities of the Accession Partnerships and, more widely, 
to the general objective of meeting the Copenhagen economic criteria for accession, i.e. 
establishing a functioning market economy and raising competitiveness to a level which 
would allow the countries to meet competitive pressure within the European Union.3  
However, the programmes would have benefited from clearer and more convincing 
information on the specific implementation of these objectives. Technical assistance to 
candidate countries in the area of economic policy planning and implementation has 
proven powerful and should be continued. 
1.5 FOLLOW-UP  
The programmes and their assessments by the Commission services will be discussed 
within multilateral policy dialogues between Member States and candidate countries. A 
special meeting of the Alternates of the Economic and Financial Committee with 
representatives of candidate countries will take place on 27 April 2012 to discuss and 
assess the individual programmes. On 4 May, a High-level meeting between the EFC and 
representatives of the candidate countries will be held and the draft conclusions prepared 
at the Alternates level will be endorsed. The Ministerial Meeting between the ECOFIN 
and their counterparts from the candidate countries is scheduled for 15 May 2012 and 
intends to adopt and publish the conclusions on the programmes of the Candidate 
Countries.  
This annual exercise will be repeated again next year when countries will be invited to 
submit a programme covering the period 2013-2015.  
                                                   
3 So far, the Commission considers Croatia, Iceland and Turkey to have achieved the status of a 
functioning market economy, while the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is seen to be well 
advanced as regards meeting the economic criteria and to have continued to move closer towards 
becoming a functioning market economy. Montenegro has made further progress towards a functioning 
market economy as a result of progress in stabilising the banking sector and maintaining a relatively 
prudent fiscal stance. Similarly, Serbia has taken important steps towards establishing a functioning 
market economy and achieved a certain degree of macroeconomic stability, although further efforts will 
be necessary for restructuring the economy. 
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2 CROATIA 
2.1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
Croatia's eight Pre-Accession Economic Programme (“PEP 2012-2014”) presents a 
comprehensive, though optimistic, medium-term macroeconomic and fiscal framework 
based on the projection of a gradual recovery from recession and stagnation in the 
preceding years. The programme’s fundamental objective is to establish a knowledge-
based, export-oriented and competitive economy in which output and employment 
expand and social cohesion is maintained. The document largely complies with the 
formal requirements and appears consistent with the 2012 state budget which was 
adopted on 24 February 2012.   
Macroeconomic performance in 2011 was characterised by a stabilisation of the output 
level following the contraction in 2008-2010. Real GDP still declined in the first quarter, 
then started to expand in the second and third quarters, before contracting again in the 
final quarter. Annual GDP is estimated to have stagnated (-0.0%) in real terms compared 
to 2012. However, employment continued to fall, pushing up the unemployment rate by 
1.7 percentage points. Consumer price inflation rose to an annual average of 2.3% mainly 
as the result of higher commodity prices, particularly in the food segment. The current 
account deficit remained unchanged compared to the preceding year at 1% of GDP. 
Gross external debt, a major challenge for macroeconomic policies, also remained stable 
at just above 100% of GDP over the course of the year. The fiscal deficit of general 
government had been planned to be 5.6% of GDP and, according to preliminary 
information from the Ministry of Finance, this budgetary target has been broadly met. 
Looking forward, the PEP projects a macroeconomic scenario for 2012-2014 with 
moderate output growth and relatively low inflation. Real GDP is seen to accelerate 
gradually from 0.8% growth in 2012 to 2.5% in 2014. In view of this relatively optimistic 
projection, the programme would have benefited from a broader assessment of risks 
associated with a lower growth profile. The unemployment rate is projected to rise to 
14% in 2012 and only starts to recede from this level in 2014. Consumer price inflation is 
expected to remain relatively stable at around 2.4%. A small current account surplus is 
projected until the end of the projection period in spite of the resumption of growth. 
External debt is projected to decline gradually to around 95% of GDP by 2014. It would 
have been appropriate to include a sustainability analysis for the external debt in view of 
its very high level and the risk that the projected current account surpluses will not 
materialise. Similarly, the programme could usefully have included a presentation of 
Croatia's price and cost competitiveness including an account of the development of 
export market shares. Overall, the macroeconomic scenario is optimistic regarding output 
growth in the near term and the current account development.  
The "PEP 2012-2014", which reflects the 2012 state budget as adopted in February 2012, 
plans a significant expenditure-led consolidation of general government finances over the 
programme period. The adjustment is frontloaded in 2012 when the share of total 
expenditures in GDP is planned to be reduced by 1.9 percentage points and net 
borrowing by 1.7 percentage points to 3.8% of GDP.  Subsequently, the fiscal deficit is 
projected to fall more moderately to 3.3% of GDP in 2013 and 2.6% in 2014. Realising 
these deficit targets will face considerable hurdles and require a determined and sustained 
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effort to rein in expenditures through the swift adoption of appropriate cost saving 
measures. It will be highly challenging to implement the envisaged cuts in the public 
wage bill, health care costs and subsidies, particularly already in the current fiscal year. 
Furthermore, meeting the fiscal deficit targets requires a return to at least moderate GDP 
growth. The projected fiscal outcomes would have been more convincing, if the 
supporting measures had been made more explicit. The PEP provides a sensitivity 
analysis which indicates the budgetary consequences of alternative scenarios where 
growth disappoints and no further consolidation efforts are made. However, if the 
baseline scenario was realised, Croatia would comply with its Fiscal Responsibility Law 
and move closer to achieving medium-term fiscal sustainability.  
Structural obstacles to growth are not appropriately identified, but only alluded to 
indirectly in the PEP. The programme covers a range of structural reform areas, 
particularly product and labour markets, various industry and utility sectors, finance, 
agriculture, public administration, education, health care, social security, the judiciary 
and environmental protection. The presentation is often backward looking, providing 
information on past and on-going reform measures and initiatives with a strong emphasis 
on legislative action and EU harmonisation. The programme does not fully and 
consistently establish a clear link between the core objectives and the instruments and 
measures described. To serve as useful guidance for a structural reform agenda, the 
programme would benefit from the definition of clear objectives, specific measures and 
concrete time frames for implementation. More emphasis should have been given to 
measures urgently needed to improve the business environment in view of the significant 
regulatory and administrative obstacles still in place. The programme contains fiscal 
estimates on some measures, but the link between the structural reform agenda and the 
implementation of the fiscal strategy is generally weak. Intensified efforts to speed up the 
implementation of reforms, in particular in the areas of enterprise restructuring, education 
and labour markets would help to increase the economy's growth potential and 
international competitiveness over the medium and longer term.  
There are significant risks associated with various parameters of the PEP. The 
macroeconomic scenario is considerably more optimistic regarding GDP growth than the 
current consensus which expects a contraction in 2012. The downside risks to the PEP's 
growth projection are accentuated by the recent deterioration in the outlook for major 
export markets and the current oil price level. There is separate risk that the current 
account deficit may widen substantially if growth should develop as projected in the 
PEP. The fiscal scenario is, apart from disappointing growth, associated with a risk from 
a failure to take the concrete measures required to cut or restrain expenditure in line with 
projections and with a risk that the financing of the public debt will be more costly than 
projected. Regarding structural reforms, there is a general risk that the slow pace of the 
reform process in recent years will continue. This would undermine both fiscal 
consolidation and macroeconomic performance. 
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2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Real GDP growth (% change) COM -1.2 0.6 0.8 1.2 n.a.
PEP 2012 -1.2 0.4 0.8 1.5 2.5
Consumer price inflation (%) COM 1.1 2.1 1.5 1.7 n.a.
PEP 2012 1.1 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.4
General government balance (% of GDP) COM -4.9 -5.5 -5.4 -5.2 n.a.
PEP 2012 -4.9 -5.6 -3.8 -3.3 -2.6
Primary balance (% of GDP) COM -2.9 -3.3 -2.2 -1.5 n.a.
PEP 2012 -2.9 -3.4 -1.5 -1.3 -0.8
Government gross debt (% of GDP) COM 41.2 45.8 50.0 53.8 n.a.
PEP 2012 41.3 44.9 47.2 48.9 49.4
Sources: Pre-Accession Economic Programme (PEP) 2012, Commission autumn 2011 forecast (COM)
Comparison of key macroeconomic and budgetary projections
 
2.2 INTRODUCTION 
Croatia submitted its eight Pre-Accession Economic Programme on 1 March 2012. The 
programme covers the period 2012-2014. It was prepared in conjunction with the state 
budget for 2012 and the budget projections for the two following years. Due to the 
parliamentary elections in December 2011 the budget was first adopted on 24 February 
2012. 
2.3 KEY CHALLENGES 
The key challenge for Croatia's economic policy is to provide the conditions for 
sustainable growth while preserving macroeconomic stability. This requires a 
strengthening of the economy's international competitiveness through internal structural 
reforms as macroeconomic policy is heavily constrained by the large external debt and 
the need for fiscal consolidation. The process of fiscal consolidation requires significant 
expenditure reforms with a view to restructure current spending towards a more growth-
oriented and sustainable pattern. The stagnation of economic activity over the past two 
years is a clear indication of structural weaknesses which need to be tackled urgently. 
The required measures are, in particular, the swift and effective implementation of 
growth-enhancing reforms in areas such as privatisation and corporate sector 
restructuring, labour market, business environment, social security, education, and public 
administration. 
As pointed out in the Commission's most recent Progress Report on Croatia's accession 
process which refers to the period from October 2010 to September 2011, the speed of 
structural reforms remained slow, not least with respect to privatisation and the 
restructuring of loss-making enterprises. The investment climate continued to suffer from 
a heavy regulatory burden and numerous non-tax fees. Planned reforms of the highly 
rigid labour market were narrowly circumscribed and the already low employment and 
participation rates declined further. Social transfer payments, which represent a relatively 
high share of public budgets, remained not well-targeted. Considering the need to 
achieve medium-term fiscal sustainability, the budgetary process could be improved 
further. Enhancing the efficiency of public spending remains a key challenge. 
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2.4 RECENT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS AND MEDIUM-TERM SCENARIO 
2.4.1 Recent macroeconomic developments 
The PEP covers recent macroeconomic developments appropriately taking into account 
that the complete GDP estimates for 2011 were released after the submission date. 
Following the sharp contraction of Croatia's output during the global economic and 
financial crisis in 2008/09, the output decline levelled off in 2010. Over the three-year 
period between the first quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2011 the level of real 
GDP shrank close to 10%. GDP expanded slightly in the second and third quarter of 
2011, but started to recede again in the fourth quarter like in many EU Member States. 
Croatia's annual average growth in 2011 turned out to be zero, i.e. far below the 
projection in last year's PEP (1.5%). An analysis of GDP components reveals that final 
domestic demand continued to contract in 2011, particularly due to a further drop in 
investment activity (-7.2%). Private consumption was slightly positive (+0.2%), but this 
was partly offset by lower public consumption (-0.2%). The level of real GDP was held 
up by inventory accumulation which contributed 1.1 percentage points to growth. Net 
exports added 0.4 percentage points to GDP growth as exports of goods and services 
expanded faster (+2.2%) than imports (+1.0%).  
The current account deficit corresponded to 1.0% of GDP in 2011 which is unchanged 
from the preceding year.4 The sharp adjustment from current account deficits of 8.9% of 
GDP in 2008 and 5.0% in 2009 is exclusively the result of declining domestic demand 
(expenditure reduction) and does not reflect an improvement of international 
competitiveness.  
Inflows of foreign direct investments in 2011 remained far below the pre-recession level. 
Nevertheless, net FDI was higher than in 2010 helped by retained earnings by already 
established foreign companies. The labour market continued to weaken in 2011 as 
declining employment pushed up the unemployment rate to an annual average of 13.5%. 
Although underlying inflationary pressures remained low, annual consumer price 
inflation rose to 2.3% as a consequence of higher commodity prices, particularly in the 
food segment. 
 
                                                   
4  This is based on the official current account data in euro. The current account deficit expressed in the 
domestic currency was 0.8% of GDP both in 2010 and in 2011. 
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COM PEP COM PEP COM PEP COM PEP COM PEP
Real GDP (% change) -1.2 -1.2 0.6 0.4 0.8 0.8 1.2 1.5 n.a. 2.5
Contributions:
- Final domestic demand -3.4 -3.4 -1.1 -1.4 0.0 0.8 1.6 0.7 n.a. 1.6
- Change in inventories -0.4 -0.4 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 n.a. 0.1
- External balance of goods and services 2.6 2.6 1.4 1.4 0.6 -0.1 -0.5 0.7 n.a. 0.7
Employment (% change) -4.0 -4.0 -4.0 -3.1 -0.1 -1.3 0.6 0.1 n.a. 0.8
Unemployment rate (%) 11.8 11.8 13.6 13.3 13.2 14.0 12.4 14.0 n.a. 13.4
GDP deflator (% change) 1.0 1.0 1.7 2.3 1.9 1.3 1.8 2.2 n.a. 2.4
CPI inflation (%) 1.1 1.1 2.1 2.3 1.5 2.4 1.7 2.5 n.a. 2.4
Current account balance (% of GDP) -1.2 -1.2 -1.2 0.2 -0.6 0.0 -1.4 0.5 n.a. 1.1
Sources: Pre-Accession Economic Programme (PEP) 2012, Commission autumn 2011 forecast (COM)
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Comparison of macroeconomic developments and forecasts
 
2.4.2 Medium-term macroeconomic scenario 
The PEP 2012-2014 presents a comprehensive medium-term macroeconomic scenario 
with projections for key economic variables, covering GDP and its demand components, 
employment and wages, inflation as well as balance of payments developments. 
Like in the previous PEP, the projected path of GDP growth is upward-sloping, reaching 
2.5% in the last programme year. But, following disappointing GDP performance in 
2011, the growth rates in the first two programme years (2012 and 2013) have been 
lowered. Nevertheless, the 0.8% growth rate projected for 2012 seems unrealistic and an 
outlier compared to practically all other comparable forecasts. While this projection is in 
line with the Commission's autumn 2011 forecast, it does not seem to take into account 
the renewed weakening of Croatia's growth performance since then, in the last quarter of 
2011 and in early 2012. By pointing to a number of substantial downside risks to its 
growth forecast, but not to any upside risks, the PEP seems to admit implicitly that the 
2012 growth forecast is unlikely to be achieved.  
The external assumptions of the PEP 2012-14 have changed compared to previous years' 
programme in a direction unfavourable to Croatia's economy. EU and global GDP 
growth have been lowered significantly and the oil price has been increased. Projections 
for world trade are not provided any more. 
Real sector 
The PEP projects that the Croatian economy will revert to positive annual growth rates in 
the programme period following the contraction in 2009-2010. Real GDP is set to 
accelerate moderately from 0.8% growth in 2012 to 1.5% in 2013 and 2.5% in 2014. In 
2012, the resumption of growth will be driven by a strong surge in investments by public 
enterprises. Investments by the private sector and by general government are not 
expected to contribute significantly to the 7.4% rise in overall fixed capital formation. 
Change in inventories is expected to contribute with 0.1 percentage point to overall GDP 
growth in 2012. Private consumption is expected to recede by 0.3% reflecting a decline 
in household real disposable income which, in turn, is seen as the result of declining 
employment and fiscal consolidation. Net exports are projected to detract 0.1 percentage 
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points from GDP growth as imports increase slightly more than exports. In 2013 and 
2014, exports are expected to pick up and outpace a relatively small increase of imports. 
The contribution of net exports to GDP growth is projected to be 0.7 percentage point in 
both years. Consumer spending is also projected to return to growth as the labour market 
stabilises in 2013 and sees a declining unemployment rate in 2014. Overall investment 
growth is expected to moderate compared to 2012. The PEP stresses that this projection 
requires (1) an imminent stabilisation of international macroeconomic conditions, (2) a 
quick implementation and effects of planned structural reforms, and (3) improving 
economic sentiments. 
There are significant downside risks associated with the PEP's growth projection for 
2012, not least because some of Croatia's main export markets are in mild recession and 
because investment by public companies are considered as practically the sole source of 
growth. Most forecasts from various institutions have turned notably more pessimistic 
regarding Croatia's growth outlook since last autumn. In December 2011, Croatia's 
central bank had already projected a small contraction. In February, the IMF projected a 
decline of about 1% and the average of private bank forecasts was even more negative. 
The economic data released in the first quarter of 2012 confirm such projections and 
suggest that Croatia is falling back into recession. After two quarters with mild growth, 
GDP declined by 0.4% year-on-year in 2011 Q4. In seasonally adjusted quarter-on-
quarter terms this can be estimated to correspond to a decline of 1.3%. A renewed 
downward trend in industrial production has been extended into 2012 with the volume of 
industrial production being 5.0% lower year-on-year in January-February. Certainly, 
retail sales were relatively strong in January and February, but they are likely to have 
been distorted by the announcement of a VAT-increase which came into force at the 
beginning of March. Employment has trended down in recent months and the rate of 
registered unemployment increased to 20.1 % in February, 0.5 percentage point higher 
year-on-year. These data suggest that the economy continues to contract in early 2012. 
There is no evidence yet of increased investment by public companies and considering 
the long lead time for investments by public companies in sectors like railways and 
energy it is doubtful that such investments will be reflected in macroeconomic data for 
2012. There are also financing risks related to large-scale investments by public 
companies as regards credit availability and a relatively high level of interest rates. In the 
absence of other growth drivers it seems therefore very likely that the GDP forecast for 
the current year will have to be revised down significantly. To the extent that the recent 
data softness indicates underlying weakness of competitiveness, the PEP's growth 
forecast for the following two years may also be too optimistic. 
Inflation 
Annual average consumer price inflation increased from 1.1% in 2010 to 2.3% in 2011, 
mainly as a result of higher international prices for energy and food commodities and 
their pass-through to related domestic prices. The kuna's small depreciation (2.1% in 
nominal effective terms, annual averages) contributed also to the rise in the price level. 
Due to the large slack in resource utilisation, not least in the labour market, underlying 
inflationary pressures were practically absent on the domestic side. This was reflected in 
a slightly declining price level for services which are less affected by import prices than 
goods. Croatia's monetary and exchange rate regime continued to provide a stable anchor 
for the inflation performance. 
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The PEP expects annual average inflation to remain essentially stable in the programme 
period, just 0.1–0.2 percentage points above last year's level of 2.3%. This forecast 
appears plausible and consistent with the projections for growth and employment. It 
takes into account the various domestic and external forces influencing the price level 
including the already enacted changes to the VAT rates. The risks to the forecast are 
appropriately identified. On the downside, it is weaker-than-expected domestic demand, 
particularly from private consumption. On the upside, it is mainly a new commodity 
price shock, higher-than-expected increases of administrative prices, and a stronger 
depreciation of the domestic currency than assumed. 
Monetary and exchange rate policy 
Like the previous programmes, the current PEP regards exchange rate stability as the 
precondition for overall macroeconomic stability in Croatia. Monetary policy aims to 
maintain a stable kuna/euro exchange rate as the main nominal anchor for preserving 
price stability. The programme's basic assumption is that that the present policy 
framework of a tightly managed float and price stability as core objective remains in 
place. 
In the recent past, monetary policy has continued to sustain a high level of liquidity in the 
domestic banking system to encourage lending to the non-financial sector. This goal was, 
however, subordinated to the need of maintaining exchange rate stability. In the context 
of some downward pressure against the kuna in the foreign exchange market, the central 
bank stabilised the kuna-euro rate by selling a total amount of €877.4 million against 
kuna on five occasions between July 2011 and February 2012. The central bank also 
withdrew kuna liquidity from the financial system by raising the reserve requirement rate 
for banks by 1 percentage point in October and again in January, thereby easing the 
depreciation pressure against the kuna further. The PEP projects that the kuna-euro rate 
will remain stable throughout the programme period at a level only marginally higher 
than the 2011 average rate of 7.43 kuna per euro. 
External sector 
The current account deficit had declined sharply to 1.0% of GDP in 2010 in the context 
of depressed economic activity and it remained at this level in 2011. Like in the 
preceding year, the trade performance in 2011 clearly demonstrated Croatia's declining 
international competitiveness. Market share was lost as exports of goods and services 
increased by 2.2% in volume terms while the export market (defined as the weighted 
average of trade partners' import volumes) increased by 5.4% according to the 
Commission's trade database. Imports of goods and services in volume terms increased 
by 1.0% although domestic demand contracted by 0.6%. 
The PEP projects a small current account surplus in 2012 gradually widening to 1.1% of 
GDP in 2014. This projection is based on a foreign trade profile in which exports are 
growing faster than imports in 2013-2014. Based on the pattern of trade performance in 
the recent past, such a scenario appears implausible because imports can be expected to 
grow stronger than exports if, as projected, the economy returns to growth – an argument 
that was still the basis for the current account projection in last year's PEP.  Foreign 
direct investment remained at a low level in 2011 although retained earnings by 
established foreign companies helped to lift the statistical figure for net FDI inflows to 
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2.2% of GDP. For the programme years it is expected that FDI will remain at a low level 
averaging 1.4% of GDP. The PEP states clearly and appropriately that "more intense 
growth in investments will be conditional on the elimination of a range of obstacles that 
are currently present on the domestic market". Consistent with the current account 
projection, external debt is forecast to decline from approximately 100% of GDP in 2012 
to around 95% of GDP in 2014. The PEP does not provide an overall assessment of the 
medium-term sustainability of Croatia's external debt. This is particularly regrettable in 
view of the very high level of external debt and the risk that the current account may 
deteriorate again in connection with an economic recovery. 
Financial sector 
The PEP provides information on institutional developments in the financial sector under 
"structural reforms", but it does not provide quantitative and qualitative information on 
financial intermediation, domestic credit developments and the stability of the financial 
system. But, as reported in the central bank's most recent publication on financial 
stability, the financial sector has remained stable over the past year. Bank lending to the 
private sector increased very slowly and was practically stagnant for the household sector 
when adjusted for exchange rate changes. The capital adequacy ratio of the banking 
sector stood at a relatively high level of 19.4% at the end of September 2011. However, 
the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans continued its upward trend albeit at a 
slower rate than in the preceding two years. It registered 12.4% at the end of 2011 
compared to 11.2% at the end of 2010. The deterioration in the quality of bank loans is 
most pronounced for corporate loans. 
Main risks to the macroeconomic scenario 
The macroeconomic scenario is considerably more optimistic regarding GDP growth 
than the current consensus which expects a contraction in 2012. The downside risks to 
the PEP's growth projection are accentuated by the recent deterioration in the outlook for 
major export markets, the current oil price level, and the uncertainties surrounding large-
scale investments by public companies. Regarding the current account, the main risk is 
that the deficit recorded in 2011 will widen substantially if growth should develop as 
projected in the PEP. Regarding the projection of continued low inflation, the risks seem 
to be relatively moderate and balanced between upside and downside. 
2.5 PUBLIC FINANCE 
The consolidation of public finances remains a stated objective of fiscal policy in the 
PEP 2012-2014. The programme stresses the need to achieve sustainability of public 
finances by reducing the fiscal deficit and reversing the rising trend of the public debt 
ratio. For this purpose it underlines the importance of implementing the Fiscal 
Responsibility Law. This means, among other things, that total expenditures of general 
government as a share of GDP will have to be reduced by a minimum of 1 percentage 
point each year until the primary balance has been brought back into balance. This 
particular fiscal rule applies for the first time for the current fiscal year. In 2011, nominal 
expenditures were kept at the same level as in the preceding year and the state budget 
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was executed in such a way that the 5.6% of GDP deficit target for general government 
was met.5  
Looking forward, net borrowing by general government is projected to decline gradually. 
The largest decline should already happen in the current year for which a deficit 
corresponding to 3.8% of GDP in 2012 is projected. Subsequently, the deficit is expected 
to narrow more modestly to 3.3% in 2013 and to 2.6% in 2014. The fiscal consolidation 
is planned to be achieved by reducing total expenditures by 4.2 percentage points of GDP 
over three years to 37.2% of GDP in 2014. Total revenues as a share of GDP are 
projected to decline modestly by 1.2 percentage points to 34.6% in 2014. In this scenario, 
public debt will rise by a total of 4.5 percentage points over three years and reach 49.4% 
of GDP in 2014. 
This fiscal strategy appears reasonably ambitious. There are, however, considerable risks 
that it will not be achieved. One reason is, as mentioned above, that the economic growth 
forecast on which, in particular, projected tax revenues depend is optimistic, at least for 
2012. Another reason is that most of the budgeted expenditure reduction still needs to be 
specified and implemented, a process which is likely to meet significant legal, 
administrative and political hurdles. Furthermore, there is a risk that the financing of the 
public debt will be more costly than projected. 
2.5.1 Budget implementation in 2011 
The PEP provides only sparse information on how the underlying patterns of revenues 
and expenditures have developed in 2011. But it is provisionally estimated that net 
borrowing by general government increased from 4.9% of GDP in 2010 to 5.6% in 2011. 
This means that the 2011 fiscal deficit is equal to the planned deficit as presented in last 
year's programme. Unlike in preceding fiscal years, a budget revision was not needed in 
the course of 2011 which, of course, was facilitated by the relatively large increase of the 
budgeted deficit. According to the provisional figures provided in the PEP, both total 
revenues and total expenditures, expressed in nominal terms, have been realised as 
planned in the PEP 2011-2013.6 Concerning the central government alone, the PEP-data 
indicate that 2011 expenditures remained at the previous year’s level in nominal terms. 
This means, that the decision issued by the Croatian parliament in August 2010 has been 
implemented, viz. to keep expenditures in 2011 within the limit of expenditures in 2010. 
Overall, the budget execution in 2011 has been improved compared to previous years. 
 
                                                   
5  According to a more recent provisional estimate from the Ministry of Finance, the fiscal deficit of 
general government corresponded to 5.0% of GDP in 2011. 
6  Expressed as a share of GDP, revenues and expenditures are both 0.5 percentage points lower than 
originally planned. But this arises only from a changed 2011-level for nominal GDP which has been put 
1.2% higher in this year’s PEP compared to last year’s PEP. 
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Change:
2011-14
Revenues 37.0 35.8 35.7 35.1 34.6 -1.2
- Taxes and social security contributions 33.1 31.8 31.8 31.0 30.5 -1.3
    - Other (residual) 3.9 4.0 3.9 4.1 4.1 0.1
Expenditure 41.9 41.4 39.5 38.4 37.2 -4.2
- Primary expenditure 39.9 39.2 37.2 36.4 35.4 -3.8
of which:
Gross fixed capital formation 1.3 1.9 1.6 1.6 1.5 -0.4
Consumption
Transfers & subsidies 23.2 22.0 21.0 20.4 19.6 -2.4
Other (residual) 15.4 15.3 14.6 14.4 14.3 -1.0
- Interest payments 2.0 2.2 2.3 2.0 1.8 -0.4
Budget balance -4.9 -5.6 -3.8 -3.3 -2.6 3.0
- Cyclically adjusted -4.5 -5.5 -3.7 -3.2 -2.6 2.9
Primary balance -2.9 -3.4 -1.5 -1.3 -0.8 2.6
Gross debt level 41.3 44.9 47.2 48.9 49.4 4.5
Sources: Pre-Accession Economic Programme (PEP) 2012, Consumption is part of 'other (residual).
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Composition of the budgetary adjustment  (%  of GDP)
 
 
2.5.2 Near-term and medium-term budget strategy  
Croatia’s state budget for 2012, including the budget projections for the two following 
years, was adopted on 24 February 2012. It provides the main elements for the fiscal 
scenario in the PEP 2012-2014. The budgetary figures in the PEP are, however, adjusted 
to comply with the requirement to present budget performance and strategy in terms of 
general government. For 2012, the authorities envisage the fiscal deficit of general 
government to decline to 3.8% of GDP from 5.6% in 2011. Total revenues are projected 
to increase 1.8% although their share of GDP would decline by 0.1 percentage point to 
35.7% as nominal GDP is projected to increase by 2.0%. Total expenditures are projected 
to decrease 2.6% and their share of GDP would decline by 1.9 percentage points to 
39.5%. Based on these figures, the fiscal rule in the Fiscal Responsibility Law would be 
met in 2012 since it requires that total expenditures as a share of GDP are reduced by a 
minimum of 1 percentage point. 
The revenue projection has taken into account the significant changes in the tax 
legislation which were enacted in February 2012. The general VAT rate has been 
increased by 2 percentage points to 25% and a reduced rate of 10% has been introduced 
on a selected range of products and services as of 1 March. The overall VAT reform is 
estimated to increase revenues by 0.9% on annual basis. A reduction in employers' 
contribution to the compulsory health insurance from 15% to 13% as of 1 May 2012 is 
estimated to lower revenues by 0.7% of GDP on an annual basis. Various changes to the 
income tax regime are expected to be broadly revenue-neutral. Modifications in the profit 
tax regime are estimated to increase revenues by close to 0.1% of GDP on an annual 
basis. A relatively costly tax relief for reinvested profits will first be introduced in 2013. 
Overall, the realisation of the budgeted revenue growth in 2012 depends primarily on 
whether the projected GDP growth will materialise. If, contrary to the projection, annual 
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GDP would contract, revenues will undershoot their target in the absence of correcting 
measures.  
On the expenditure side, social transfers are projected to be cut by 2.0% in 2012. Since 
pension payments will rise as a result of the decision to re-activate their adjustment to 
inflation and gross salaries, spending on the other components of social transfers 
(particularly health care) will have to be reduced sharply. The realisation of such cuts 
already in the current fiscal year will be challenging and depends critically on the swift 
adoption of appropriate cost saving measures. Likewise, it remains to be seen whether 
the programmed 4.8% reduction of the public wage bill can be achieved by reducing 
expenditures relating to special salary supplements, part-time work, overtime work, and 
special working conditions. Subsidies to agriculture and the railways are projected to be 
cut substantially which is likely to face legal and political challenges. The budgeted 
interest expenditure on the public debt may have been underestimated as it implies a 
declining average interest rate on this debt. Therefore, meeting the expenditure targets in 
2012 will be very difficult and require substantial fiscal discipline considering the 
"stickiness" of much public spending.  
Overall, fiscal revenues seem to have been projected in line with recent policy measures 
and the underlying macroeconomic scenario. On the expenditure side, the budget projects 
considerable restraint and it may prove challenging to keep expenditures within the 
budgetary limits. The balance of risks is clearly tilted towards a significantly higher 
deficit not least because recent economic data suggest that the underlying growth forecast 
is too optimistic. As an apparent foreboding of these difficulties, the government has 
announced that there will be a budget revision in the summer, following an assessment of 
budget performance in the first half of the year. 
Beyond the current year, total revenues are projected to rise 1.9% in 2013 and 3.4% in 
2014 in nominal terms. This reflects the expected rise in nominal GDP (3.7% and 4.9%, 
respectively, for the two years), changes in revenues related to EU accession in mid-
2013, and the aforementioned changes in the tax regime adopted in February 2012. As a 
share of GDP, total revenues decline by 1.2 percentage points over three years. On the 
expenditure side, restraint is projected to continue beyond the current year with total 
expenditures, in nominal terms, increasing by 1.1% in 2013 and by 1.6% in 2014. On the 
basis of projected nominal GDP growth, their share of GDP would fall by 1.1 percentage 
points in 2013 and by 1.2 percentage points in 2014. This means that the fiscal scenario 
fulfils the requirement set by the Fiscal Responsibility Law that expenditures are to be 
reduced by a minimum of 1 percentage point of GDP until the primary balance has been 
brought back to zero or better. A balanced primary budget lies beyond the programme 
period, as the primary budget is projected to show a deficit of still 0.8% of GDP by 2014. 
If revenues and expenditures develop as projected, net borrowing by general government 
would fall to 3.3% in 2013 and to 2.6% in 2014, i.e. a significant fiscal consolidation 
would be achieved. Like for 2012, these deficit projections are subject to the above-
mentioned risks concerning the macroeconomic scenario and the implementation of the 
underlying expenditure consolidation measures, which are not identified and explained in 
the PEP. The Croatian authorities, nevertheless, acknowledge such risks and a sensitivity 
analysis (see section 2.5.3. below) assesses the negative budgetary consequences in 
scenarios where fiscal policy remains unchanged and where output growth falls short of 
baseline macroeconomic assumptions.   
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Structural balance 
The PEP 2012-2014 provides estimates regarding the cyclical state of the economy and 
the fiscal balances, applying the same methodology as in last year's submission. Like in 
previous years, potential GDP growth has been lowered for the first two programme 
years and the two preceding years. The method underlying this recalculation is not 
revealed. For the third programme year (2014) potential growth is estimated at 2.1%. 
Average projected real GDP growth exceeds average projected potential GDP growth in 
the programme period. This results in a closing of the negative output gap in 2014. 
Somewhat counter-intuitively, the negative output gap is estimated to have been as small 
as 0.3% of GDP in 2011 when the unemployment rate was 13.3%. In the same year, the 
cyclically-adjusted fiscal balance is seen to have been identical to the unadjusted fiscal 
balance. The cyclical budgetary component remains very small in the programme period. 
The structural fiscal balance is considered as being identical to the cyclically-adjusted 
fiscal balance in 2010-2014. The PEP estimates that fiscal policy has been anti-cyclical 
in 2008-2011 and will turn slightly pro-cyclical in 2012-2013 before resuming an anti-
cyclical stance in 2014. Given the uncertainties relating to the applied methodology, the 
estimates of potential growth, output gap and cyclically-adjusted fiscal balances should 
be considered with caution. There is scope for developing the analysis and making it 
verifiable in future submissions. 
Debt levels and development, analysis of below-the-line operations and stock-flow 
adjustments 
The fiscal scenario in the PEP 2012-2014 projects a gradual increase of public debt from 
an estimated 44.9% of GDP at the end of 2011 to 49.4% at the end of 2014. 7 Projections 
on the decomposition of changes in the debt ratio show that its rise is exclusively driven 
by the negative primary balance and interest payments in each programme year. Stock-
flow adjustments are projected to lower the increase of the debt ratio to a considerable 
extent. In 2012, the PEP projects these adjustments to lower the debt ratio by 1.5 
percentage points. Privatisation proceeds are contributing 0.6 percentage points while the 
rest is unspecified. The unspecified part of the stock-flow adjustment rises to 1.9 
percentage points in 2014. 
 
                                                   
7  The PEP defines public debt according to the Croatian budget act as general government debt, thus 
excluding guarantees provided by the government to the State Development Bank (HBOR). 
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2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Gross debt ratio [1] 41.2 44.9 47.2 48.9 49.4
Change in the ratio 6.1 3.6 2.3 1.7 0.5
Contributions [2]:
1. Primary balance 2.9 3.4 1.5 1.3 0.8
2. “Snow-ball” effect 2.0 1.1 1.4 0.3 -0.4
Of which:
Interest expenditure 2.0 2.2 2.3 2.0 1.8
Growth effect -0.7 -0.5 -1.3 -1.3 -2.2
Inflation effect 0.8 -0.5 0.4 -0.4 -0.1
3. Stock-flow 1.2 -0.9 -0.6 0.1 0.2
[2]  The snow-ball effect captures the impact of interest expenditure on 
accumulated debt, as well as the impact of real GDP growth and inflation on 
the debt ratio (through the denominator). The stock-flow adjustment 
includes differences in cash and accrual.
Source: Pre-Accession Economic Programme(PEP); ECFIN calculations
Composition of changes in the debt ratio (%  of GDP)
Notes:
[1]   End of period.
 
 
The PEP contains a debt sensitivity analysis which reveals that the public debt ratio is 
highly sensitive to a depreciation of the kuna-euro exchange rate since most of the 
outstanding public debt is denominated in foreign currency, mostly in euro. A 25% 
depreciation of the kuna would lead to an increase in public debt by about 8 percentage 
points to around 57% of GDP in 2013-2014. The debt level is also highly sensitive to the 
course of fiscal policy. If fiscal policy would remain unchanged, it is estimated that the 
public debt ratio would be 8 percentage points higher by 2014 than in the baseline 
scenario. The activation of contingent liabilities under the restructuring programme for 
the shipbuilding industry is a third way in which the debt ratio could increase faster than 
projected. The PEP estimates that it would lift the debt ratio by more than 2 percentage 
points in 2013. 
In terms of debt sustainability a rise of about 15 percentage points in the debt ratio 
between 2008 and 2011 calls for increased vigilance. In addition, both the sensitivity 
analysis and the discussion of fiscal risks underline the need for a prudent fiscal policy. A 
deterioration of financing conditions is a significant risk for the public sector’s financing 
and re-financing requirements in the programme period.  
Budgetary implications of major structural reforms 
The programme presents estimates of the fiscal impact of structural measures in various 
policy fields envisaged over the PEP horizon. A summary table is presented below. It 
shows that the overall net impact on the country's fiscal position is an improvement of 
around 0.3% of GDP in 2012 and falling to around 0.1% in 2013 and 2014. Most of the 
specific measures presented in the policy matrix of structural reform measures have a 
small effect on the budget. The structural reform measure which achieves the largest 
budgetary saving is a cut in agricultural subsidies in 2012 with an impact corresponding 
to 0.2% of GDP. Overall, the reform measures presented in the policy matrix are 
relatively small but positive with respect to the objective of fiscal consolidation. 
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2012 2013 2014
Enterprise restructuring and subsidies 11.7 -0.1 -0.3
Labour market reforms -7.5 21.9 17.4
Agriculture and rural sector 97.0 -8.3 4.2
Health care reforms 3.6 -5.9 4.2
Other reforms 50.7 59.4 10.0
Total impact on the budget 155.5 66.9 35
Total impact on the budget (in % of GDP) 0.33 0.14 0.07
Net direct budgetary impact of key reform commitments (in million EUR)
Source: 2012 Pre-accession Economic Programme (PEP), own calculations, a minus sign indicates a 
deterioration of the budget balance.  
 
2.5.3 Sensitivity analysis and comparison with previous programme 
Like in previous years, the PEP 2012-2014 includes a sensitivity analysis which shows 
how public deficit and debt would react to economic shocks.  The debt sensitivity 
analysis has already been mentioned above. For the fiscal deficit, two alternative 
scenarios to the baseline are described. The first one assumes an unchanged fiscal policy 
and fiscal dynamics as recorded in previous years. This would result in fiscal deficits 
which would be between 2.0 percentage points (in 2012) and 2.7 percentage points (in 
2014) higher than in the baseline. It clearly demonstrates the size of the consolidation 
effort needed which policymakers have to undertake in order to reach their fiscal targets. 
The second alternative scenario assumes a real GDP growth rate in 2012 which is 1 
percentage point lower than in the baseline (i.e. -0.2% rather than 0.8%). This would 
result in fiscal deficits which would be between 0.4 (in 2012) and 1.1 (in 2014) 
percentage points higher than in the baseline. Regarding the sensitivity of the fiscal 
deficit to assumed GDP growth, it would have been appropriate to broaden the analysis 
to cover a growth rate in 2012 which is equal to the most pessimistic of current growth 
forecasts (-2%). In addition to the sensitivity analysis, the differences in the fiscal 
scenarios between the PEP 2011-2013 and the PEP 2012-2014 are shortly summarised. 
The differences regarding the programme years are attributed to revisions of the 
underlying macroeconomic projections, the recent changes in tax legislation, and the 
commitment to cut expenditures through rationalisation of costs and the implementation 
of structural reforms. 
2.5.4 Quality of public finance and institutional features 
After referring to last year’s budgetary execution without revisions during the year, the 
PEP 2012-2014 describes a number of measures and developments in 2011 which should 
improve the quality of public finances. They include changes in the government-
sponsored financing models for private business, the rationalisation of the operations of 
public enterprises, efforts to lower the overall tax burden and non-tax fees, improvements 
in the management of the public debt, increased efficiency in the use of EU-funds, and 
the strengthening of administrative capacities. However, the PEP does not address the 
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need to improve the budgetary process further and to enhance the efficiency of public 
spending more fundamentally in the programme period. It lacks a vision and a strategy to 
make use of the considerable scope for rationalising and streamlining public expenditure, 
in particular to introduce a better targeting of social spending, which could free resources 
for higher public investment. Low employment and participation rates suggest the need 
to consider the relevant incentives in the tax system and the benefits regime. Overall, the 
PEP would benefit from presenting a more convincing policy strategy to improve the 
quality of public finances through concrete revenue and expenditure measures. 
On the institutional side, the PEP describes the follow-up to the adoption of the Fiscal 
Responsibility Law in 2010, i.e. the adoption of implementing rules and the 
establishment of a Fiscal Policy Committee charged with the monitoring of the 
application of the new fiscal rules. It is also mentioned that the government did not last 
year adopt an annual Strategy of Government Programmes covering the period 2012-
2014 contrary to the provisions of the Budget Act. This is explained with the 
postponement of the normal budgetary process until after the parliamentary elections 
held in December 2011 and the ensuing change of government. Such a postponement 
shortens the time available for the preparation of the budget and its parliamentary 
scrutiny. Thereby, it risks weakening the continuity and quality of the budgetary process. 
This may be exemplified by the government’s announcement at the time of the budget’s 
adoption that a budget revision is likely to be needed already in the summer.  
2.5.5 Sustainability of public finance 
The PEP 2012-2014 contains a short analysis of the sustainability of public finances in 
the period up to 2050 with a focus on pension, health and interest expenditure. The 
assumptions regarding long-term population trends have not been changed compared to 
last year's PEP, but the labour market participation rates have been revised down. Growth 
projections for labour productivity and real GDP have been left unchanged for the long 
term. Total expenditures are projected to decrease from 41.9% of GDP in 2010 to 39.2% 
in 2020, but then to increase gradually to 42.3% in 2050. Total revenues are set to fall 
from 37.0% of GDP in 2010 to 35.6% in 2020 where they are projected to remain over 
the following thirty years. Spending on old-age pensions is expected to remain between 8 
and 9% of GDP until 2050 because the growth in the number of pensioners as a share of 
the total population will be counterbalanced by a rising share of pensions financed from 
individual capitalised pension funds. Pension contributions would fall initially but then 
stabilise around 5.2% of GDP in the medium to long term. Health care spending is set to 
increase markedly in the long term, i.e. from 5.8% of GDP in 2020 to 9.2% in 2050, 
mainly as a result of an ageing population. Interest expenditure on public debt is 
projected to rise gradually from 2.0% of GDP in 2010 to 3.4% in 2050.  
The long-term fiscal challenges of an ageing society remain significant not least in view 
of an already relatively high public debt ratio and very low labour market participation 
rates. However, the programme does not relate its long-term fiscal projections to the need 
to adopt concrete reform measures in areas like pensions, health care or labour markets 
which are the areas where reform has the potentially largest budgetary benefits. Overall, 
the programme would have benefited from sketching the outlines of a policy response to 
the challenges of an ageing society. 
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2.6 STRUCTURAL REFORMS 
2.6.1 Obstacles to growth and the structural reform agenda 
The PEP covers a broad range of structural reform areas identical to last years' 
programme. It states in a general way that the government will alleviate or eliminate 
obstacles to growth in various areas with a particular emphasis on the labour market, the 
business environment and public administration reform. Some of the intended reforms 
which are mentioned in a general way, like more labour market flexibility and higher 
efficacy of the judiciary, suggest indirectly where bottlenecks to growth can be found. 
But there is no attempt to identify these obstacles directly and to assess them 
systematically, as requested by the Commission. 
 The programme does not fully and consistently establish a clear link between strategic 
objectives and the various instruments and measures described. It is mainly backward-
looking. To serve as a guide for the implementation of structural reforms, the programme 
would need to have a sound diagnosis, clear policy targets, concrete measures and a time 
frame for implementation. More emphasis should also have been given to measures to 
improve the business environment, given the administrative obstacles still in place. The 
programme contains fiscal estimates for some measures, but the link between the 
structural reform agenda and the implementation of the fiscal strategy is weak. 
Intensified efforts to speed up the implementation of reforms, in particular in the areas of 
enterprise restructuring, education and labour markets would support the fulfilment of the 
second Copenhagen economic criteria. 
2.6.2 Key areas of structural reform 
Product and capital markets 
The PEP 2012-2014 touches upon a number of reform areas related to the functioning of 
product markets, such as competition policy, state aid, privatisation, railway and shipyard 
restructuring, energy and SME development. In the field of competition policy, the 
follow-up to the entering into force of the new Competition Act in 2010 is described, 
particularly the work on establishing a competition assessment procedure for all new 
legislation and regulation. Regarding state aid, which increased to 2.8% of GDP in 2010, 
the programme provides only a rough indication of its composition. The structure of state 
aids is still heavily biased in favour of sectoral aids and their reduction is considered to 
be dependent on structural reforms in shipbuilding and railways and on the transition to 
the use of EU funds in agriculture and fisheries. In the field of privatisation the activities 
of the new Government Asset Management Agency (GAMA) are described in a mainly 
backward-looking fashion. The process of privatisation of state assets continues to make 
only slow progress with modest proceeds. In mid-January 2012, GAMA's portfolio 
comprised 682 companies and had a value of €5.4 billion. A clear time frame for selling 
or liquidating state assets is still missing (except for the shipyards). Regarding railway 
restructuring the PEP mentions a number of current efforts, but there is no indication of a 
clear and comprehensive strategy. Regarding the energy sector, the PEP mainly describes 
recent and on-going measures in the various areas (natural gas, electricity, transport, 
renewable energy, energy efficiency, and oil and petroleum products) in accordance with 
the government's energy strategy. The PEP fails to address the persisting shortcomings in 
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the overall business environment in the product markets, including weaknesses in the 
regulatory framework and inefficiencies in public administration. 
Labour market 
In addition to the severe repercussions of the on-going macroeconomic weakness on 
employment levels and the number of unemployed, the Croatian labour market suffers 
from deep-rooted structural problems, as evidenced by very low participation and 
employment rates as well as high rates of youth and long-term unemployment. The 
policy response, as described in the programme, does not include strategically relevant 
reform concepts. It continues to focus on active labour market measures by the Croatian 
Employment Service. However, as already mentioned in previous PEP assessments, a 
more comprehensive reform approach seems to be required to address the structural 
weaknesses of the Croatian labour market. Despite some actions taken, such as reducing 
incentives for early retirement, labour supply disincentives appear to continue. In line 
with EU requirements and the Europe 2020 Strategy, labour market policies should pay 
sufficient attention to tackle skill mismatches and to develop strategies for life-long 
learning. Labour market policies should be subject to regular results-oriented monitoring 
and regular independent evaluations. 
Other reform areas 
Other reform areas covered are the agricultural sector, public administration, education, 
health care, social security, the judiciary and environmental protection. Like for the 
previously mentioned sectors, the presentation is mainly backward looking, providing 
information on past and on-going reform measures and initiatives with a strong emphasis 
on legislative action. Harmonisation with EU requirements has been treated with priority. 
The programme would have benefited from discussing the relevance of envisaged 
reforms in the context of the overall reform strategy. 
2.7 OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF FORMAL REQUIREMENTS  
Macro framework 
The programme presents a clear and concise picture of past economic developments and 
covers most relevant data in an accurate way. Weaknesses remain with respect to data on 
sector's savings-investment balances. The PEP presents a sufficiently comprehensive and 
broadly consistent medium-term macroeconomic framework, but it fails to comply with 
the Commission's request to present an in-depth analysis of external sustainability and 
competiveness issues.  
Fiscal framework 
The fiscal programme is broadly consistent with the macroeconomic framework. The 
programme could have been improved by providing more concrete information on the 
envisaged fiscal policy measures, in particular on those to rein in current spending. The 
programme makes an effort to present fiscal data according to ESA standards. Historical 
data are fully in line with data submitted in the context of the 2011 fiscal notification. 
Unresolved issues remain with respect to the coverage of the general government sector 
as a number of "quasi-fiscal activities" (such as the Croatian Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (HBOR), and Croatian Motorways) and a large number of municipalities 
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are not included in the fiscal programme. PEP submissions would benefit from an 
explanation of operations and future plans of HBOR and Croatian Motorways.   
Structural reforms 
This part of the programme would gain from presenting an analysis of the structural 
bottlenecks of growth, as requested by the Commission. A more coherent and consistent 
presentation of the structural reform agenda, better linking individual reform measures to 
the programme's key economic objectives and the fiscal strategy, would improve the 
quality of the programme and its usefulness as a tool for economic policy making. 
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Annex: Structural indicators
EU 27
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
General economic background
Real GDP 1 5.1 2.2 -6.0 -1.2 0.6f 3.2 0.3 -4.3 2.0 1.6f
Labour productivity 2 75.7 78.6 78.4 77.4 n.a. 100 100 100 100 100
Real unit labour cost 3 0.0 1.7 3.3 -4.2 -5.1 -0.8 1.0 2.8 -1.6 -0.5f
Real effective exchange rate 4 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 121.4 123.2 118.3 109.0 113.1
Inflation rate 5 2.7 5.8 2.2 1.1 2.2 2.3 3.7 1.0 2.1 3.1e
Unemployment rate 6 9.0 8.4 9.1 11.8 13.2 7.2 7.1 9.0 9.7 9.6
Employment
Employment rate 7 57.1 57.8 56.6 54.0 n.a. 65.3 65.8 64.5 64.1 n.a.
Employment rate - females 8 50.0 50.7 51.0 48.8 n.a. 58.2 58.9 58.4 58.2 n.a.
Employment rate of older workers 9 35.8 36.7 38.5 37.6 n.a. 44.6 45.6 46.0 46.3 n.a.
Long term unemployment 10 5.7 5.3 5.1 6.7 n.a. 3.1 2.6 3.0 3.9 n.a.
Product market reforms 
Relative price levels 11 71.9 74.1 75.5 75.9 n.a. 100 100 100 100 100
Total trade-to-GDP ratio 12 26.4 24.4 25.0 26.3 n.a. 10.7 11.6 9.8 11.7 n.a.
Net FDI  13 4.4 3.6 3.4 0.7 n.a. 3.9 2.2 2.1 1.0 n.a.
Sectoral and ad-hoc state aid 15 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 n.a.
Business investment 16 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 18.7 18.4 16.2 15.9 n.a.
Knowledge based economy
Tertiary graduates 17 6.8 10.1 12.8 n.a. n.a. 13.8 14.5 14.3 n.a. n.a.
Spending on human resources 18 4.1 4.3 n.a. n.a. n.a. 5.0 5.1 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Educational attainment 19 95.3 95.4 95.2 95.7 n.a. 78.1 78.5 78.6 79.0 n.a.
R&D expenditure 20 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.7 n.a. 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.0 n.a.
Broadband penetration rate 21 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 18.2 21.7 23.9 25.7 n.a.
Source:  Commission services, national sources
1. Growth rate of real GDP in %.  2. Labour productivity per person employed - GDP in PPS per person employed relative 
to EU-27 (EU-27=100).  3. Growth rate of the ratio: compensation per employee in current prices divided by GDP (in 
current prices) per total employment.  4. Vs IC36 (1999 = 100), current year's values are based on Commission's forecast 
deflator figures, nominal unit labour cost deflator.  5. Annual average rate of change in Harmonized Indices of Consumer 
Prices (HICPs), tFYRoM = CPI.  6. Unemployed persons as a share of the total active population.  7. Employed persons 
aged 15-64 in % of total population of the same age group.  8. Employed women aged 15-64 in % of total female 
population of the same age group.  9. Employed persons aged 55-64 (EU27) or 50-64 (tFYRoM)) in % of total population 
of the same age group.  10. Long-term unemployed (over 12 months) in % of total active population.   11. comparative 
price levels of final consumption by private households including indirect taxes (EU-27=100).  12. Trade integration - 
Average value of imports and exports of goods divided by GDP.  
f: forecast, e: estimated value, p: provisional value, b: break in series, s: Eurostat estimate, r: revised value,
13. Average value of inward and outward FDIs flows in % of GDP.  14. Market share of the largest generator (% of total 
net generation). 15. In % of GDP. 16. Gross fixed capital formation by the private sector in % of GDP.  17.Total tertiary 
graduates in science and technology per 1000 of population aged 20-29.  18. Public expenditure on education in % of GDP. 
19. Percentage of the population aged 20 to 24 having completed at least upper secondary education.  20. GERD (Gross 
domestic expenditure on R&D) - in % of GDP.  21. Number of broadband access lines per 100 inhabitants.
Croatia
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3 ICELAND 
3.1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
Iceland's Pre-Accession Economic Programme 2012-2014 (PEP) was submitted on 
1 February 2012. Its main objective is to lay the foundations for a sustainable economic 
recovery after a long and deep recession. It presents a broadly plausible medium-term 
macroeconomic scenario and a relatively ambitious fiscal scenario, although both subject 
to considerable downside risks. The quality of the programme could be significantly 
enhanced by adding alternative growth scenarios and a budget sensitivity analysis to 
better identify and quantify the impact of potential risks. There is also scope for 
improving the fulfilment of formal and data requirements. 
Since the end of 2010, the economy has started to mildly recover and real GDP grew by a 
stronger than expected 3.1% in 2011. The situation on the labour market started to 
improve in mid-2011, although job creation and long-term unemployment remain a 
serious challenge. Strong domestic demand has pushed inflation up and, despite robust 
export performance, led to a reduction of the surplus in trade in goods and services. The 
central bank reacted to a growing inflationary pressure by increasing its key policy rate 
but the monetary stance remained rather accommodative. Official gross foreign currency 
reserves continued to increase, reaching 64% of GDP by the end of 2011. Financial 
sector balances and intermediation remain impaired. Achievements in macroeconomic 
stabilisation have been made under the shelter of extensive capital controls which, after 
having been in place for more than 3 years, risk becoming entrenched if more resolute 
measures for their lifting are not taken. 
The PEP 2012-2014 presents a broadly plausible growth scenario with a modest 
recovery, driven by private consumption, investments, and exports. Government 
consumption is set to further decline and to start increasing only in the outer years of the 
programme. Total investments remain at a historical low of about 14% of GDP but are 
expected to gain speed as the economy recovers and big energy-intensive projects come 
out of the pipeline. Domestic demand is projected to drive imports growth, exceeding the 
growth of exports over the programme horizon. As a result, the external trade surplus is 
set to fall to below 8% of GDP in 2014. The inflation outlook is based on the central 
bank's November 2011 forecast and does not take into account a recent acceleration in 
inflation and inflation expectations. The current account, adjusted for the net factor 
income of banks in winding-up proceedings, posted a small deficit in 2011 but is 
expected to turn into a surplus and stay positive over the programme horizon. The 
programme lacks a detailed assessment of the structure and financing of the current 
account. It does not provide any analysis of its sustainability over the medium term, 
including competitiveness issues, as was requested by the Commission for the 2012 
programmes. 
Fiscal consolidation has been a success over the recent years. The primary deficit was 
reduced to around 1% of GDP in 2011 and the increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio was 
brought to a halt. However, consolidation efforts slowed down in 2011 and slippages led 
to a higher than expected budget deficit. In addition, the revision in October 2011 of the 
medium-term budgetary scenario envisaged a milder medium-term adjustment. Some 
ambiguity remains with respect to the composition of the planned fiscal adjustment. 
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While the consolidation seems to be expenditure-led, as the spending to GDP ratio is 
planned to fall markedly, this adjustment pattern is not sufficiently reflected by the 
choice of underlying fiscal measures, which are mostly on the revenue side. Moreover, 
the proposed consolidation path counts very much on temporary non-tax revenues and 
some measures remain unspecified or have not been legislated. In view of risks of further 
fiscal slippages and the already high level of government debt, it will be of utmost 
importance that the government follows on its ambitious target of bringing the debt level 
below 60% of GDP by 2020. The credibility of the fiscal programme could have been 
strengthened by providing more details about the 2011 budget execution and a more 
elaborated assessment of policies supporting the medium-term budgetary framework, the 
risks involved, and possible contingency measures to address these risks. 
The PEP covers a broad range of structural reform areas with a view to improving the 
supply side of the economy and increasing its resilience. However, the level of detail in 
presenting key policy measures is insufficient and could be improved. The programme 
would also benefit from providing a clear timeline and sequencing of planned measures, 
along with information about their estimated budgetary impact. In the short term, the still 
precarious situation of the financial sector and the high household and corporate 
indebtedness are identified as major obstacles to a sustainable recovery. This is coupled 
with the problem of inefficient capital markets and existing restrictions on capital 
movement. As a medium to long-term challenge, the programme outlines the need for 
export diversification to alleviate overreliance on certain commodity exports. 
Risks to the programme scenario are mostly on the downside. Private consumption has 
proven surprisingly strong in 2011 on the back of higher wages and social benefits, and 
other temporary factors, the importance of which is likely to diminish over the medium-
term. There are also risks to the envisaged investments profile, related to the on-going 
corporate debt restructuring and possible delays in energy-intensive projects. Extensive 
capital controls are one of the most salient features of the economy and their removal 
represents a particular challenge. A weak and slow recovery of Iceland's major overseas 
markets could also undermine even the modest exports performance. After budgetary 
slippages last year, and with parliamentary elections in 2013, the consolidation path may 
weaken further, especially in view of the uncertainty surrounding some of the 
consolidation measures and the composition of adjustment. 
The link between the programme's reform agenda and the fiscal scenario is not 
sufficiently clear. In view of the country's EU accession perspective, as spelled out in the 
latest Progress Report, Iceland has taken some steps in aligning its reform priorities to 
the acquis. 
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COM PEP COM PEP COM PEP COM PEP COM PEP
Real GDP (% change) -4.0 -4.0 2.1 2.6 1.5 2.4 2.7 2.5 n.a. 2.8
Contributions:
- Final domestic demand -2.2 -2.0 2.7 2.3 1.9 3.3 2.9 2.5 n.a. 3.0
- Change in inventories n.a. -1.0 n.a. 0.5 0.0 -0.3 0.0 0.0 n.a. 0.0
- External balance of goods and services -1.5 -1.1 -0.6 -0.1 -0.4 -0.5 -0.2 0.0 n.a. -0.2
Employment (% change) 1 -0.3 -1.2 0.2 1.8 0.2 1.9 0.5 1.3 n.a. 0.9
Unemployment rate (%) 8.0 8.4 7.6 7.6 7.3 6.4 6.7 5.8 n.a. 5.4
GDP deflator (% change) 6.9 6.9 3.7 4.0 3.4 5.0 3.1 2.7 n.a. 2.8
CPI inflation (%) 5.4 5.4 4.1 4.0 3.6 4.2 2.8 2.9 n.a. 2.5
Current account balance (% of GDP) -11.2 -11.2 -10.4 -9.3 -9.6 -4.1 -9.5 -1.7 n.a. -2.4
1. Employment deffinitions differ and data are incomparable. 
Sources: Pre-Accession Economic Programme (PEP) 2012; Commission 2011 Autumn Forecasts (COM)
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Comparison of macroeconomic developments and forecasts
 
3.2 INTRODUCTION 
On 1 February 2012, Iceland submitted its second Pre-Accession Economic Programme, 
following government adoption and earlier consultation of social partners. The 
programme was prepared by the Ministry of Economic Affairs with the participation of 
the relevant ministries and agencies and covers the period 2012-2014. It builds on earlier 
policy documents, such as the government's 2020-strategy adopted in January 2011,8 the 
revised medium-term fiscal objectives from October 20119 and the government's 
economic programme of November 2011.10 The key policy objective of the programme 
is to secure a sustainable economic recovery, based on the pursuit of fiscal consolidation 
and on measures strengthening the supply side of the economy. To this end, a number of 
key priorities, such as maintaining fiscal coherence, continuing efforts to complete 
private sector debt restructuring, redesigning the monetary policy framework, and 
tackling long-term unemployment are seen as the cornerstones of the programme. 
3.3 KEY CHALLENGES 
Economic policy challenges in Iceland remain manifold. A core objective of the 
programme is to lay strong foundations for sustainable economic recovery and, in 
parallel, continue tackling the remnants of the longest and most severe recession since 
Iceland's independence. Extensive capital controls are one of the most salient features of 
the economy. Their removal will be a key challenge for the government. Free capital 
movement is a prerequisite for sustainable growth based on domestic and foreign 
investments and needs to be implemented in a careful manner, in close coordination with 
other policies, to preserve price, exchange rate and financial stability. To this end, the 
government and the central bank continued to implement the first phase of their March 
2011 capital account liberalisation strategy,11 although with mixed success until now. 
                                                   
8 http://eng.forsaetisraduneyti.is/media/2020/iceland2020.pdf 
9 http://www.fjarmalaraduneyti.is/media/utgafa/Rikisbuskapurinn_2012_2015.pdf (in Icelandic) 
10 http://eng.efnahagsraduneyti.is/media/Acrobat/ECONOMIC-PROGRAMME-ENGLISH112011.pdf 
11 http://www.sedlabanki.is/lisalib/getfile.aspx?itemid=8673 
 34 of 127 
There have been further advances in macroeconomic stabilisation but the PEP 
acknowledges policy challenges ahead. Striking the right balance between the still 
needed efforts to reign in budget deficit and government debt and supporting the 
economic recovery is one of them. Fiscal consolidation continued in 2011 but 
consolidation efforts have been slowing down. Looking ahead, the envisaged 
consolidation path has been weakened compared to previous plans, although it still 
remains relatively ambitious. The composition of the planned adjustment is not 
sufficiently clear and risks are related to the fact that the strategy very much counts on 
temporary non-tax measures like asset sales and other unspecified or unlegislated 
measures. Concerns remain about the high level of public debt and the possibility of 
meeting the ambitious target of bringing down government debt below 60% of GDP by 
2020. Although steps have been taken to tackle the considerable domestic debt overhang, 
private sector debt restructuring is not yet completed. The banking sector and financial 
intermediation are still not fully functioning and efficient. The labour market has shown 
some signs of revival, with the unemployment rate and net emigration falling down. 
Nevertheless, job creation will remain a challenge for some time, as the economy is still 
adjusting after the crisis. Wages and inflation have increased more than expected in 2011 
and are estimated to remain elevated over 2012. 
3.4 RECENT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS AND MEDIUM-TERM SCENARIO 
3.4.1 Recent macroeconomic developments 
Following the collapse of its financial sector in October 2008, the Icelandic economy 
went into a deep and long recession, contracting by 6.8% in 2009 and by a further 4.0% 
in 2010. Since the end of 2010 the economy started to recover, based on stronger private 
consumption, exports and investments (albeit from a very low level). GDP increased by 
3.1% in 2011 and the growth rate was higher than the autumn 2011 official forecast of 
Statistics Iceland of 2.4%. In line with renewed expansion of the economy, the labour 
market stabilised. The average number of employed persons remained broadly 
unchanged in 2011 but those working full-time increased along with an increase in 
working hours. The unemployment rate fell to 7.1% (Labour Force Survey) as a number 
of unemployed exited the labour force, still a long way from the pre-crisis levels of 
around 3%. Long-term unemployment started to decline but is still significant at about a 
quarter of all unemployed. Annual inflation accelerated to reach 6.4% in March 2012 and 
remained elevated since then. Higher international commodity and energy prices explain 
only partially the bout of rising inflation. Strong domestic demand has also been an 
important inflationary driver and domestic goods and services, including housing, 
contributed to more than half of the overall inflation. The central bank reacted to rising 
inflation and inflationary expectations by increasing its key policy rate in three steps 
from 4.25% to 5.00%. Exports were robust in 2011, supported by higher fish and 
aluminium prices and a growing interest in Iceland as a tourist destination. Nevertheless, 
the surplus in trade in goods and services fell from 10.1% in 2010 to 8.2% of GDP in 
2011, as imports grew faster than exports. The current account deficit stood at 7.1% of 
GDP in 2011, down from 8.0% in 2010. The "underlying" current account balance as 
calculated by the central bank (i.e. excluding accrued interest of banks in winding up 
proceedings) improved from a deficit of 2.0% in 2010 to a deficit of 0.6% of GDP in 
2011. Official foreign currency reserves increased by 57% year-on-year to 64% of GDP 
at end-2011 (2010: 43% of GDP). The stock of gross external debt (excluding banks in 
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winding-up proceedings) has increased as well to an estimated 220% of GDP, compared 
to 215% at end-2010. 
3.4.2 Medium-term macroeconomic scenario 
The PEP 2012-2014 presents a broadly plausible growth scenario with a modest 
recovery, driven by private consumption, investments and exports. The external 
assumptions are based on the most recent IMF and OECD global forecasts by the time of 
drafting. On this basis, the PEP expects Iceland's trading partners' GDP to rise by 1.5% in 
2012 and 2.1% in 2013, which appear to be somewhat optimistic in light of the most 
recent estimates of negative growth in the euro area in 2012. 
COM PEP COM PEP COM PEP COM PEP COM PEP
Real GDP (% change) -4.0 -4.0 2.1 2.6 1.5 2.4 2.7 2.5 n.a. 2.8
Contributions:
- Final domestic demand -2.2 -2.0 2.7 2.3 1.9 3.3 2.9 2.5 n.a. 3.0
- Change in inventories n.a. -1.0 n.a. 0.5 0.0 -0.3 0.0 0.0 n.a. 0.0
- External balance of goods and services -1.5 -1.1 -0.6 -0.1 -0.4 -0.5 -0.2 0.0 n.a. -0.2
Employment (% change) 1 -0.3 -1.2 0.2 1.8 0.2 1.9 0.5 1.3 n.a. 0.9
Unemployment rate (%) 8.0 8.4 7.6 7.6 7.3 6.4 6.7 5.8 n.a. 5.4
GDP deflator (% change) 6.9 6.9 3.7 4.0 3.4 5.0 3.1 2.7 n.a. 2.8
CPI inflation (%) 5.4 5.4 4.1 4.0 3.6 4.2 2.8 2.9 n.a. 2.5
Current account balance (% of GDP) -11.2 -11.2 -10.4 -9.3 -9.6 -4.1 -9.5 -1.7 n.a. -2.4
1. Employment deffinitions differ and data are incomparable. 
Sources: Pre-Accession Economic Programme (PEP) 2012; Commission 2011 Autumn Forecasts (COM)
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Comparison of macroeconomic developments and forecasts
 
 Real sector 
The PEP projects a continuation of the economic recovery which has gained pace in 
2011. Real growth is projected to average 2.7% over the medium-term, boosted by robust 
private consumption, pick-up of investments (from a very low level) and modest 
increases in exports. Private consumption is foreseen to grow by about 3% on average 
over the programme horizon, supported by rising incomes and employment, and is 
arguably to remain the main driver of growth. In 2011, total investments stood at a 
historically low level of about 14% of GDP but are set to gain speed and grow by 11% on 
average, as the economy recovers and big energy-intensive projects come out of the 
pipeline. Growth in exports is expected at about 2%, while strong domestic demand will 
be driving imports growth to above 3% on average. As a result, the external trade surplus 
is set to decrease from 10.1% of GDP in 2010 to below 8% of GDP in 2014. 
While broadly realistic, the PEP growth scenario is subject to considerable downside 
risks. In 2011, private consumption has proven surprisingly strong on the back of higher 
wages and social benefits, freezing of loan payments and withdrawals from private 
pension accounts. The importance of these factors is likely to diminish over the medium-
term, while elevated inflation could undermine households' real purchasing power in a 
still fragile labour market. The still high level of private sector indebtedness would 
continue to exert pressure on households' finances even after the debt restructuring is 
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completed. The PEP rightly points out that there are risks to the envisaged investments 
profile. Corporate investments' performance will depend on progress in the on-going 
restructuring of corporate balance sheets. The recovery of residential investment, 
although under way, may be impeded by the potentially ample supply of uncompleted 
residential property. In addition, investments in energy-intensive projects, included in the 
forecast, are prone to delays. A weak and slow recovery of Iceland's major overseas 
markets could also undermine even the modest exports performance. The PEP also 
acknowledges that some export sectors have benefited from a competitive real exchange 
rate and may start losing price competitiveness as the economy recovers. The programme 
does not explore in details the impact of capital controls on the economy and does not 
present any other alternative medium-term scenario. Such an analysis would help focus 
awareness of accumulating costs of the capital controls for the Icelandic economy. 
Inflation 
The PEP projects annual inflation to peak at about 6% in the first quarter of 2012, 
subsiding thereafter to 3% by the end of the year and reaching the inflation target (2.5%) 
by the end of 2013. However, this inflation outlook is based on the central bank's 
November 2011 forecast and does not take into account a recent acceleration in inflation 
and inflation expectations. Inflation risks over the medium-term appear to be on the high 
side. The most recent forecast from February already envisaged a higher inflation profile 
and inflation reaching its target only in the second half of 2014. The economic recovery 
and wage increases in 2011, which resulted from the implementation of collective wage 
agreements, have led to strongly rising prices, including of domestically produced goods 
and services, pointing to the existence of structural or policy weaknesses and rigidities in 
the economy. Inflation expectations have also significantly increased and the risk of 
entrenching inflation expectations at high levels is recognised by the programme. 
Furthermore, the inflation outlook very much relies on the assumption of continued 
exchange rate stabilisation. A stable nominal exchange rate of the króna against the euro 
is foreseen over the programme horizon, but so far has not materialised as the exchange 
rate has depreciated markedly since the beginning of 2012. Preserving króna stability in 
the context of the gradual lifting of capital controls will present a particular challenge. 
Contrary to the previous submission, the PEP does not comment on output gap levels or 
delve into the concept of non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment but, 
nevertheless, points out that there is significant uncertainty about the extent to which 
there is some spare capacity left in the economy and how effective it is in containing 
inflationary pressures. 
Monetary and exchange rate policy 
The PEP acknowledges that capital controls have permitted a more rapid lowering of 
interest rates in the crisis. This trend started reversing in August 2011, in response to 
rising inflation, and, following three 25 p.p. hikes, the central bank's key interest rate 
reached 5.00% in March 2012. Nevertheless, the monetary policy stance remained rather 
accommodative by the end of the year and in the first months of 2012. 
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In 2010, the central bank elaborated a report on exchange rate and monetary policy after 
capital controls.12 The report suggested modifications in the current inflation targeting 
regime with a stronger focus on asset price cycles, more active foreign exchange market 
interventions, better coordination between monetary and fiscal policy and introduction of 
macro-prudential rules. Preparations for the actual implementation of these suggestions 
are still on-going. As mentioned in the PEP, the central bank is now working on a new 
report examining the benefits and drawbacks of different exchange rate regimes ''with 
focus on the adoption of the euro, through EMU membership''. While considerations 
about defining elements of the long-term monetary and exchange rate policy framework 
are certainly challenging and necessary, the PEP would have benefited from an analysis 
of the medium-term prospects of the current monetary and exchange rate strategy. 
External sector 
The PEP's section on external developments is limited and rather backward looking, 
recalling the strong adjustment of the balance of goods and services from high pre-crisis 
deficits to post-crisis surpluses that resulted from the sharp increase in exports and 
compression of imports, mainly due to a weaker króna. 
Exports, including revenues from tourism, further increased in 2011. However, driven by 
robust domestic demand, imports have expanded at a faster pace than exports, effectively 
reducing the trade surplus. The good performance of domestic tourism in 2011 has been 
accompanied by increased travel abroad, and the net contribution of travel services has 
indeed slightly deteriorated. The deficit in the income balance remained significant, 
keeping the current account in deficit. A large share of this deficit comes from unpaid 
accrued interest on banks in winding-up proceedings (about 6.5% of GDP in 2011). 
Adjusted for the net factor income of these banks, the current account posted a small 
deficit in 2011 but is expected to turn into a surplus and stay positive over the 
programme horizon. 
Price increases in USD for aluminium are projected to be moderate over the programme 
horizon, after having risen substantially in the last two years. The price of the other major 
export commodity (marine products) is expected to increase by about 5% in 2012, 
following two consecutive years of steady growth. In 2012-2014, domestic demand is 
expected to drive the growth of imports of goods and services above the growth of 
exports. As a result, the external trade surplus is set to fall to close to 7% of GDP in 
2014. There are certain risks to this profile as the 2011 outcome was worse than expected 
in the programme. In addition, exports of goods continue to be characterised by capacity 
constraints in important exporting sectors and lack of diversification. Having in mind the 
current historically low level of investments, as the economy and investment activity 
recovers, there would be a need for sustained increase in imports of investment goods 
that could quickly reduce current levels of trade surpluses. 
The PEP lacks a detailed assessment of the structure and financing of the current account 
and its sustainability over the medium term. It could also have been strengthened by 
providing an analysis of competitiveness issues, notably on developments in price and 
cost competitiveness and in export market shares in goods and services. Recent increases 
in exports have benefited heftily from real exchange rate depreciation and high world 
                                                   
12 http://www.sedlabanki.is/lisalib/getfile.aspx?itemid=8529 
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prices for marine products and aluminium. The PEP does not make any projection about 
capital flows and their composition, although at least an analysis of recent dynamics and 
short-term trends and expectations may have been warranted. It is also notable that net 
errors and omissions remain exceptionally volatile, obscuring proper analysis of balance 
of payments flows. 
In March 2011, the Government adopted a revised capital liberalisation strategy. It 
envisages two phases of gradual liberalisation, with a focus on foreign (off-shore) 
holdings of króna. The first phase is already under way. The central bank holds auctions 
to purchase off-shore króna which it offers to investors willing to buy government bonds, 
other domestic assets, or invest in Iceland, locking-in their investment for a certain 
period. The final step in this phase would be to impose an exit levy and/or issue a long-
term government bond in foreign currency. Once the outstanding amount of off-shore 
króna and the difference between on-shore and off-shore exchange rates have been 
reduced, the capital controls on domestic economic actors could be liberalised (the 
second phase). The PEP also spells out a number of additional conditions (changes to the 
central bank law, building a framework for macro-prudential policies and developing 
macro-prudential tools), aiming to rebuild confidence in the financial system before the 
full liberalisation can take place. In September 2011, the parliament extended the capital 
controls until the end of 2013. In early 2012, capital controls have been further tightened 
by removing the exemptions on some bond payments and regulating the payments made 
by the estates of the old banks. Overall, the liberalisation of off-shore holdings of króna 
has had a mixed success up to now. The outstanding amount of off-shore króna (about 
30% of GDP) and the difference between on-shore and off-shore króna/euro exchange 
rates (about 30-40%) remain significant. 
 
External competitiveness and the current account 
Evolution of the current account balance 
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Source: Pre-Accession Economic Programme (PEP) 2012; Commission staff calculations 
 
With a view to discussing Iceland's external vulnerabilities, the PEP could have briefly 
assessed the level of foreign reserves on the basis of standard liquidity and solvency 
indicators and, more generally, Iceland's net international investment position in the 
context of the capital liberalisation strategy. External assets and liabilities continue to be 
subject to fluctuations, mainly due to uncertainties about the balance sheets of the banks 
in winding-up proceedings which account for the bulk of external liabilities. Official data 
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show gross external debt as high as 834% of GDP. However, corrected for the banks in 
winding-up proceedings, the level of external debt stood at about 220% of GDP at the 
end of 2011. The international investment position, again excluding banks in winding-up 
proceedings, has improved to a deficit of about 50% of GDP. The central bank continued 
building-up reserves and by the end of 2011 its net foreign assets have reached about 
40% of GDP. 
Financial sector 
The PEP provides a rather comprehensive and balanced assessment of the financial 
sector's vulnerabilities and resilience, based on the central bank's financial stability 
assessment. There has been significant progress with the restructuring of the financial 
sector, although its balance sheets are still impaired and new lending is anaemic. It is 
encouraging that the banks were able to improve their financial results and strengthen 
their capital base over 2011. In September 2011, the capital adequacy ratio (24%) of the 
three biggest banks was well above the regulatory minimum of 16%. The Housing 
Financing Fund (HFF) capital ratio increased to 2.4% in June, although still below its 5% 
target. The market continues to be highly concentrated, dominated by three big banks, 
which have expanded marginally over the last year mainly through mergers and 
acquisitions of other much smaller financial institutions, as well as the HFF. The 
government retains majority ownership in one of the banks, and minority stakes in the 
other two banks; with the majority stakes owned indirectly by the winding-up 
committees of the old banks. While new bank lending remained stagnant, the HFF 
lending has been expanding recently. The sector remains vulnerable due to its weak asset 
quality and the uncertainty surrounding the restructuring and evaluation of loan 
portfolios. Non-performing loans fell marginally but still stood high at about 16% in 
September 2011. Banks continued to rely for their funding predominantly on short-term 
deposits. This presents a potential liquidity management challenge and is forcing them to 
hold substantial secure liquid assets. The PEP rightly points out that this unfavourable 
structure is linked to the capital controls. Banks should also be able to strengthen and 
improve their deposit base structure once these controls are lifted. In view of the high 
uncertainty and costs that the on-going process of loan restructuring infuses to the 
financial sector and the whole economy, it is imperative that it is completed as quickly as 
possible. Going ahead, even after restructuring, households and corporate debt would 
remain high and would necessitate close monitoring. The PEP does not analyse the links 
between the financial sector and the medium-term growth scenario, which are of crucial 
importance for the sustainability of the economic recovery. Future submissions would 
certainly benefit from their exploration. 
 Main risks 
Overall, the programme broadly identifies the main risks to the macroeconomic scenario 
over the medium-term. Maintaining external competitiveness could be challenging, 
especially if inflation remains elevated and the real effective exchange rate appreciates 
significantly. Attracting and sustaining higher domestic and foreign investments could 
also prove difficult, in a still uncertain international economic environment. Economic 
recovery may also be impeded by unfinished household and corporate debt restructuring 
and a weak financial sector. Finally, the gradual capital account liberalisation remains a 
key challenge for the authorities. 
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3.5 PUBLIC FINANCE 
Fiscal consolidation has been a success over the recent years, with significant 
frontloading of the adjustment. The primary deficit was reduced to around 1% of GDP in 
2011 and the increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio appears to have been brought to a halt. 
However, consolidation efforts have slowed down in 2011 and there were some slippages 
which have led to a higher than expected budget deficit. In addition, the revision in 
October 2011 of the medium-term budgetary scenario has envisaged a milder 
medium-term adjustment. The composition of the planned adjustment is not sufficiently 
clear as the outlined measures are almost exclusively on the revenue side, while the brunt 
of the adjustment is still to be borne predominantly on the expenditure side. The 
proposed consolidation path is also increasingly counting on temporary non-tax measures 
and other unspecified or unlegislated measures. In view of risks of further fiscal 
slippages and the already high level of government debt, it will be of utmost importance 
that the government follows on its ambitious target of bringing it below 60% of GDP by 
2020. The programme could have provided more details about the 2011 budget execution 
and the policies and risks behind the medium-term budgetary framework. 
The fiscal programme envisages a continuing improvement of the consolidated general 
government balance by close to 5 percentage points of GDP, turning from a deficit of 
3.4% of GDP in 2011 to a surplus of 1.2 % in 2014. The primary deficit is set to improve 
as well, from a deficit of 0.6% to a surplus of 4.4% of GDP. The actual 2011 deficit has 
been recently reported by Statistics Iceland at 4.4% of GDP, a full percentage point 
higher than PEP's estimates. The underperformance in 2011 weakens substantially the 
starting point of the planned fiscal consolidation, which is based on a reduction of the 
total expenditure-to-GDP ratio by 4.3 percentage points over the programme horizon to 
41.2% in 2014. The PEP does not provide sufficient information to identify the sources 
of expenditure reduction, undermining the credibility of the medium-term fiscal 
programme. Total revenue is set to increase marginally by 0.4 percentage points to 
42.4% of GDP in 2014, largely due to unspecified or temporary measures. The general 
government debt ratio is projected to decline by 13.5 percentage points, from 98.4% of 
GDP in 2011 to 84.8% of GDP in 2014. 
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3.5.1 Budget implementation in 2011 
The PEP does not present a detailed analysis of the actual budgetary execution in 2011. 
The central budget deficit is estimated at about 2.8% of GDP, making most of the 
estimated general government deficit of 3.4% of GDP in 2011. According to Iceland's 
most recent ''Reporting of Government deficits and Debt Levels'' (of 15 March 2012), the 
actual budgetary outcome has been worse than the one reported in the programme, with a 
deficit for the general government of 4.4% of GDP in ESA95 terms. The slippages were 
mainly on the expenditure side and at central government level, while local government 
budgets performed better than expected posting a deficit of 0.3% of GDP. 
The initial 2011 budget included a set of ambitious consolidation measures, amounting to 
around 2.7% of GDP with most of the adjustment on the expenditure side. They included 
freezes of nominal wages and benefits, cuts in current and capital spending as well as 
increased taxation of capital income and net wealth, higher inheritance tax and 
introducing a new bank levy. Overall, revenue execution (on a cash basis) has been 
broadly satisfactorily, with taxes on income and profits, excises and social security 
contributions performing relatively well. On the other hand, revenue from value added 
tax, about a quarter of all treasury revenue, underperformed, despite booming private 
consumption. Budget performance has been weakened by the government decision to 
implement the spring collective wage agreements in the public sector, which has 
absorbed some of the envisaged savings on the expenditure side. Contingent liabilities 
have not influenced the 2011 deficit but remain a source of risk for the budget over the 
medium term. 
3.5.2 Near-term and medium-term budget strategy  
The PEP's fiscal scenario contains a relatively detailed presentation of the operations of 
the central government but fails to present sufficient information about the general 
government. Fiscal projections for 2012 are based on the budget adopted in December 
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2011 and target a general government deficit of 1.4% of GDP (of which 1.2% at central 
government level). The 2012 budget includes new consolidation measures, most of them 
on the revenue side, amounting to around 1.7% of GDP (see Box 1). The revenue 
forecast is rather conservative as the programme does not envisage significant increase in 
the revenue-to-GDP ratio. On the other hand, the development of the medium-term 
expenditure profile, which dominates the adjustment, is not sufficiently elaborated in the 
PEP. 
Expenditure restraint measures are projected at ISK 8.1 billion, or around 0.5% of GDP 
in 2012. They include mainly cuts in current expenditure and transfers (about ISK 4 
billion each) and ISK 0.2 billion savings in maintenance and capital expenditure. Over 
2013-2015, government ministries and agencies are to save ISK 5 billion per year 
through additional but unspecified measures. At the same time, central government 
spending on wages in 2012 and 2013 is set to increase by more than 3% each year, due to 
the implementation of the wage agreements, and to continue to rise in 2014-2015 by 0.5 
percentage points above the forecasted rate of inflation. The implementation of the wage 
agreements is also leading to increased spending on social security benefits. An 
unspecified, real increase in expenditure related to the aging population, disability 
benefits and medicines is also envisaged while spending on unemployment benefits is 
expected to be lower, in line with the envisaged reduction in unemployment. Most of the 
current expenditure and transfer payments are set to rise only with inflation but the 
programme fails to provide sufficient details about the expenditure structure and the 
envisaged measures that would underpin the foreseen expenditure profile. The public 
investment to GDP ratio slightly declines over the PEP horizon from already very low 
levels. 
Revenue increasing measures are set to yield ISK 20.7 billion, or 1.2% of GDP in 2012. 
They include the introduction of a new tax on salary payments of financial institutions, 
pension funds, and insurance companies, new tax bracket for the tax on wealth, increase 
of the fishing fee and of the reference price for the carbon tax, reduction of the tax 
deduction permitted for third-pillar pension savings and extension of the possibility of 
withdrawing third-pillar pension savings by one more year. All these measures are 
estimated to generate ISK 11.7 billion in additional revenue, to be topped-up by asset 
sales and dividends for another ISK 9 billion. Over 2013-2015, the PEP's fiscal scenario 
envisages that revenue measures would bring on average 1.7% of GDP per year 
additional revenue. Most of this revenue, though, depends on measures that are uncertain 
(dividends and asset sales), have not been enacted or specified. 
General government total revenues are projected to increase slightly by 0.1 percentage 
point of GDP, from 42.0% in 2011 to 42.1% in 2012. Total expenditure as a share of 
GDP are set to continue falling, from 45.4% in 2011 to 43.6% in 2012. The primary 
balance is expected to turn from a deficit into a surplus of 1.9% of GDP for the first time 
since the crisis and to continue to improve by 1.3 and 1.1 percentage points of GDP in 
2013 and 2014. 
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 Fiscal measures in the 2012 budget   
 Revenue measures* Expenditure measures**  
 Assets sale                                          (ISK 7.0 bn) 
Dividends                                           (ISK 2.0 bn) 
Wealth tax                                          (ISK 1.5 bn) 
Fishing fee                                         (ISK 1.5 bn) 
Carbon tax                                         (ISK 0.8 bn) 
Tax on financial institutions salaries (ISK 4.5 bn) 
PIT on pension withdrawal                (ISK 1.4 bn) 
Third-pillar pension savings              (ISK 2.0 bn) 
Total effect on revenue: ISK 20.7 billion (1.2% of GDP) 
Cuts in current spending                                 (ISK 4.0 bn) 
Cuts in transfers                                              (ISK 3.9 bn) 
Cuts in maintenance and capital expenditure (ISK 0.2 bn) 
 
 
 
 
Total effect on spending: ISK 8.1 billion (0.5% of GDP) 
 
 
* Estimated impact on central government revenues. The initial proposal for a 10.5% tax on financial institutions salaries has 
been modified to 5.45% tax on wages plus additional 6% tax on profits to be levied over a certain threshold. 
** Estimated impact on central government expenditure. 
Sources: PEP 2012 
 
 
Fiscal adjustment has been weakened compared to previous plans, although it still 
remains relatively ambitious. It relies on temporary and unspecified measures, especially 
in the outer years of the programme. Revenue estimates are rather conservative, in line 
with the expected recovery of the economy and matching the uncertainty surrounding 
some of the consolidation measures on the revenue side. As regards expenditure, the PEP 
points out that the room for further savings has narrowed considerably. Nevertheless, the 
medium-term consolidation depends mainly on the expenditure side, as the programme 
envisages only modest increases in spending, in general, below inflation rates. The 
credibility of the programme suffers from the lack of sufficient details about the sources 
of this expenditure profile. 
Risks 
The fiscal scenario is built on broadly realistic growth assumptions but it, nevertheless, 
faces several risks. The first is related to the actual 2011 budgetary outcome, which 
proved to be worse than expected, making the starting point for the medium-term 
adjustment weaker. Another source of tension comes from the need to balance fiscal 
consolidation efforts with the support of the economic recovery. It is coupled with an 
obvious 'consolidation fatigue' after several years of significant efforts, which have 
strained the society and the economy. The PEP acknowledges the importance of these 
factors and envisages a milder, although still relatively ambitious, adjustment path. 
Manifold risks, even for this weaker fiscal scenario, stem from the unfinished agenda of 
restructuring the financial sector. Lending activity remains largely frozen and banks and 
the HFF, despite their expanding capital base and strong liquidity positions, could be still 
a source of significant liabilities. The households and the corporate sector are also in a 
limbo with unclear balance sheets and high debt burden, which impedes investment 
decisions and economic recovery and undermines tax bases. The level of government 
debt is also disturbingly high and needs to be brought down over the medium term in 
order to limit solvency and servicing risks. Finally, despite shielding the economy from 
possible foreign capital outflows, capital controls have widespread perverse effects on 
the structure of the economy and on economic policy and risk becoming entrenched if 
more resolute measures for their lifting are not taken. 
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Change:
2011-14
Revenues 41.5 42.0 42.1 42.1 42.4 0.4
- Total taxes 30.8 31.7 31.6 35.8 35.9 4.2
    - Other (residual) 10.7 10.3 10.5 6.3 6.5 -3.8
Expenditure 51.5 45.4 43.6 42.1 41.2 -4.2
Primary expenditure (1) 46.0 40.9 38.7 37.3 36.4 -4.5
of which:
Gross fixed capital formation 2.9 - - - - -
Consumption 25.9 25.0 24.0 23.4 22.9 -2.1
Transfers & subsidies 9.6 - - - - -
Other (residual) 7.6 - - - - -
Interest payments 5.5 4.5 4.9 4.8 4.8 0.3
Budget balance -10.1 -3.4 -1.4 0.0 1.2 4.6
- Cyclically adjusted - - - - - -
Primary balance (2) -6.6 -0.6 1.9 3.3 4.4 5.0
Gross debt level 92.9 98.4 93.2 89.4 84.8 -13.6
(1) Expenditure minus interest payments; (2) as defined by the PEP: total balance corrected for net interest
Sources: Pre-Accession Economic Programme (PEP) 2012, ECFIN calculations
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Composition of the budgetary adjustment  (%  of GDP)
 
- Structural balance (cyclical component of deficit, one-off measures and temporary 
measures, fiscal stance) 
The programme does not contain an estimation of the structural balance. 
Budgetary implications of "major structural reforms" 
The programme provides only very limited information about the budgetary impact of 
major structural reforms. A new bill on fisheries management (not yet adopted) is 
expected to bring significant budgetary revenue (see Box 1) and a reduction in the 
number of ministries from twelve to ten, and possibly to eight, could bring some minor 
savings on the expenditure side. 
General government debt 
A key objective of Iceland's economic programme is to bring the central government 
debt to 45-50% of GDP and the general government debt to 60% of GDP by 2020. The 
PEP projects a decrease of the general government debt to around 85% of GDP in 2014, 
which is in line with the fiscal scenario. 
Projections on the decomposition of changes in the debt ratio over the PEP period reveal 
that the primary balance would increasingly be the main factor for debt reduction. In 
addition, the "snowball effect" (i.e. the combined effect of interest and nominal GDP 
growth) has a steady, although declining, debt reducing effect. The residual stock-flow 
adjustment remains rather small, with the exception of 2011 when the government 
decided to borrow the full outstanding amount of the bilateral loans negotiated with the 
Nordic countries. In March 2012, the central bank and the government prepaid around 
one fifth of their obligations toward the IMF and the Nordic countries. Although not 
reflected in the programme, the prepayment would reduce government debt by 
approximately 3.4% of GDP. 
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2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Gross debt ratio [1] 92.9 98.4 93.2 89.4 84.8
Change in the ratio 5.0 5.5 -5.1 -3.8 -4.6
Contributions [2]:
1. Primary balance [3] 6.6 0.6 -1.9 -3.3 -4.4
2. “Snow-ball” effect 0.9 -2.9 -3.4 -1.3 -1.6
Of which:
Interest expenditure, net 3.4 2.9 3.4 3.3 3.2
Growth effect 3.4 -2.2 -2.2 -2.2 -2.4
Inflation effect -5.9 -3.5 -4.6 -2.4 -2.4
3. Stock-flow adjustment -2.6 7.8 0.2 0.8 1.4
[2]  The snow-ball effect captures the impact of interest  expenditure on accumulated debt, as 
well as the impact of real GDP growth and inflation on the debt ratio (through the 
denominator). 
Source: Pre-Accession Economic Programme(PEP); 2012 Commission Services' calculations
Composition of changes in the debt ratio (%  of GDP)
Notes:
[1]   End of period.
[3] As defined in the PEP: Budget balance corrected for net interest  payments
 
Future PEP submissions would benefit from presenting the currency and maturity 
structure of the debt, in addition to a sensitivity analysis linking debt scenarios (stock and 
servicing) to deviations of key economic variables from base assumption, such as GDP 
growth, inflation, exchange rates, interest rates (especially with a view to capital 
liberalisation). Iceland has regained its investment grade rating and is well-positioned to 
solidify its position on the international financial markets. However, the relatively high 
stock of debt and explicit and implicit contingent liabilities underline the need for a 
continuation of prudent fiscal policy and careful debt management.  
3.5.3 Sensitivity analysis and comparison with previous PEP 
The programme does not provide a sensitivity analysis of the impact of changes to main 
economic assumptions (e.g. GDP growth, revenue growth, interest rates, exchange rates) 
on the fiscal position. It nevertheless outlines potential risks stemming from very high 
contingent liabilities. State guarantees stood at around 80% of GDP in 2011 covering 
mainly the Housing Financing Fund and Landsvirkjun (the state-owned 
electricity-generating company). The financial situation of the power-generating 
company is satisfactory and its exposure to the volatility of aluminium prices has been 
reduced. On the other hand, risks related to the operations of the Housing Fund 
materialised in 2010, triggering a government recapitalisation amounting to some 2% of 
GDP. The Fund, to which about 70% of all state guarantees are extended, is still 
undercapitalised and remains a potential source of obligations for the government. The 
state could also be liable to pay an estimated ISK 15-30 billion (0.9-1.8% of GDP) 
arising from the merger of SpKef savings bank with Landsbanki and from settling the 
difference between assets and liabilities of SpKef. 
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The Icesave dispute represents a prominent contingent liability. In December 2011, the 
winding-up board of Landsbanki paid-out about one-third of all outstanding priority 
claims. In the same month, the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) Surveillance 
Authority took Iceland to the EFTA Court over a potential breach of the Deposit 
Guarantee Directive. Thus, the potential obligations for Iceland remain significant but 
uncertain. The PEP expects that sufficient assets would be recovered from Landsbanki's 
estate in order to cover all the priority or senior claims over the coming years. 
As in the case of the government debt scenario, future PEP submissions would benefit 
from a proper sensitivity analysis of the fiscal balance to changes in some key economic 
variables. This would be useful in assessing the effects of possible deviations from the 
baseline macroeconomic scenario on the realisation of the medium-term fiscal 
programme and its targets. It would also underpin the achievement of sustainable public 
finances by providing the basis for corrective measures in case further deviations from 
the outlined fiscal path occur. 
3.5.4 Quality of public finance and institutional features 
The PEP presents a comprehensive overview of on-going institutional reforms, aiming to 
improve the quality of public finances. After the crisis exposed many of the weaknesses 
of the budgetary process and decision-making, Iceland has launched a thorough overhaul 
of the underlying legal basis, including its organic budget law. The new law has the 
ambition to lay the foundations for a sustainable fiscal policy and is set to be presented to 
the parliament in the spring of 2012. In parallel, Iceland is performing a gap analysis of 
its internal financial control and external audit in order to strengthen its financial control 
system and bring it closer to EU standards and best practices. 
In 2011, the budget has set a two-year forward looking framework for binding nominal 
expenditure limits, provided price deviations would be less than 1.5 percentage points 
from assumptions, and coupled with an ISK 5 billion reserve to cover contingency 
expenditure. The rule was undermined by the collective wage agreements last year. 
Nevertheless, the programme foresees that it will remain in place, with a possible 
revision of the 2013-2014 ceilings in the spring of 2012. The rule would need to be 
implemented in practice, if it is to gain credibility in the future. 
Special attention is devoted in the PEP to the quality of local government finances. 
Deficits and debts at local level have increased in the crisis, leading the authorities to 
pass a new law in the autumn of 2011, introducing fiscal rules at local level. It requires 
local governments to balance their budgets over each three year period. In addition, it 
introduces a limit on total debt of 150% of revenue to be achieved within 10 years. The 
law differentiates the required efforts and monitoring on the basis of these two criteria, 
the only exception being the City of Reykjavik because of the high debt of Reykjavik 
Energy, a local public utility company. According to the PEP, local governments would 
have to further consolidate their budgets, making a combined effort of 1% of GDP over 
three years until 2014. The new law on local government finances is certainly a step in 
the right direction and should help in the process of rebalancing local budgets. 
The programme does not explicitly discuss the composition of budget revenue and 
expenditure. Consolidation requirements are carefully balanced with a need to support a 
more even income distribution. Looking ahead, the programme's revenue enhancing 
 47 of 127 
measures look increasingly tilted towards the later goal, as it envisages higher taxation of 
the financial sector and of the rent in some sectors in the economy. Growth-enhancing 
expenditure, like public investment, has been reduced significantly in the crisis and is 
foreseen to remain at historically low levels over the programme horizon.  Priority has 
been given to supporting public consumption, which is close to a turning point and may 
stop falling in 2012. This expenditure structure, although boosting short-term recovery 
and consumer confidence, is not conducive to sustainable long-term growth and may 
come under pressure for increasing government investments as the economy expands. 
3.5.5 Sustainability of public finance 
The PEP 2012-2014 does not discuss or provide information about long-term projections 
of population trends and age-related public expenditures. Therefore, it remains unclear to 
what extent the current health and social welfare system present a challenge for the long-
term sustainability and how the medium-term policy strategy would respond to those 
challenges. Last years' PEP asserted a relatively favourable outlook for Iceland's pension 
system, in comparison with peer countries. Nevertheless, a government committee was 
set up to examine the financial burden from ageing population on the pension system in 
Iceland and to suggest possible avenues for future pension reforms. 
3.6 STRUCTURAL REFORMS 
3.6.1 Obstacles to growth and structural reform agenda 
The PEP covers a broad range of structural reform areas with a view to improving the 
supply side of the economy and increasing its resilience. In the short term, the still 
precarious situation of the financial sector and the high household and corporate 
indebtedness are identified as major obstacles to a sustainable recovery. This is coupled 
with the problem of inefficient capital markets and existing restrictions on capital 
movement. As a medium to long-term challenge, the programme outlines the need for 
export diversification to alleviate overreliance on exports of marine products and 
aluminium. 
3.6.2 Key areas of structural reform 
Overall, the programme's set of measures to tackle policy priorities is broadly 
appropriate. Proper attention is given, in line with the Iceland 2020 strategy, to 
stimulating innovation and job creation and fostering regional development. However, 
the level of detail in presenting some of the measures is insufficient and the timeline and 
sequencing of measures are either lacking or not sufficiently elaborated upon. 
Product and capital markets 
The PEP touches upon a number of structural reform areas, such as enterprise sector 
restructuring, energy, competition and regional policies, with a special attention given to 
the financial sector. The state retains a major presence in the economy. It is the owner of 
all public utilities and in control of strategically important sectors, like the energy sector. 
The programme confirms that there are no plans for privatisation. The Treasury remains 
the main shareholder in Landsbanki, minority owner in the other two big banks and holds 
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important shares in several smaller savings banks. In the medium-term, it intends to 
profit from its involvement in the financial sector by collecting dividends or selling 
assets, although in view of the remaining problems in the sector, this assumption may 
prove optimistic. 
In 2011, competition policy has been strengthened, notably to deal with dominant 
positions in different markets. No further policy changes in the field of competition are 
envisaged over the programme horizon. A new Energy Strategy has been developed to 
target reduction in consumption and imports of fossil fuels. It also prioritises the use of 
renewable energy and sets ambitious goals for the share of renewables in the transport 
sector, to be achieved by 2020. As part of its development agenda, the government is 
implementing a 2010-2013 regional development plan. The aim is to improve conditions 
for development throughout the country through measures supporting employment, 
investment, innovation and culture. In addition, a one-year regional transporting aid 
scheme has been introduced to promote the manufacturing industry and support growth 
in remote regions. 
The PEP admits that despite significant progress in financial sector restructuring over the 
last few years, the sector continues to suffer from serious problems. A February 2012 
decision by the Supreme Court of Iceland, judging illegal the retrospective interest 
payments on exchange-rate linked loans, is likely to further delay the completion of debt 
restructuring and increase its burden for the banks.  Banks have high operating costs and 
the sector is highly concentrated, facing serious competition issues, which could only be 
worsened by mergers in the sector. Entry barriers are significant, according to the 
Competition Authority, and consumers cannot easily change their bank. The incentives 
structure in the sector is influenced by the fact that most of the owners of the banks are 
foreign creditors, through companies owned by the old banks' winding-up committees, 
which currently are 'locked-in'  because of the capital controls. It is also not clear to what 
extent the debt restructuring has left the banks in position to either directly own or 
influence companies and some sectors of the economy experiencing debt problems. The 
Ministry of Economic Affairs is set to present a report to the parliament in 2012 on the 
future structure of the financial system, addressing some of these issues and setting a 
base for drafting concrete legislative proposals. The ministry and the central bank are 
also to explore the use of macro-prudential tools to strengthen the system. Further actions 
to improve the legal framework in the sector and coordination between different 
authorities are envisaged. 
Labour market 
Although the number of unemployed declined in 2011, the labour force has fallen as well 
and job creation remains a challenge. The government recognised the seriousness of the 
problem and launched a number of measures and programmes to improve the functioning 
of the labour market and soften the effects of the crisis on the unemployed. According to 
the PEP, among all programmes, participation in job training and training involving 
innovative projects have been the most successful as over 60% of the participants have 
been deregistered from the unemployment registry within three months of participation. 
On-the job training will continue in 2012, offering 1,500 jobs. Long-term unemployment, 
which reached historically high levels and represents about a quarter of total 
unemployment, is of particular concern. While the parliament extended the maximum 
eligibility period for unemployment benefits until the end of 2012, part of the efforts to 
decrease long-term unemployment has been channelled to the design of an education 
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programme for those unemployed for six months or longer. About 1,000 people applied 
for the programme in the autumn 2011 and received benefits during the first semester of 
their studies. Looking ahead, the PEP also outlines a number of additional measures to 
boost education, linking it more closely to the needs of the labour market. The 
programme does not comment on the wage setting mechanism in the country. In view of 
its importance for the labour market and overall economic performance, future 
submissions would certainly benefit from analysing it. 
Other reform areas 
Other reform areas cover the agricultural sector, public administration, FDI performance 
and private debt restructuring. The programme sketches a few ideas (on-going and 
planned) on how to increase administrative capacity and cooperation between 
government bodies. It also acknowledges the substantial differences between agricultural 
policy and instruments in Iceland and the EU but fails to address the question of how and 
in what timeframe Iceland would align itself to the acquis. 
Although the PEP claims that households debt restructuring of exchange-rate linked 
loans have been completed, the recent Supreme Court decision judging illegal the 
retrospective interest payments on these loans, have effectively reopened the issue once 
again. This could also delay the envisaged completion of corporate debt restructuring 
beyond mid-2012. The restructuring of foreign currency loans remains unfinished as 
well, depending on the outcome of a number of court cases. The programme asserts the 
important role played by the Financial Supervision Authority and the Competition 
Authority in ensuring the fairness and efficiency of the corporate restructuring process. 
In order to provide the authorities with more information and support policy-making, 
Statistics Iceland has been entrusted to collect detailed information about indebted 
households and corporations, including about their payment difficulties and equity, 
which is expected to be published for the first time in 2012. 
The PEP recognises the importance of investment for economic growth in Iceland. 
Foreign direct investments are currently still relatively low and heavily concentrated in a 
few sectors. In December 2011, the government submitted to the parliament a proposal 
for a resolution on foreign investment calling for transparency and clear regulations on 
FDI. If adopted, the proposal would also explicitly give the authorities a mandate to seek 
foreign investments which support economic diversification, environmental protection, 
research and development, high job creation and value added, use new technologies, 
create new opportunities and provide high tax revenue. 
3.7 OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF FORMAL REQUIREMENTS  
Macro framework 
Chapter 2.1 presents a brief description of real and external sectors and labour market 
developments. Future submissions should also capture monetary and credit variables in a 
comprehensive manner. The medium-term macroeconomic framework in chapter 2.2 
would benefit from an analysis of the medium-term prospects of the current monetary 
and exchange rate strategy. Exploring the links between the financial sector and the 
medium-term growth scenario and presenting alternative growth scenarios could also 
enhance the quality of the programme in the future. The PEP could assess as well the 
level of foreign reserves on the basis of standard liquidity and solvency indicators and, 
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more generally Iceland's net international investment position in the context of the capital 
liberalisation strategy. A more forward looking assessment of balance of payments 
developments and in-depth analysis of the sustainability of the external position and of 
competitiveness issues are also warranted. Weaknesses remain with respect to data on 
savings-investment balances. 
Fiscal framework 
Historical data on budget balances and debt are consistent with data provided in the 
context of the September 2011 fiscal notification.  The programme would have gained 
clarity by providing more details about the 2011 budgetary execution and the policies 
and risks behind the medium-term budgetary framework. The PEP continues to have a 
strong emphasis on central government instead of general government operations. Future 
submissions would benefit from more complete data (e.g. on composition of general 
government revenue and expenditure, long term fiscal projections, cyclical budget 
balance). A sensitivity analysis should be added to the baseline fiscal programme to 
better understand risks to the scenario. 
Structural reforms 
The structural reform framework is coherent but the level of detail in presenting some of 
the measures is insufficient. The programme would also benefit from providing a clear 
timeline and sequencing of the planned measures, along with information about their 
estimated budgetary impact. 
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Annex: Structural indicators
EU 27
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
General economic background
Real GDP 1 6.0 1.3 -6.8 -4.0 3.1 3.2 0.3 -4.3 2.0 1.6f
Labour productivity 2 96.5 100.9 100.2 93.8 n.a. 100 100 100 100 100
Real unit labour cost 3 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. -0.8 1.0 2.8 -1.6 -0.5f
Real effective exchange rate 4 126.0 79.7 62.7 70.2 71.8 121.4 123.2 118.3 109.0 113.1
Inflation rate 5 3.7 12.7 16.4 7.6 4.3 2.3 3.7 1.0 2.1 3.1e
Unemployment rate 6 2.3 3.0 7.2 7.6 7.1 7.2 7.1 9.0 9.7 9.6
Employment
Employment rate 7 85.1 83.6 78.3 78.2 n.a. 65.3 65.8 64.5 64.1 n.a.
Employment rate - females 8 80.8 79.6 76.5 76.2 n.a. 58.2 58.9 58.4 58.2 n.a.
Employment rate of older workers 9 84.7 82.9 80.2 79.8 n.a. 44.6 45.6 46.0 46.3 n.a.
Long term unemployment 10 0.2 0.1 0.4 1.3 n.a. 3.1 2.6 3.0 3.9 n.a.
Product market reforms 
Relative price levels 11 148.9 116.8 100.8 110.3 n.a. 100 100 100 100 100
Total trade-to-GDP ratio 12 26.7 31.7 30.5 32.7 35.0 10.7 11.6 9.8 11.7 n.a.
Net FDI  13 -16.5 30.4 -18.2 20.7 8.1 3.9 2.2 2.1 1.0 n.a.
Sectoral and ad-hoc state aid 15 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 n.a.
Business investment 16 24.3 20.2 10.6 10.1 11.9 18.7 18.4 16.2 15.9 n.a.
Knowledge based economy
Tertiary graduates 17 10.2 10.4 10.3 n.a. n.a. 13.8 14.5 14.3 n.a. n.a.
Spending on human resources 18 7.4 7.6 n.a. n.a. n.a. 5.0 5.1 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Educational attainment 19 52.9 53.6 53.6 53.4 n.a. 78.1 78.5 78.6 79.0 n.a.
R&D expenditure 20 2.7 2.6 3.1 n.a. n.a. 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.0 n.a.
Broadband penetration rate 21 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 18.2 21.7 23.9 25.7 n.a.
Source:  Commission services, national sources
1. Growth rate of real GDP in %.  2. Labour productivity per person employed - GDP in PPS per person employed relative 
to EU-27 (EU-27=100).  3. Growth rate of the ratio: compensation per employee in current prices divided by GDP (in 
current prices) per total employment.  4. Vs IC36 (1999 = 100), current year's values are based on Commission's forecast 
deflator figures, nominal unit  labour cost deflator.  5. Annual average rate of change in Harmonized Indices of Consumer 
Prices (HICPs).  6. Unemployed persons as a share of the total active population.  7. Employed persons aged 15-64 in % 
of total population of the same age group.  8. Employed women aged 15-64 in % of total female population of the same 
age group.  9. Employed persons aged 55-64 (EU27) or 50-64 in % of total population of the same age group.  10. Long-
term unemployed (over 12 months) in % of total active population.   11. comparative price levels of final consumption 
by private households including indirect taxes (EU-27=100).  12. Trade integration - Average value of imports and exports 
of goods divided by GDP.  
f: forecast, e: estimated value, p: provisional value, b: break in series, s: Eurostat estimate, r: revised value,
13. Average value of inward and outward FDIs flows in % of GDP.  14. Market share of the largest generator (% of total 
net generation). 15. In % of GDP. 16. Gross fixed capital formation by the private sector in % of GDP.  17.Total tertiary 
graduates in science and technology per 1000 of population aged 20-29.  18. Public expenditure on education in % of GDP. 
19. Percentage of the population aged 20 to 24 having completed at least upper secondary education.  20. GERD (Gross 
domestic expenditure on R&D) - in % of GDP.  21. Number of broadband access lines per 100 inhabitants.
Iceland
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4 THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA 
4.1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
The Pre-Accession Economic Programme for 2012 - 2014 (the "2012 PEP") of the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was submitted on 31 January 2012. Its main 
objective is to improve the country's competitiveness by a broad rand of measures, such 
as enhancing the business environment, supporting SMEs, improving human capital and 
the functioning of the labour market, promoting exports, improving the efficiency of 
public administration, strengthening the rule of law and the capacities of supervisory 
institutions and improving the productivity in agriculture. These objectives are in line the 
country's challenges. The programme complies with the requested form. However, with 
respect to the presented content and the provided numeric underpinning, the document 
does not meet the standard expected from an advanced candidate country. Overall, the 
programme unfortunately is neither very helpful for presenting the authorities' medium-
term plans, nor does it provide a solid base for policy decision.  
 
The programme presents the macroeconomic outlook in the form of annual ranges. 
However, there is no central scenario and this range approach is not applied for the whole 
framework. So the government’s expectations for the programme period remain 
ambiguous and the analysis of the impact of different growth scenarios on other parts of 
the economy, such as inflation and external balances, appears incomplete. The 
programme's external projections do not seem to be entirely consistent with the growth 
scenario, which in the stronger growth scenario could result in wider external balances in 
2013 and 2014. Contrary to the Commission's request, the programme neither presents a 
detailed assessment of the country's external sustainability nor of competitiveness issues. 
Overall, the macroeconomic scenario appears to be on the optimistic side, in particular 
for 2012. The fiscal strategy is not discernible as neither the public finance path over the 
years 2012 to 2014 nor the envisaged measures are made explicit. The structural reform 
agenda is very comprehensive but would have benefitted from a more explicit discussion 
of policy measures and their estimated impact on fulfilling the programmes objectives. 
The programme refers to the Europe 2020 strategy and defines national targets in some 
areas. It also addresses EU accession related priorities, although the translation of those 
priorities into concrete measures could have been presented in more detail. Overall, the 
usefulness of the programme for medium-term policy making appears limited, as the 
macro-economic scenario and the public finance path over the 2012-2014 period are 
ambiguous. Only limited and aggregated public finance data is provided for the whole 
period.  
 
Real GDP growth accelerated from 1.8% in 2010 to 3% in 2011. In the first half of the 
year, output growth was at 5%, but economic activity decelerated markedly in the rest of 
the year. Inflation remained high in the first half of the year, reflecting strong demand but 
also high international food and fuel prices. Inflationary pressures decelerated in the 
second half of the year, leading to an annual inflation rate of 3.8%, compared to 1.6% in 
2010. The trade deficit widened sharply in the first half of 2011, although lower domestic 
demand in the second half helped to contain the increase in trade deficit, from 21.3% of 
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GDP in 2010 to 23% in 2011. Inflows of current transfers remained stable at close to 
20% of GDP. In line with the underlying dynamics in the trade balance, the current 
account deficit rose from 2.2% in 2010 to 2.8% in 2011. FDI inflows rose from 3% in 
2010 to about 4% in 2011. The international investment position appears to have 
deteriorated markedly in 2011, reflecting increased reliance on foreign loans for 
financing mainly public spending. The cash-based central government deficit was at 
2.6% of GDP, while the central government debt rose as a result of drawing on external 
sources. Unemployment dropped slightly, from 32% of the labour force in 2010 to 31.4% 
in 2011. Despite the overall relatively favourable macroeconomic performance, the key 
accession-related challenges remain: improve the functioning of the market economy in 
order to raise the country's potential growth and to reduce the extremely high level of 
unemployment. This requires further substantial improvements of the business 
environment, a strengthening of the rule of law and of institutional and administration 
capacities as well as efforts to enhance the quality of education.  
The medium-term macroeconomic framework for the period 2012-14 is presented in the 
form of annual ranges for GDP growth. The upper boundary increases from 4% in 2012 
to 4.7% in 2014. The lower boundary expects output growth of at least 3% in 2012 which 
will improve to at least 4% in 2014. Growth is expected to be mainly driven by domestic 
factors, in particular private consumption and investment. This appears optimistic, in 
particular given the limitations of raising disposable incomes. Import growth is seen to 
remain moderate, supporting a decline in external imbalances. In view of the strong 
underlying domestic demand, this improvement comes a bit as a surprise. Inflation is 
forecast to remain benign, while strong employment growth will help to reduce 
unemployment. Overall, there is a significant downside risk to the forecast in 2012, while 
in view of expected strong growth in 2013-2014, external imbalances could be much 
wider. 
The preliminary central government deficit was 2.6% of GDP in 2011. However, the 
presented data is on cash-base only, not taking into account substantial payment arrears. 
Lower than expected revenue growth required adjustments on the spending side to meet 
the budget target. As in the past, the main adjustment took place in the area of public 
investment. The budget for 2012 is based on a rather optimistic growth scenario, 
expecting nominal GDP growth of about 7% and revenue growth of nearly 6%, based on 
already optimistic revenue estimates for 2011. The budget plans to contain current 
spending in order to increase capital investment. However, the programme misses details 
on how exactly this reorientation will be implemented. For the period 2013-14 the 
authorities envisage a deficit at 2.5% of GDP at most. However, the programme does not 
provide sufficient details, neither with respect to planned revenue and spending scenarios 
nor with respect to planned measures in order to achieve deficit targets. Furthermore, the 
PEP lacks a presentation of risk mitigation strategies, such as in case of lower than 
expected revenue growth or unexpected higher spending. The issue of risks to deficit 
financing is not adequately addressed. This renders it particularly difficult to assess the 
authorities' fiscal policy stance in the medium term.  
The programme would have benefited from a more in-depth diagnosis of structural 
bottlenecks to growth, in line with the Europe 2020 strategy, as requested by the 
Commission. The main growth obstacles appear to be a weak business environment, 
resulting from an inadequate rule of law and insufficient judicial, regulatory, supervisory 
and administrative capacities, and, among others, a poorly educated labour force. The 
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programme puts slightly increased emphasis on these shortcomings. However, it would 
have benefitted from a clearer link between identified obstacles and policy measures and 
a concreter and more concise presentation of those reform measures. Furthermore, the 
document could have presented the reform measures in a more forward looking way, for 
example by specified concrete targets to be achieved.  
The main risks to the programme are related to lower than expected growth, resulting 
from a further deterioration of the external environment, impeding export markets but 
possibly also affecting current transfers of citizens living abroad or temporary job 
opportunities in neighbouring Greece.  Conversely, the rather high growth assumed in the 
programme is likely to lead to a widening of external imbalances and create pressure on 
the de-facto exchange rate peg to the Euro. On the other hand, lower growth could lead to 
a further deterioration in the labour market and require adjustments in the fiscal 
framework. In addition to the risk stemming from lower growth, the financing of the 
envisaged deficits primarily through external sources exposes the fiscal framework to 
risks related to the costs and availability of foreign financing. With respect to structural 
reforms, the main risks are related to delayed or stalled implementation. 
Given the lack of detail with respect to the country's fiscal scenario, it is not possible to 
assess to which extent the presented structural reforms are in line with the budgetary 
framework.  However, in view of the country's accession related reform requirements, 
the reform agenda would have benefitted from bolder measures and/or an approach with 
a stronger focus to key reform areas. In this respect, a better and more concrete 
integration between the fiscal framework and the reform agenda would have been 
helpful.  
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Real GDP growth (% change) COM 1.8 3.0 2.5 3.5 n.a.
2012 1.8 3.5 3.0-4.0 3.5-4.2 4.0-4.7
Consumer price inflation (%) COM 1.6 3.8 2.5 3.3 n.a.
2012 1.6 3.9 2.5 2.5 2.5
General government balance (% of GDP) COM -2.5 -2.5 -2.2 -2.0 n.a.
2012 -2.5 -2.5 -2.5
Primary balance (% of GDP) COM -1.8 -1.8 -1.5 -1.3 n.a.
2012 -2.1 -1.8 -1.8
Government gross debt (% of GDP) COM 26.2 29.0 31.0 32.5 n.a.
2012 24.6 27.0 28.8
Sources: Pre-Accession Economic Programme (PEP), Commission 2011 Autumn Forecast (COM)
Comparison of key macroeconomic and budgetary projections
up to -2.5
up to -1.8
up to 28.8
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4.2 INTRODUCTION 13 
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia submitted its sixth PEP on 31th January 
2012, covering the period 2012-2014. The programme has been adopted by the 
government. It is a joint document based on contributions from numerous line ministries 
and the Central Bank, under the coordination of the Ministry of Finance. Social Partners 
and the business community have been consulted on the draft document. The programme 
takes into account the 2012 budget and other national programmes, such as the National 
Development Plan, the Fiscal strategy for 2012-2014, the Investment strategy for 2012-
14, the National Employment Strategy and the National Plan for the Adoption of the 
Acquis (NPAA). The document also refers to the country's accession process, the 
European Partnership priorities and the Commission's assessment in the Progress Report.  
4.3 KEY CHALLENGES  
Although the country weathered the global financial crisis rather well, the key policy 
challenges remain unchanged: addressing the underlying reasons for high structural 
unemployment, in particular among the young, improving the business environment in 
order to foster investment and job creation and improving the quality of public finances. 
Furthermore, improving the country's productivity and competitiveness are important 
challenges in order increase the country's growth potential over the medium term.   
With respect to the country's accession perspective, important challenges continue to be 
to improve the functioning of the labour market, to strengthen administrative capacities 
and regulatory and supervisory agencies and improve the rule of law and contract 
enforcement.  
4.4 RECENT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS AND MEDIUM-TERM SCENARIO  
4.4.1 Recent macroeconomic developments 
In the first half of 2011, output growth was at around 5% year-on-year, compared to 0% 
in the same period a year before. The main sources of growth have shifted from 
investment in the second half of 2010 and the first quarter of 2011 to private 
consumption in the second quarter of 2011 Besides a base effect a significant part of the 
domestic recovery appears to reflect front-loaded public spending ahead of general 
elections in June, in particular in the area of construction but also in the form of early 
execution of transfer payments, usually planned towards the end of the year.  
On the back of strong domestic demand, the current account deteriorated, from 2.3% of 
GDP in 2010 to around 2.8% of GDP in 2011. This deterioration largely reflects a 
widening of the trade deficit to 24% of GDP, resulting from strong imports, while the 
export dynamics decelerated. Capital inflows in the form of current private transfers 
                                                   
13  The ECOFIN Council of 26/27 November 2000 invited the Commission to "report each year to the 
Council (Ecofin) on its assessment of the Pre-accession Economic Programmes”. The Council 
Presidency conclusions adopted last year can be found at:  
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/11/st09/st09654-re01.en11.pdf 
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remained high at some 20% of GDP and largely financing the trade deficit. A significant 
part of the financing of the current account deficit was covered by drawing about half -
i.e. some 3% of GDP- of an IMF Precautionary Credit Line.  
The preliminary general government deficit was at -2.6% of GDP in 2011. However, 
revenues were significantly below expectations, which – in combination with higher than 
expected spending for social security and subsidies – allowed the realisation of only 
some 76% of the planned capital spending.  
Inflation accelerated in the first five months of 2011 and decelerated afterwards, coming 
down to 2.8% in December, compared to a peak of 5.8% in May. However, annual 
average inflation was markedly higher than a year before, at 3.9%, compared to 1.6% in 
2010. The main factors behind the price increase were strong prices rises for food, rents 
but also energy.   
Official labour-market data point to a continued, albeit decelerating increase in overall 
employment. Employment appears to have increased markedly in agriculture and 
manufacturing. The former is probably due to government incentives to register so far 
unregistered employment. Unemployment continued to drop slightly, but still remained 
at the high level of around a third of the labour force with youth unemployment at some 
56% of this age group's labour force.  
The exchange rate of the Denar has remained largely unchanged against the euro at a 
level of 61.5 MKD/EUR. The Central Bank intends to maintain its current informal peg 
to the euro. 
4.4.2 Medium-term macroeconomic scenario  
Instead of providing precise annual projections, the programme presents its medium-term 
scenario for the period 2012-2014 in the form of annual ranges. The upper boundary for 
GDP growth is seen at 4% in 2012, which will further accelerate to 4.7% in 2014. The 
lower boundary expects output growth of at least 3% in 2012 which will accelerate to at 
least 4% in 2014. In view of rather cautious assumptions on the international 
environment, growth is expected to be mainly driven by domestic factors, in particular 
private consumption and investment. Despite this strong reliance on domestic demand, 
import growth is surprisingly forecast to decelerate significantly, as compared to 2010 
and 2011. At the same time export growth is expected to re-accelerate, benefitting from 
expected stronger exports of recently established foreign investments and contributing to 
a slightly declining trade deficit in percent of GDP. The current account is forecast to 
improve from -4.8% in 2012 to -3.7% in 2014. Inflation is forecast to remain at around 
2.5% during the programme period, seemingly independent from the actual growth 
profile. Employment growth is seen to accelerate from 2% in 2012 to 3% by 2014. 
However, as a result of a similar increase in labour supply, the impact on the 
unemployment rate will be limited, lowering the rate from 30.1% in 2012 to 28.1% in 
2014.  
Overall, the upper boundary of this growth profile is rather on the optimistic side, while 
the lower profile appears more plausible. In particular, assumptions on growth of private 
consumption appear rather optimistic, as the growth of disposable income is limited by 
low wage growth and the fact that up to now a large share of the newly registered 
employment probably does not reflect newly created jobs but just improved registration. 
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Furthermore, the expected import growth profile looks rather subdued, given the 
projected strong growth of domestic demand and the high import content of envisaged 
investment. Presenting two different scenarios would have improved the clarity of the 
programme. 
COM PEP COM PEP COM PEP COM PEP COM PEP
Real GDP (% change) 1.8 1.8 3.0 3.5 2.5 3.0-4.0 3.5 3.5-4.2 n.a. 4.0-4.7
Contributions:
- Final domestic demand -0.6 -0.7 2.7 4.9 2.9 4.3-4.7 5.2 4.5-5.1 n.a. 5.1-5.8
- Change in inventories 1.2 n.a. 0.0 n.a. 0.0 n.a. 0.0 n.a. n.a. n.a.
- External balance of goods and services 2.5 2.5 0.3 -1.5 -0.5 -1.3-0.7 -1.7 -1.1 to -0.9 n.a. -1.0 to -1.1
Employment (% change) 1.3 1.3 2.5 3.0 2.0 2.0 3.0 2.5 n.a. 3.0
Unemployment rate (%) 31.8 32.0 30.5 30.8 30.0 30.1 28.5 29.2 n.a. 28.1
GDP deflator (% change) 2.2 1.6 1.8 3.6 3.9 2.8 4.7 2.4 n.a. 2.5
CPI inflation (%) 1.6 1.6 3.8 3.9 2.5 2.5 3.3 2.5 n.a. 2.5
Current account balance (% of GDP) -2.2 -2.2 -5.5 -4.8 -5.5 -4.8 -6.5 -4.6 n.a. -3.7
Sources: Pre-Accession Economic Programme (PEP); Commission 2011 Autumn Forecast (COM)
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Comparison of macroeconomic developments and forecasts
 
Real sector 
Compared to the Commission's Autumn forecast, the PEP scenario is clearly more 
optimistic for 2012, in particular with respect to the strength of domestic demand, but 
also expecting a rather benign performance of the country's external balances. In 2013, 
expectations with respect to domestic demand growth are more similar, while the PEP 
scenario is more optimistic with respect to containing the deterioration of external 
balances. 
In contrast to the Commission scenario, the PEP uses ranges to indicate upper and lower 
boundaries to the country's growth profile. However, this approach has not been used for 
the projections of price developments, the labour market and the external balances which 
raises questions of consistency.   
Potential GDP growth is estimated to be at 3¾%, using a standard Hodrick-Prescot 
method. This implies that in 2012, at least in the lower bound scenario, the economy 
might still operate below potential, while 2013 and 2014 the expected range of growth is 
mainly above potential growth. (However, realised average GDP growth during the last 
10 years has been around 3%).  
The situation in the labour market is expected to benefit from rather strong output 
growth, which should allow employment growth rates between 2-3%. This is expected to 
bring unemployment rates down to around 30% or 28%, respectively. Real wages are 
expected to increase by some 0.5% to 3%. 
Inflation  
Inflation is expected to remain contained. After a marked increase in 2011 to 3.9%, lower 
energy and food prices, as well as lower import prices are expected to help bring down 
inflation to around 2 - 2.5% during the programme period. The programme does not 
mention the possibility of inflationary pressures from the demand side, despite 
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expectations of above-potential growth. Risks are seen to be mainly on the downside, 
reflecting the risk of lower growth in the EU and its negative impact on the domestic 
economy. The Central Bank is expected to continue its policy of maintaining price 
stability. While the inflation outlook of the programme appears largely consistent with 
the lower range of the growth profile, some elements of the programme suggest the risk 
of inflationary pressures. For example, the programme points to the possibility of strong 
wage increases, which not only could impede competitiveness but also lead to rising 
costs of living.  
Monetary and exchange rate policy 
The monetary framework underlines price stability as the overarching monetary policy 
objective. To this end, the central bank maintains a de-facto fixed peg of the denar 
towards the euro. In view of the high share of euro-denominated imports (some 60% of 
total imports) this helps to contain price pressures through imports. The peg to the euro 
also contributes to curtail balance sheet risks as a large share of assets and liabilities are 
denominated in euro. No changes to the current exchange rate regime are envisaged.  
Overall, the monetary framework is in line with the programme's objective of 
maintaining a nominally fixed exchange rate towards the euro.  
External sector 
During the last 5 years, the current account deficits moved largely in line with underlying 
GDP growth, reaching -12.8% of GDP in 2008, when output growth was 5% and 
declining to -2.2% in 2010, when GDP growth was 1.8%. In 2011, the current around 
deficit rose to -2.8%, in line with stronger GDP growth of 3.0%. However, the usually 
rather low current account deficit hides persistently high trade deficits, amounting to 
more than 20% of GDP, which are largely compensated for by a similar amount of 
inflows of current transfers. Furthermore, the financing of the current account deficit is 
increasingly relying on foreign credit, while the level of FDI has remained very low, at 
around 3%-4% of GDP.  
For 2013-14, the programme expects a marked decline in the trade and current account 
deficits, from 4.8% of GDP in 2011 to 3.7% in 2014. The profile reflects to a large extent 
very moderate import growth but also expected increased export activities of prospective 
foreign investors. These two factors should result in a fall of the trade deficit, from 
23.5% of GDP in 2011 to some 20 % in 2014, which should support a similar 
improvement in the current account balance. No major changes are expected in the case 
of the other current account components. In particular with respect to the surplus in 
current transfers, only a minor deterioration is envisaged  
The programme expects a structural improvement in the composition of exports due to 
recent and ongoing foreign direct investment, in particular in the area of chemistry and 
car manufacturing, which will also translate into an increased export potential. If 
materialised, this FDI driven improvement would be a welcome development, in 
particular, as in the past a high import content of exports tended to prevent any 
substantial improvement in the trade balance.  
The programme does neither include a discussion of the long-term sustainability of the 
country's external balances, as requested by the Commission, nor a discussion on the 
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financial market. The absence of this discussion is an important shortcoming, given the 
currently high degree of uncertainty with respect to the global economy in general and 
with respect to international financial markets in particular.  
 
Chart 1: External competitiveness and the current account 
Evolution of the current account balance 
(% of GDP) 
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Financial sector 
Overall, the country's financial sector has remained rather solid in recent years. However, 
a number of issues for discussion remain, such as the relatively low level of financial 
intermediation, the high exposure of debt to the euro and also the risk of a negative spill-
over from the crisis in neighbouring Greece. The programme is rather silent on those 
issues. 
Main risks to the macroeconomic scenario 
The programme mainly points to the uncertainties related to the global situation, in 
particular the sovereign debt crisis in the EU. The programme argues that the authorities 
are monitoring international developments and are ready to intervene if necessary. 
However, the programme does not provide more details on measures the authorities 
intend to take in case adverse international developments take place.  
Furthermore, the programme does not mention any risks related to the domestic 
economy, such as higher inflation, which would erode disposable income and thus lower 
private consumption. On the external side, the programme could have discussed in more 
details scenarios analysing the impact of a significant decline in current transfers, of 
pressures on the country's exchange rate regime, but also risks related to marked decline 
in export markets or a possible spill-over of the crisis in neighbouring Greece. 
4.5 PUBLIC FINANCE  
The programme claims to envisage during the programme period a moderately 
expansionist fiscal policy, in order to bolster expected negative international 
environment, while in the medium term the authorities are committed to a sustainable 
fiscal framework. In terms of revenue, the authorities intend to keep tax rates unchanged, 
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while lowering social security contributions in order to reduce the tax wedge. On the 
expenditure side, the programme envisages reductions of current spending, with the 
notable exception of subsidies for agriculture which are set to rise, while capital spending 
will be increased as a share of GDP. Furthermore, increased funds will be used to 
implement projects with IFIs and international donors. Overall, deficits are planned to 
remain below 2.5% of GDP. The country has a solid track record of meeting its deficit 
target, albeit often the targets are met by cancelling capital investment projects.    
However, in recent years, the authorities tended to overestimate revenue performance, 
which required the adoption of supplementary budgets during the year in order to cut 
planned spending accordingly. The most notorious area of spending cuts has been capital 
investment, where the authorities regularly announce major spending increases while 
realised spending tends to be significantly lower, usually at level of some 3% of GDP.  
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4.5.1 Budget implementation in 2011  
The programme presents data for the first nine months of 2011, reporting an increase in 
total revenues by 4% year-on-year, while spending was 6.4% higher than in the same 
period a year before. Based on expected GDP growth for 2011 of 3.5% and inflation of 
3%, revenue and spending were envisaged to increase by 7% and 7.2%, respectively On 
the revenue side, the main source for growth was VAT revenue, rising by 11%, while 
profit taxes and personal income taxes showed even higher increases. However, the latter 
two categories account for only 10% of total revenues, compared to nearly 30% in the 
case of VAT. On the expenditure side, the share of transfers remained rather constant at 
some 60% of total spending, while spending for wages and goods and services dropped 
as a share of GDP. Spending on subsidies for agriculture rose markedly, in particular in 
the first half of the year. Spending for capital investment increased from 2.5% of GDP in 
the first nine months of 2010 to 3% of the estimated full-year GDP in the first nine 
months of 2011.  
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In view of snap elections in June, the authorities seem to have front-loaded spending, 
such the disbursement of transfer payments, usually disbursed towards the end of the 
year. As a result, spending in the first half of 2011 was markedly higher, while in the 
second half spending was lower than a year before, compensating higher spending in the 
first half. Despite the less favourable fiscal performance, in particular in the first half of 
the year, achieving the 2011 deficit target of -2.5% of GDP appeared feasible at the time 
of the drafting of the PEP.  In the meantime, available data for the full year of 2011 
confirms this view. Overall, despite being successful in meeting fiscal targets, the quality 
of fiscal policy suffered from notoriously overly-optimistic revenue projections and a 
short-term orientation of spending decisions.   
4.5.2 Near-term and medium-term budget strategy  
The parliament adopted on 3 January the central government budget for 2012, envisaging 
a deficit of 2.5% of GDP. The budget is based on a rather optimistic expected real GDP 
growth of 4.5% and a projected inflation of 2.5%, bringing nominal GDP growth to 
about 7%. Central government revenues and expenditures are planned to increase by 
5.6%. The budget does not envisage changes to the tax rates, but foresees a reduction in 
social security contribution rates. On the spending side, current spending on capital 
investment is planned to be increased by 29%, while spending on current expenditures 
will be contained as a percentage of GDP. Furthermore, the authorities intend to 
implement a series of investment projects and structural reform projects, such as in the 
area of education but also agriculture, co-financed by various IFIs and donors.  
In relation to GDP, total revenues are expected to decline marginally from 34.4% of GDP 
in 2011 to 34.3% in 2012. Social contributions are expected to fall by 0.1 percentage 
point as a share in GDP. Tax revenues will increase by 0.2 percentage points of GDP, 
largely due to a strong increase in property income, due to a programme in selling state 
land. On the spending side, the level of spending in relation to GDP is expected to remain 
constant.  However, in order to allow for an increase in capital spending by 0.8 
percentage points of GDP, the 2012 budget intends to lower collective consumption by 
0.2 percentage points of GDP and social transfers and subsidies by 0.3 percentage points 
of GDP, each. However, the programme does not provide detailed information, on how 
the authorities intend to achieve these spending reductions.  
Overall, given the country’s track record of achieving its deficit target, the envisaged 
central government deficit of 2.5% of GDP appears feasible, but may require again 
budget adjustments in the course of the year. Like in the past, the planned revenue 
growth appears to be optimistic. It thus looks rather likely, that in the course of 2012, 
measures will have to be taken to respond to the lower than expected revenues. On the 
expenditure side, the planned increase in public investment is described in a rather 
general way, without providing details on planned projects. Given the country’s track 
record of underperforming spending targets in this category, it appears likely that this 
year again, it will not be possible to meet the intended spending targets.  
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The budget for 2012 
* The parliament adopted the central government budget on 2 January 2012, envisaging a deficit of 2.5% 
of GDP.  
* Revenues as percentage of GDP are expected to remain largely unchanged. On the revenue side, the 
budget envisages marginal revenue losses due as a result of reduction in the social security contribution 
rates. Table 2 in the annex specifies a number of expected revenue increases, but fails to indicate in 
which areas the authorities expect lower revenues, leading to the expected drop in the revenue share by 
0.1% of GDP.  
* On the expenditure side, the budget plans to raise spending for investment, which will be financed by 
reducing current spending accordingly. Unfortunately, the document does not provide details on how 
these spending reductions will be achieved. 
 Table: Main measures in the budget for 2012  
 Revenue measures* Expenditure measures**  
 • Property income (e.g. sale of state land)  
(+0.4% of GDP) 
• Reduction in social security contribution 
rates (-0.1% of GDP) 
• Other non-specified net-effects 
(-0.4% of GDP) 
 
• Social transfers 
(-0.3% of GDP) 
• Subsidies (-0.3% of GDP) 
• Collective consumption (-0.2% of GDP) 
• Gross fixed investment (+0.8% of GDP
 
 
 
 *  Estimated impact on general government revenues. **  Estimated impact on general government expenditure. 
Source: PEP 2012 
 
For the period 2013-2014, the programme only presents upper boundaries for expected 
revenues and spending. With respect to spending according to function no information is 
provided at all for this period. The overall intentions for this period seem to be 
maintaining largely the revenue and expenditure structure of the year 2012, or at least not 
increasing total revenues or spending as a share of GDP beyond the level achieved in 
2012. Based on this provided information and due to the lack of a presented fiscal path or 
even a lower boundary, it is not possible to assess the fiscal policy stance for this period. 
Given the country’s policy challenges with respect to increasing per-capita income levels 
by fostering investment and addressing the particularly high unemployment, bolder and 
more focussed reform steps seem warranted.  The main risks appear to be on the revenue 
side, as weaker than expected growth could lead to shortfalls of in particular VAT 
revenues or income taxes. Furthermore, there are non-negligible risks of rapidly 
increasing costs of deficit financing or even access to international financing. The 
programme does neither discuss risks nor fall-back options for its fiscal framework 
which is an important shortcoming. 
 63 of 127 
 
Change:
2012-14
Revenues 32.0 34.4 34.3 n.a.
- Taxes and social security contributions 23.4 27.0 27.1 n.a.
    - Other (residual) 8.6 7.4 7.2 n.a.
Expenditure 34.6 36.9 36.9 n.a.
- Primary expenditure 34.1 36.2 36.2 n.a.
of which:
Gross fixed capital formation 4.0 5.2 6.0 n.a.
Consumption 12.8 13.1 12.9 n.a.
Transfers & subsidies 16.9 17.8 17.2 n.a.
Other (residual) 0.3 0.1 0.1 n.a.
- Interest payments 0.6 0.7 0.7 n.a.
Budget balance -2.5 -2.5 -2.5 n.a.
- Cyclically adjusted -0.3 0.1 n.a.
Primary balance -2.1 -1.8 -1.8 n.a.
Gross debt level 24.6 27.0 28.8 n.a.
2010 2011 2012
Composition of the budgetary adjustment  (%  of GDP)
2012-2014
Sources: Pre-Accession Economic Programme (PEP), ECFIN calculations
up to 6.0
up to 12.9
-0.1 to 0.3
up to -1.8
up to 28.8
up to 17.2
up to 0.1
up to 0.7
up to -2.5
up to 34.3
up to 27.1
up to 7.2
up to 36.9
up to 36.2
 
Structural balance (cyclical component of deficit, one-off measures and temporary 
measures, fiscal stance) 
The programme presents very briefly cyclically adjusted balances. According to the 
programme’s calculations, the economy realised a negative output gap in 2010 and 2011. 
However, depending on the realised growth in 2012-2014, the economy is likely to grow 
around potential in 2013 and above potential in 2014. According to those calculations, 
the fiscal stance was slightly counter-cyclical in 2010 and 2011, and would be pro-
cyclical in the remaining programme period, unless the authorities lower the deficit 
markedly below the 2.5% of GDP boundary. Furthermore, the calculations point to a 
rather high and increasing structural deficit of more than 2¼% of GDP. 
Overall, the cyclical adjustment appears plausible with respect to the country’s current 
position in the cycle. Concerning the size of the output gap and in particular the speed of 
closing the gap, the programme’s estimates appear rather optimistic. The programme 
does not present details on one-off or temporary measures. In case the country can realise 
sustained stronger growth than in the past, achieving deficits of some 2½% of GDP is not 
necessarily a threat to the country’s long-term sustainability. However, given the 
uncertainty of the country’s growth profile and the risk related to the costs and 
availability of international and domestic finance, a fiscal stance geared towards 
medium-term balanced budget would be more in line with the country’s long term 
sustainability. In this respect, it would be of particular importance to use public funds in 
a manner to increase the country’s growth potential.  
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Budgetary implications of "major structural reforms"  
The estimated net-effect of major structural reforms will have a minor impact on the 
country's fiscal position. The programme expects a temporary annual increase in public 
spending by about ½% of GDP during the programme period.  
General government debt 
The programme envisages an increase in the central government debt ratio14 from 27.0% 
of GDP in the third quarter of 2011 to 28.8% end of 2012. For 2013-2014, the authorities 
expect no further increase in the debt ratio. The main driving forces are the primary 
deficit, increasing in 2012 the debt ratio by 1.8 % of GDP and (unspecified) stock-flow-
adjustments, increasing the debt ratio by 1.3 % of GDP in 2012. Interest rate spending 
will raise the debt ratio by 0.7% of GDP. On the other hand, expected real GDP growth 
of 4.5% in 2012 will reduce the debt ratio by 1.2 percentage points, while inflation of 
2.5% will reduce the debt ratio by 0.7% percentage points. Thus, overall, the combined 
effect of interest payments, real growth and inflation (the so-called "snowball effect") 
will lower the debt ratio by 1.8 percentage points of GDP in 2012. The programme 
would have been expected to provide more information on the stock-flow-adjustment.  
2010 2011 2012
Gross debt ratio [1] 24.6 27.0 28.8
Change in the ratio 0.7 2.4 1.8
Contributions [2]:
1. Primary balance 2.1 1.8 1.8
2. “Snow-ball” effect -0.1 -1.1 -1.3
Of which:
Interest expenditure 0.7 0.7 0.7
Growth effect -0.4 -0.9 -1.2
Inflation effect -0.4 -0.9 -0.7
3. Stock-flow -1.3 1.7 1.3
[2]  The snow-ball effect captures the impact of interest expenditure on 
accumulated debt, as well as the impact of real GDP growth and inflation on the 
debt ratio (through the denominator). The stock-flow adjustment includes 
differences in cash and accru
Source: Pre-Accession Economic Programme(PEP); Commission services’ 
calculations
Composition of changes in the debt ratio (%  of GDP)
Notes:
[1]   End of period.
up to 28.8
up to 1.8
up to 1.8
2013-2014
up to 0.7
n.a
n.a
n.a
n.a
 
The programme indicates that in 2013-2014 the central government debt ratio is expected 
not to increase beyond 28.8% of GDP, despite plans to increase credit financed public 
investments into transport infrastructure and energy. The energy investments are planned 
to be channelled through state owned companies and thus might not affect central 
government accounts. However, when looking at general government balances, those 
investment projects probably would lead to a marked increase in the public debt ratio.  
                                                   
14  The presented debt is only central government debt, i.e, does not include the debt of state companies, 
which might add some 5% of GDP to the presented debt level.  
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The public debt management is done by a separate department in the Ministry of 
Finance. For the programme period, the 2012-2014 fiscal strategy defines guidelines for 
central government debt, with an upper limit of 35% of GDP and of 45% of GDP for 
total public debt, i.e., including debt of state companies but also the Central Bank. In 
September 2011, the share of domestically financed central government debt was about 
32% of central government debt, or 7% of GDP. The programme, however, does not 
specify its medium-term plans with respect to the debt structure. Contingent liabilities 
accounted for some 4% of GDP in September 2011 and seem to be no major threat to the 
country's fiscal sustainability. A bigger risk seems to be the high share of foreign 
denominated debt, accounting for some 70% of total debt. Furthermore, the fiscal 
strategy requires that at least 70% of foreign debt should be denominated in Euro, which 
translates into a quite high dependence on the exchange rate of a single currency. The 
programme would have benefitted from providing data on the maturity structure and the 
currency composition of foreign denominated debt. 
4.5.3 Sensitivity analysis and comparison with previous PEP  
The programme presents a brief sensitivity analysis of the impact of lower growth on the 
deficit and of interest rate and exchange rate shocks on debt. With respect to GDP 
growth, the programme assumes that a less favourable international environment would 
lead to lower exports and thus lower production. According to those simulations, GDP 
growth rates which are a quarter lower than in the scenario would increase the central 
government deficit by 0.2 to 0.4 percentage points, to 2.7% to 2.9% of GDP. Overall, 
these estimates look plausible, in particular in view of the limited impact of exports on 
revenues. However, it would have been interesting to simulate the impact of shocks with 
a higher fiscal sensitivity, for example a drop in private consumption as a result of a 
sharp fall in current transfers.  
The analysis of interest and exchange rate shocks finds that an increase in the interest rate 
by 1 percentage point would raise the costs of debt financing by up to 14 %, reflecting 
the high share of debt based on variable interest rates. With respect to exchange rate 
shocks, the simulation tested the effects of a 10% appreciation and depreciation of the 
Euro in relation to other currencies. Like in the previous programme, the analysis of the 
exchange rate risk points to a relatively low risk stemming from the volatility of non-euro 
currencies, affecting debt servicing costs by up to 2%. However, the analysis would have 
benefitted from a broader approach, e.g. also taking into account the hypothetic 
possibility of pressure on the current exchange rate to the euro, which is the currency in 
which about 60% of the country's public debt is denominated. Overall, the sensitivity 
analysis provides interesting insights. However, given recent turbulences on international 
capital markets, the document would have benefitted from a more thorough analysis, 
including a discussion of risks related to the access of international financial markets, but 
also more long-term risks, related to contingent liabilities, payment arrears, the aging of 
the population. In particular, the programme does not provide information on possible 
fall-back positions for mitigating unfavourable developments.  
4.5.4 Quality of public finances and institutional features 
The programme refers to plans to improve the quality of public finances by shifting 
spending from less productive use to capital investment, in particular transport 
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infrastructure and by increasing efficiency in using budget funds. However, the 
programme does not provide much concrete information on actual revenue and 
expenditure measures in order to achieve those objectives.  
The quality of budgetary planning still seems to be weak, leading to recurring significant 
deviations between budgetary plans and their execution. In particular, the repeatedly 
announced reorientation from current spending to capital investment appears to be 
regularly hampered by lower than expected revenues. In contrast to previous 
submissions, the 2012 PEP only provides very general information on the expected 
performance of revenue and spending items, in particular with respect to the time range 
beyond the 2012 budget. Furthermore, there seems to be no progress in improving 
expenditure managements of multi-annual budgeting, which would be important for 
medium-term capital investment. The programme points to plans on joint investment 
projects, co-financing IFI and IPA projects. However, the document is very parsimonious 
with respect to providing concrete spending estimates, in particular with respect to 
investment plans. 
The revenue side of the central government's budget is dominated by VAT revenues and 
social security contributions, accounting for about 45% and 30% of total revenues, 
respectively. Furthermore, income taxes and dividends from state shares in the country's 
telecom company are other significant sources of revenues, accounting for about 10% 
and 5% of total revenues, respectively. On the spending side, social transfers and 
subsidies account for about half of total spending, while another 37% of total spending 
are used for public consumption. Capital spending accounts for about 12% of total 
spending (around 4% of GDP) while spending on debt services accounts for less than 2% 
of total spending. Despite repeated plans to shift spending from current expenditures to 
capital investment, the spending structure has remained rather stable in recent years. The 
document does not provide detailed information on the composition of public investment. 
However, there seems to be significant room for improving the growth and employment 
impact of public spending. Concerning aligning the country's statistical system with 
ESA 95, the programme refers to a current IPA project with its implementation phase 
2010-2012. However, besides listing a number of directives to be transposed, the 2012 
PEP does not provide any information on the actual progress in this area. 
4.5.5 Sustainability of public finances  
The programme presents long-term estimates on the sustainability of public finances for 
the period up to 2060. The scenario expects an increase in economic growth up to 2030, 
from annual GDP growth of 1.8% in 2010 to 4% in 2020 and to 4.6% in 2030, and a 
deceleration afterwards, with growth rates at around 3.7%. Unemployment is expected to 
decline gradually, from 32.2% in 2010 to 8% in 2060. The decline appears to be rather 
linear, expecting unemployment rates of less than 10% in the period 2050-2060 only. 
Central government revenues are expected to decline only marginally, dropping from 
33.6% of GDP in 2010 to 33.3% in 2060, while the share of central government 
expenditure in GDP is forecast to drop slightly faster, from 35.9% of GDP in 2010 to 
33.5. As a result, the deficit will drop, from 1.4% in 2020 to close to zero in 2060.  
Expenditures for pensions are expected to increase slightly in the period up to 2030, from 
8.9% of GDP in 2010 to 9% in 2020-2030 and to decline to 8.7% by 2060, reflecting the 
increased relevance of private pension funds. Health expenditures are set to increase 
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slightly, from 4.5% of GDP in 2010 to 4.9% towards the end of the period. Spending for 
education is projected to rise slightly less than in the previous programme, from 4.6% of 
GDP in 2010 to 5% of GDP in 2060.  
The document is rather benign with respect to any major and immediate threats to the 
long-term sustainability of the country's public finances, mainly relying on the country's 
relatively low debt level and the track record of maintaining low deficits. Surprisingly, 
demographic pressures are not seen as major medium-term risk, although the presented 
data points to a marked and stable increase of pension-age population, from 9.7% of the 
total population in 2010 to 12.3% in 2060. Furthermore, the programme points to the 
recent introduction of a second (private) pension pillar which should help to contain 
public spending pressures in the medium-term. However, social security contributions 
are likely to decline accordingly, which thus could nevertheless create pressure on the 
financing of public pension funds. Health-related spending is also likely to increase at 
least in line with the aging population. Overall, the programme is optimistic on the ability 
to meet those costs. However, in view of a rapidly increasing share of old-age 
population, the financial viability of the public pension and health-care systems should 
be monitored carefully. 
4.6 STRUCTURAL REFORMS  
4.6.1 Obstacles to growth and the structural reform agenda  
The document does not explicitly elaborate on structural obstacles to growth, as 
requested by the Commission, but only refers to the challenges of reducing 
unemployment and increase growth. As discussed in the various Commission's progress 
reports and following the analysis of a number of international institutions, key obstacles 
to growth appear to be weak institutional capacities, in particular problems with the rule 
of law, the poor quality of public services, impeding investment, and the low level of 
qualification of the country's labour force, hampering job creation.  
The presented reform measures should, once fully implemented, have a positive impact 
on those obstacles to growth. However, the programme does not provide a clear picture 
what exactly the authorities intend to do, which targets the authorities plan to achieve and 
even more importantly, when those targets are going to be met.  
4.6.2 Key areas of structural reform  
The 2012 PEP identifies the following key reform areas: (1) improving the business 
environment, (2) support of enterprises and in particular of SMEs, (3) reduction of 
unemployment, (4) improving human capital, (5) functioning of labour market and 
increased (6) export support and promotion. 
The programme presents its reform agenda in the context of the Europe 2020.  Overall, 
the choice of the reform priorities appears broadly appropriate. The document provides 
detailed data on the budgetary impact of the presented reform measures. However, 
probably due to the small net budgetary impact, this link is not noticeable when 
analysing the presented fiscal framework. Annex 3 of the document contains a matrix 
with policy commitments, including information on the various spending flows per year. 
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However, a number of projects appear to be budgeted for 2012 only. The presentation in 
the text usually does not specify the time profile for the implementation of those reform 
projects. The spending peak seems to be in 2013, with a decline in absolute terms and 
even more when expressed in terms of nominal GDP. However, a large part of structural 
reforms is financed by international financial institutions and donations, among others 
also from the EU budget, which by definition is not included in the presentation of a net-
budgetary impact. 
2012 2013 2014
Business environment -0.2 -0.1 0.0
Enterpreneurship & SMEs -0.7 -0.5 -0.6
Labour market -11.1 -10.6 -10.2
Education -17.4 -32.9 -36.8
Export promotion 0.0 0.0 0.0
Energy and Transport -0.2 -0.4 -0.3
Other reforms (public administration, knowledge-based 
society, judiciary, envrionment, public procurement etc)
-15.6 -3.9 5.7
Total impact on the budget -45.3 -48.4 -42.3
Total impact on the budget (in % of GDP) -0.6 -0.6 -0.5
Source: 2012 Pre-accession Economic Programme (PEP), ECFIN calculations
Net direct budgetary impact of key reform commitments (in EUR million)
 
Product and capital markets 
The document presents a large number of structural measures to improve the efficiency 
of product and capital markets. The main measures are intended to simplify and 
accelerate procedures for business entry and exit, enhance dispute mediation, improve 
communication between the authorities and the business sector, facilitate access of SMEs 
to financial capital, to increase efforts to fight unfair competition, to strengthen and 
improve the alignment of the financial banking and non-banking sector regulation and 
supervision with European standards. Overall, most of the presented measures are 
important steps towards improving the country's business environment and do respond to 
the country's key challenges. However, the majority of presented reforms is related to 
legal matters, while the main financial costs are probably related to building up necessary 
administrative capacities of the public administration and of regulatory and supervisory 
institutions. In the area of product market reforms, the presentation in the PEP makes it 
difficult to assess the concrete implementation as well as the impact on the functioning of 
the country's product markets. The link between the envisaged policy measures and the 
programme's core objectives could have been established in a clearer way. Furthermore, 
the programme could have presented the current state and plans related to privatisation. 
Labour market  
In order to address the persistently high structural unemployment, the authorities intend 
to improve the quality of education and training and to foster job creation by supporting 
self-employment, by subsidising certain categories of employment, strengthening labour 
market institutions, such as the employment agency and the labour inspectorate, by 
implementing and improving the effectiveness of active labour market measures and 
fostering the dialogue with the civil society. The PEP falls short of justifying the 
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appropriateness of specific measures by e.g. referring to the results of evaluations of 
recent labour market policies. 
Besides enumerating a number of planned measures and intended projects, the 
programme's objectives do not seem very ambitious. The PEP recalls the target of an 
employment rate of 55% by 2015 (as mentioned in the National Employment Strategy) 
and expects unemployment to drop by one percentage point annually, from 30.8% in 
2011 to 27% in 2014. In the long-term scenario, the pace of the decline in unemployment 
is even lower, at about ¼ percentage point per year in the period 2050-2060. It would 
have been worth assessing the impact of an increasing employment rate on the 
unemployment rate. Overall, the moderate pace of the decline in the unemployment rate 
is rather surprising, in particular when taking into account the high level of 
unemployment in the country, the expected rather strong economic growth, the high 
priority which the government claims to devote to this issue and the mentioned measures 
in order to reduce unemployment.  
Other reform areas  
The PEP also presents a number of other reforms, which are considered to be important, 
such as public administration reform, agricultural reform and reform efforts in the field 
of education, environment, infrastructure, energy and transport, trade liberalisation etc.  
There are frequent references to the EU accession requirements and adoption of the 
acquis. However, like in other areas, the presentation would have benefitted from better 
defining the conceptual framework behind those reform measures. Furthermore, it would 
have been useful to provide more operational information on planned reform measures, 
for example in the area of public administration reform or plans related to the agricultural 
sector, which seems to be a crucial priority sector for the government. 
4.7 OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF FORMAL REQUIREMENTS  
Macro framework 
The programme presents a summary of past economic developments, but compared to 
last year's submission, the provided data is less complete. The macroeconomic 
framework suffers from the lack of precise annual growth estimates and therefore 
remains ambiguous, providing a rather weak base for supporting the discussion of the 
fiscal framework. The PEP does not provide an in-depth assessment of the external 
sustainability and of competitiveness issues, as requested by the Commission. 
Fiscal framework 
The fiscal framework is broadly linked to the macroeconomic framework.  However, the 
presentation mainly focuses on past developments and the 2012 budget with only very 
little information about the fiscal strategy beyond 2012. The document contains 
references to accession related challenges, but remains rather unspecific with respect to 
concrete policy measures envisaged.  It would have benefitted from providing more 
concrete background information on the main reasons behind the dynamics of revenue 
and spending categories. The data are not in line with ESA 95 and there is no indication 
of a timeframe for better aligning fiscal statistics with ESA 95 standards. The authorities 
did not submit the fiscal notification this year. 
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Structural reforms 
The document does not explicitly elaborate on structural obstacles to growth, as 
requested by the Commission, but only refers to the challenges of reducing 
unemployment and increase growth. The structural reform framework presents a wide 
array of intended policy objectives and measures in a broad range of areas.  However, the 
presentation would have benefitted from being more explicit on the actual steps the 
authorities intend to undertake and on the economic results those measures are expected 
to achieve.  
Compliance with required content, form and data 
Weak alignment with ESA 95 continues to impede the analysis and comparability of the 
presented data, in particular in the area of public finances. With respect to content and the 
quality and quantity of provided information, the programme does not meet the level 
achieved last year.  
 
* * * 
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Annex table: Structural indicators 
Annex: Structural indicators
EU 27
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
General economic background
Real GDP 1 6.1 5.0 -0.9 1.7 3.0f 3.2 0.3 -4.3 2.0 1.6f
Labour productivity 2 56.7 58.5 60.1 58.3 n.a. 100 100 100 100 100
Real unit labour cost 3 -12.9 2.6 9.9 -1.1 -0.3f -0.8 1.0 2.8 -1.6 -0.5f
Real effective exchange rate 4 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 121.4 123.2 118.3 109.0 113.1
Inflation rate 5 2.3 8.3 -0.8 1.6 3.9 2.3 3.7 1.0 2.1 3.1e
Unemployment rate 6 34.9 33.8 32.2 32.0 30.5f 7.2 7.1 9.0 9.7 9.6
Employment
Employment rate 7 40.7 41.9 43.3 43.5 n.a. 65.3 65.8 64.5 64.1 n.a.
Employment rate - females 8 32.3 32.9 33.5 34.0 n.a. 58.2 58.9 58.4 58.2 n.a.
Employment rate of older workers 9 28.8 31.7 34.6 34.2 n.a. 44.6 45.6 46.0 46.3 n.a.
Long term unemployment 10 30.1 28.7 26.3 26.7 n.a. 3.1 2.6 3.0 3.9 n.a.
Product market reforms 
Relative price levels 11 44.6 46.3 45.4 44.5 n.a. 100 100 100 100 100
Total trade-to-GDP ratio 12 61.6 63.6 n.a. n.a. n.a. 10.7 11.6 9.8 11.7 n.a.
Net FDI  13 8.5 6.1 2.0 3.2 n.a. 3.9 2.2 2.1 1.0 n.a.
Sectoral and ad-hoc state aid 15 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 n.a.
Business investment 16 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 18.7 18.4 16.2 15.9 n.a.
Knowledge based economy
Tertiary graduates 17 4.6 6.1 7.0 n.a. n.a. 13.8 14.5 14.3 n.a. n.a.
Spending on human resources 18 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 5.0 5.1 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Educational attainment 19 79.2 79.7 81.9 82.8 n.a. 78.1 78.5 78.6 79.0 n.a.
R&D expenditure 20 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.0 n.a.
Broadband penetration rate 21 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 18.2 21.7 23.9 25.7 n.a.
Source:  Commission services, national sources
Table II.2.6:
1. Growth rate of real GDP in %.  2. Labour productivity per person employed - GDP in PPS per person employed relative 
to EU-27 (EU-27=100).  3. Growth rate of the ratio: compensation per employee in current prices divided by GDP (in 
current prices) per total employment.  4. Vs IC36 (1999 = 100), current year's values are based on Commission's forecast 
deflator figures, nominal unit  labour cost deflator.  5. Annual average rate of change in Harmonized Indices of Consumer 
Prices (HICPs), tFYRoM = CPI.  6. Unemployed persons as a share of the total active population.  7. Employed persons 
aged 15-64 in % of total population of the same age group.  8. Employed women aged 15-64 in % of total female 
population of the same age group.  9. Employed persons aged 55-64 (EU27) or 50-64 (tFYRoM)) in % of total population 
of the same age group.  10. Long-term unemployed (over 12 months) in % of total active population.   11. comparative 
price levels of final consumption by private households including indirect taxes (EU-27=100).  12. Trade integration - 
Average value of imports and exports of goods divided by GDP.  
f: forecast, e: estimated value, p: provisional value, b: break in series, s: Eurostat estimate, r: revised value,
13. Average value of inward and outward FDIs flows in % of GDP.  14. Market share of the largest generator (% of total 
net generation). 15. In % of GDP. 16. Gross fixed capital formation by the private sector in % of GDP.  17.Total tertiary 
graduates in science and technology per 1000 of population aged 20-29.  18. Public expenditure on education in % of GDP. 
19. Percentage of the population aged 20 to 24 having completed at least upper secondary education.  20. GERD (Gross 
domestic expenditure on R&D) - in % of GDP.  21. Number of broadband access lines per 100 inhabitants.
The former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia
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5 MONTENEGRO 
5.1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
Montenegro's first Pre-Accession Economic Programme (PEP 2012-2014) presents a 
comprehensive medium-term macroeconomic and fiscal framework based on the 
projection of a mild slowdown of growth in 2012 followed by a gradual acceleration in 
the outer years. The main objective is to strengthen fiscal and financial stability as a 
prerequisite for long term economic growth and higher employment. The document 
broadly complies with the Commission's requirements, notwithstanding some analytical 
gaps. Overall, the programme appears broadly consistent with earlier key policy 
documents and contributed to the preparation of the 2012 budget law. 
The economy grew by 3% in 2011, slightly faster than estimated in the programme 
(2.5%). Growth was mainly driven by exports and private consumption, both supported 
by a resilient tourism industry. Inflation remained moderate, at 3% on average, reflecting 
higher food and transport prices as well as a rise of excises. Bank lending still remained 
negative. Despite some additional layoffs from heavy industry and mining, the labour 
market recorded some improvement thanks to the dynamism of the services sector. 
Employment levels increased by 1% in 2011 and the unemployment rate declined by 1.6 
percentage points to 18%. The current account deficit (CAD) contracted to 19% of GDP 
in 2011 from 25% a year earlier, thanks to stronger exports and a surplus in the income 
account. In this context the country needs to reinforce the macroeconomic stability and to 
maintain the reform momentum as recommended in the latest progress report. 
The macroeconomic scenario projects real GDP growth to accelerate to 4% in 2014, up 
from 2% in 2012. Over the period 2012-2014 private consumption is seen to be the main 
contributor to growth, supported by higher employment, rising wages and stronger credit 
growth. The impact of government consumption is expected to remain weak due to 
consolidation efforts, while investment growth will remain slightly negative on average.  
Given the uncertain international environment, the programme –as a useful complement– 
presents a low-growth scenario, based on lower average growth rates for FDI inflows, 
domestic credit, and exports. The projections' range resulting from these two 
macroeconomic scenarios seems broadly plausible. Yet, given the higher level of 
uncertainty resulting from the international environment, the probability of the low-
growth scenario has significantly increased. 
The programme fails to comply with the request of the Commission to provide and in-
depth analysis on external sustainability and competitiveness issues.  The current account 
deficit contracted from 30% of GDP in 2009 down to 19% in 2011 as a result of a crisis-
led adjustment resulting in lower imports due to the contraction of domestic demand. The 
PEP foresees a further decline of external imbalances in the medium-term, albeit at a 
modest pace, as the trade deficit is expected to shrink by 2 percentage points of GDP 
until 2014. The PEP confirms the key role of FDI to ensure the financing of the external 
deficit. To some extent, the large external deficits also reflect a structural phenomenon 
representing high investments needs that would improve economic competitiveness and 
diversify the industrial base. However, the significant size of the external deficit exposes 
the country to refinancing risks and strong macroeconomic adjustments in case of 
slowing or reversing capital flows. 
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To achieve the sustainability of public finances the medium-term fiscal policy presents 
an expenditure-led consolidation, as the authorities remain committed to maintain the 
low tax rate policy in order to attract investments. So far, public spending has been 
reduced from 47% of GDP in 2010 down to 43% in 2011. The programme projects 
further consolidation of expenditures in the mid-term, targeting 38% of GDP by 2014. 
Meanwhile, revenues should remain constant at some 39% of GDP, to reach a balanced 
budget in 2013 and a net lending position in 2014. The fiscal space thus generated would 
serve to cut public debt and sustain public investments. However, the achievements of 
these budget targets appears increasingly unrealistic, given a deteriorating international 
environment, the contingent liabilities from state guarantees, and still rising tax arrears. 
Considering the large portion of non-discretionary spending in the budget, a decisive 
implementation of expenditure reforms will also be necessary to restrain fiscal deficits. 
The PEP covers a broad range of structural reform areas in line with the programme's 
policy priorities. However, it does not provide an analysis of the main structural 
bottlenecks as requested by the Commission. Overall, there is a need for improving 
energy and transport infrastructures to lift potential growth. The restructuring of the 
metal industry and the continuation of privatisation are also necessary to improve 
industrial diversification, liberating resources, now spent on subsidies and state 
guarantees, and to rebalance metal manufacturing towards transport, energy and mineral 
ore exports. Tourism relies heavily on foreign investment inflows. Further efforts are still 
required to improve the business environment, notably to solve the issue of delays on 
project developments. Several measures presented in the programme relate to the 
continuation of previous initiatives (e.g. labour law, pensions reform, financial sector 
legislation, etc.), focusing on the development of secondary legislation. 
Until its stabilisation in 2011, the financial sector presented the main risk for 
macroeconomic stability. At present, the most immediate threat remains the still weak 
capacity of the economy to refinance debt, risking a build-up of payment arrears due to 
the illiquidity of firms. A cutback in capital inflows, notably on green-field investments 
would depress domestic demand, delay the restructuring of the economy and 
infrastructure projects, but also weaken fiscal performance given the reliance of indirect 
tax revenue from imports. However, the main fiscal risk remains the cost of debt 
servicing, worsened by the need of additional borrowing for deficit financing and the 
activation of the substantial state guarantees extended to the aluminium plant. 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Real GDP growth (% change) COM 2.5 2.7 2.2 3.2 n.a.
PEP 2012 2.5 2.5 2.0 3.5 4.0
Consumer price inflation (%) COM 0.5 3.1 2.6 3.2 n.a.
PEP 2012 0.5 3.5 2.0 2.0 2.0
General government balance (% of GDP) COM -4.9 -4.2 -2.6 -1.3 n.a.
PEP 2012 -4.9 -3.2 -1.1 0.1 1.0
Primary balance (% of GDP) COM -1.9 -3.1 -1.4 0.1 n.a.
PEP 2012 -3.9 -1.8 0.7 1.9 2.8
Government gross debt (% of GDP) COM 42.9 44.0 44.4 42.8 n.a.
PEP 2012 40.9 43.8 46.9 45.4 42.9
Sources: Pre-Accession Economic Programme (PEP) 2012, Commission autumn 2011 forecast.
Comparison of key macroeconomic and budgetary projections
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5.2 INTRODUCTION 15 
Having participated during the past five years in the EU economic and fiscal surveillance 
process with the submission of Economic and Fiscal Programmes (EFP), Montenegro 
presented this year, for the first time, a Pre-Accession Economic Programme (PEP). The 
programme, which covers the period 2012-2014, was submitted on 30 January 2012 
following its adoption by the government on 12 January. 
The PEP has taken over naturally the role of the former EFP as a policy coordination 
instrument and has contributed to the preparation of the main national fiscal documents, 
notably the preparation of the 2012 Budget Law as well as the Economic Policy 
Guidelines for 2012, although there is no an explicit reference in the programme itself. 
The objectives of the programme are in line with the accession priorities; i.e. the need to 
reinforce macroeconomic stability and to maintain the reform momentum. 
5.3 KEY CHALLENGES 
The key policy challenges Montenegro is presently facing are the development of a 
competitive economy enabling sustainable and long-term growth, while reducing 
significant external vulnerabilities. To this end, the programme's overarching policy 
priorities are continuing fiscal consolidation, restoring and maintaining financial stability 
and further improving the business environment. The programme acknowledges the risks 
related to the strong reliance of both the private and public sectors on foreign financing, 
worsened by an uncertain external environment, notably in the euro area. The 
improvement of the business climate is seen to help attract FDI leading to industrial 
diversification and enhancing export potential, a gradual narrowing of significant 
external imbalances, and boosting employment over the medium term. The tightening of 
credit conditions has led to a further downturn in lending activity, restraining the 
liquidity of domestic enterprises and consequently feeding-back into stricter lending 
conditions of banks. On the fiscal side, besides effectively implementing measures to rein 
in public spending with a view to bring down the public debt ratio, a particular challenge 
will be to tackle  growing tax arrears which have been undermining fiscal consolidation 
efforts. These issues are particularly striking in the case of a few troubled industrial 
companies, which if falling into bankruptcy would not only turn payment arrears into 
public revenues losses but would also disorderly activate state guarantees, adding further 
stress to public finances. 
5.4 RECENT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS AND MEDIUM-TERM SCENARIO 
5.4.1 Recent macroeconomic developments 
In 2010, the economy recorded positive growth of 2.5%, which was significantly higher 
than last year's EFP estimate of 0.5%.The main factors behind the stronger growth were 
                                                   
15  The ECOFIN Council of 26/27 November 2000 invited the Commission to "report each year to the 
Council (Ecofin) on its assessment of the Pre-accession Economic Programmes”. The Council 
Presidency conclusions adopted last year can be found at: 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/11/st09/st09654-re01.en11.pdf 
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higher net exports thanks to the expansion of the metal industry and a resilient tourism 
sector. The economy continued to recover in 2011 and real GDP grew by an estimated 
3%, slightly above the PEP projection of 2.5%. The recovery was primarily driven by 
domestic demand, which recorded a positive growth for the first time after the crisis, 
whereas the contribution of net exports to growth dropped significantly. Preliminary data 
indicate that retail sales increased at constant prices by 15%, reflecting strong demand 
from tourism, feeding into private consumption. Nonetheless, domestic demand still 
remained constrained as bank lending further contracted, investments slowed down, 
employment growth remained limited, and net wages rose only marginally. On the 
supply side, manufacturing and mining output accelerated by some 6.5% in 2011 and the 
construction sector expanded by 11%, whereas the output of utilities contracted sharply 
over the year (33%). Consumer prices averaged 3% in 2011, driven by food and transport 
prices as well as higher excises on alcoholic beverages and tobacco. The current account 
deficit (CAD) continued narrowing, reaching 19% of GDP in 2011 compared to 25% a 
year earlier, and to the PEP's estimate of 23%. Net FDI contracted in 2011 by 28% year-
on-year to some 12% of GDP.  
5.4.2 Medium-term macroeconomic scenario 
The macroeconomic scenario foresees the continuation of the recovery initiated in 2010. 
Following a deceleration of growth in 2012 resulting from a worsening external 
environment, growth is expected to reaccelerate in the outer years. However, given the 
uncertainty of international markets, the programme also presents a low-growth 
alternative scenario, where FDI inflows, credit activity, and exports growth would be 
much weaker in 2012 before recovering in the last two years. The projections' range 
resulting from these two macroeconomic scenarios seems broadly plausible. Yet, given 
the higher level of uncertainty resulting from recent international and domestic 
developments, the PEP acknowledges that the probability of the low-growth scenario has 
significantly increased. In the absence of a proper monetary policy, the fulfilment of the 
macroeconomic scenario relies on the accomplishment of the programme’s fiscal and 
structural objectives.  
COM PEP COM PEP COM PEP COM PEP COM PEP
Real GDP (% change) 2.5 2.5 2.7 2.5 2.2 2.0 3.2 3.5 n.a. 4.0
Contributions:
- Final domestic demand -3.4 -3.4 -1.6 2.4 2.4 1.5 4.2 3.6 n.a. 3.6
- Change in inventories 1.4 1.4 0.2 -1.7 -0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 n.a. 0.0
- External balance of goods and services 4.5 4.5 4.1 1.7 0.5 0.5 -1.0 -0.1 n.a. 0.4
Employment (% change) -1.9 -1.9 0.9 -3.4 0.9 1.4 1.7 2.4 n.a. 2.4
Unemployment rate (%) 19.7 19.7 19.2 19.5 19.0 18.5 18.6 16.8 n.a. 14.9
GDP deflator (% change) 1.6 1.6 4.5 3.0 5.3 2.0 5.9 2.0 n.a. 2.0
CPI inflation (%) 0.5 0.5 3.1 3.5 2.6 2.0 3.2 2.0 n.a. 2.0
Current account balance (% of GDP) -24.6 -24.6 -21.5 -22.8 -20.4 -21.7 -21.3 -20.8 n.a. -19.7
Sources: Pre-Accession Economic Programme (PEP) 2012, Commission Autumn 2011 Forecasts (COM)
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Comparison of macroeconomic developments and forecasts
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Real sector 
The PEP projects a moderate deceleration of the economy in 2012 caused by the 
worsening of the international environment, followed by stronger growth in 2013-2014. 
Real GDP growth is projected to reach 2% in 2012 and to accelerate to 3.5% in 2013 and 
4% in 2014. The growth path is basically a reflection of private consumption trends, 
driven by the recovery of credit activity, as well as wage and employment growth. The 
contribution from government consumption is expected to be marginal (nought in 2002 
and half a percentage point of GDP growth in 2013-2014), reflecting fiscal consolidation 
efforts. The contribution of exports will rely on tourism and agriculture rather than on the 
recovery of metal industry as it was the case in 2010 and 2011. Although the programme 
provides a list of shovel-ready energy and tourism projects, GFCF contribution to growth 
is balanced by the strong dependence of investments on imports of capital goods and 
equipment. 
The programme provides a detailed estimate of GDP by activity sector, confirming the 
increasing participation of agriculture and tourism, with trade, hotels and restaurants, as 
well as transport, adding each one half a percentage points to GDP growth by 2014. 
Traditional industries (such as mining, metallurgy and utilities) are expected to maintain 
their annual growth contribution at 0.1 percentage point. Although the programme 
provides detailed information on recent labour and wages developments, it remains quite 
vague when it comes to mid-term projections. However, according to supplemental 
information submitted later on, employment is set to grow by 1.4% in 2012 and 2.4% in 
the following years, while unemployment will decline from 18.5% in 2012 to 14.9% in 
2014. Labour productivity per worker will increase from 0.6% in 2012 to 1.5% in 2014 
as GDP outpaces employment growth rates, gradually improving competitiveness. 
The PEP provides an alternative low-growth macroeconomic scenario with a lower, 
albeit still positive, medium-term growth path assuming 0.5% GDP growth in 2012, 
which accelerates to 3.5% by 2014. The downward revision of growth affects all 
expenditure components; with the exception of exports and government consumption, 
which grow more strongly in 2014 compared to the baseline scenario. Wages and 
employment are expected to grow at a slower pace, dampening private consumption, 
although there are no concrete estimations on labour market developments in the low-
growth scenario. On the supply side, the programme assumes reduced economic activity 
but does not provide quantitative estimates. Overall, although the baseline scenario is 
more elaborated, the volatile international environment and some contingent domestic 
industrial risks strongly support the usefulness of having simulated a less favourable 
outlook. 
Inflation  
The baseline projects annual average inflation to stay constant at 2% each year in the 
period 2012-2014, which lacks plausibility. The slowing down of average inflation, as 
compared to 2011 (3.1%), is based on the assumption that prices of imported energy and 
food - the recent two main drivers of inflation- will not rise above their current levels due 
to the deterioration in the European and global environment. Both scenarios identify a 
hike of electricity prices as the main risk given the significant dependency on energy 
imports. The low-growth scenario projects lower average inflation rates for 2012 and 
2013, at 1.5% and 1.8% respectively. A more detailed analysis relating to domestic 
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demand, employment and disposable income of households and their respective impact 
on domestic prices would have been useful. 
Monetary and exchange rate policy 
Unilateral euroisation implies that there is only limited scope for the use of a proper 
monetary policy. The central bank is not an issuing bank, and most of its executive 
functions are related to banking supervision. It also engages in liquidity management 
operations in favour of the banking sector and issues treasury bills on behalf of the 
government. The structural reforms chapter briefly presents the initiatives already taken 
to strengthen the central bank capacity and supervisory function and some of the planned 
measures, including the adoption of international accounting standards. 
External sector 
The programme fails to comply with the request of the Commission to analyse external 
sustainability and competitiveness issues, focusing the external sector analysis on 
developments of the balance of payments. The current account deficit contracted from 
30% of GDP in 2009 down to 19% in 2011. This was the result of a crisis-led adjustment 
and mainly due to lower imports following the contraction of domestic demand and 
credit, but also due to the resilience of the tourism industry and the recovery of 
merchandise exports. The extremely large headline current account deficit is financed 
primarily by large FDI (12% of GDP) and tourism receipts; part of the latter recorded in 
the errors and omissions surpluses, and equivalent to half the size of the CAD. The PEP 
foresees a further decline of external imbalances in the medium-term, albeit at a modest 
pace, driven by faster growth of exports than imports. As a result, the trade deficit is 
expected to shrink between 2012 and 2014 by 2 percentage points of GDP. Meanwhile, 
income and transfers balances would remain in surplus at some 3% of GDP. According 
to the programme, lower FDI would be the main factor for the external rebalancing. 
Given the strong positive correlation between imports and investments (see graph 
below), the contraction of investments would result in lower imports and thus reduce the 
trade deficit. However, according to historical data, other factors like bank credit have a 
stronger effect on imports than FDI. 
The significant size of current account deficits exposes the country to refinancing risks 
and strong macroeconomic adjustments in case of slowing or reversing capital flows. 
Such a scenario could be triggered, for instance, by a sharp decline in FDI resulting from 
the eurozone's macroeconomic deterioration, or by restricted access to external financing 
of the main external debtors16 to refinance their maturing external obligations. To some 
extent, the large external deficits also reflect a structural phenomenon representing high 
investments needs that would improve economic competitiveness, diversify the industrial 
base, and raise future productive capacity of the economy. The PEP confirms the key role 
of FDI to ensure the financing of the external deficit. The low-growth scenario estimates 
a very mild contraction of FDI by 0.6 percentage points in 2012, and 0.2 and 0.8 in the 
next two years compared to the baseline scenario, resulting in similar effect for the CAD, 
                                                   
16  The main external debtors are the nine foreign-owned banks, the aluminium factory and the electric 
power company EPCG. 
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thus not adequately reflecting the potential risks resulting from a significant deterioration 
of the external environment.  
 
External competitiveness and the current account 
Evolution of the current account deficit and net FDI 
(% of GDP and correlation) 
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Source: Pre-Accession Economic Programme (PEP) 
 
The continuous contraction of bank lending to the private sector since the outbreak of the 
global financial crisis has contributed to the stabilisation of until then fast-rising private 
external debt. Data on nonfinancial private sector external debt is not available. Some 
estimates suggest total external debt to be close to 100% of GDP in 2011, of which the 
public external debt accounts for one third. The programme does not provide an estimate 
on the external debt nor on the net international investment position (NIIP) which should 
have been considered given the very high external indebtedness of the economy and the 
risk it represents. 
Financial sector 
The banking sector was severely affected by the global financial crisis and until recently 
presented one of the major risks for the macroeconomic stability of the country. The 
decisive support from foreign parent banks, recapitalising domestic subsidiaries and 
repatriating bad assets, as well as the timely implemented strengthening of bank 
regulations and supervision probably prevented a major crisis. The sector somewhat 
stabilised in 2011, notably after the mid-year reversal of until then continuously 
worsening of non-performing loans (NPLs), which nevertheless still accounted for 15% 
of total loans by the end of 2011. The reduction during the second half of 2011 of NPLs 
resulted in a contraction of provision expenses, reducing the aggregated loss of the 
banking sector to EUR 3 million at the end of 2011, compared to EUR 82 million losses 
a year earlier. After three years of continuous contraction, the programme expects bank 
lending to grow by 5% year-on-year in 2012 and to accelerate to 8.4% by the end of 
2014. The main risk identified by the PEP stems from the high level of indebtedness of 
the real sector, worsened by tight credit conditions. The low growth scenario evaluates 
also the risk from the exposure to the euro area sovereign debt crisis and a weakening 
economic outlook, resulting in a lower credit growth rate of 1.7% in 2012, which 
however   accelerates to similar levels as the baseline in 2014. 
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Main risks to the macroeconomic scenario 
The programme presents various risks originating from a recession in partner countries 
which would affect exports, tourism, FDI, and employment. A cutback in capital inflows, 
notably on greenfield investments, also represents a major risk as it would depress 
domestic demand, but also further weaken fiscal performance given the reliance of 
indirect tax revenue from imports. However, until very recently the stability of the 
financial sector presented the main reason of concern for the overall macroeconomic 
stability. As the banking sector gradually stabilises, the currently most immediate threat 
remains the still weak capacity of the economy to refinance debt, risking a build-up of 
payment arrears, especially in case of further deterioration of the international economic 
environment. The aluminium factory represents a particular case on its own. The largest 
exporter of the country is producing at a loss and is highly indebted.  
5.5 PUBLIC FINANCE 
To achieve the sustainability of public finances, the medium-term fiscal policy presents 
an expenditure-led consolidation which foresees a reduction of the spending ratio by 4.6 
percentage points, progressively reducing the level of total public expenditures to 38% of 
GDP by 2014. Meanwhile, revenues should remain broadly constant at some 39% of 
GDP. The envisaged fiscal targets (identified in the programme as fiscal anchors) foresee 
reaching a balanced budget in 2013, and a fiscal surplus to 2014, while capital spending 
remains in the mid-term broadly constant at some 3% of GDP. The authorities are 
committed to maintain their low tax rate policy in order to attract investments. Given that 
80% of total public spending is non-discretionary, the fiscal strategy relies on the 
effective implementation of the structural reforms agenda, and notably the reform of 
pensions, the labour market and public sector restructuring. The projected medium-term 
net lending position should help to reduce public debt levels, from a peak of 47% of GDP 
in 2012 down to 43% by end of 2014. The PEP foresees significantly lower levels of 
revenue for the period 2011-2013, compared to last year's programme projections of 42% 
of GDP. Expenditures have also been revised downwards, although more moderately 
(one percentage point of GDP lower per year). Therefore, the objective of reaching a 
balanced budget is postponed by one year to 2013. The programme presents more 
detailed analyses than in previous exercises, notably on the reform of the pension system. 
However, there is still room for further improvement; like providing further details on the 
concrete measures to support the reduction of the spending ratio in each year, or 
analysing the structural components of public expenditures too. 
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5.5.1 Budget implementation in 2011 
The general government budget was reduced from 47% of GDP in 2010 down to 43% in 
2011 resulting in a consolidated budget deficit of 4% of GDP in 2011, almost twice 
above the original plan. Consolidated revenues totalled 39% of GDP in 2011, marginally 
lower than the PEP estimation, and in contrast with a level of 42% a year earlier. Overall, 
tax income remained broadly stable over the year, recording some 24% of GDP. The 
corporate income tax and value added tax were two positive exceptions, recording some 
moderate growth over the year. However, social security contributions deteriorated, 
driven by lower health and pension contributions. Consolidation efforts brought current 
expenditures below 40% of GDP compared to 42.5% the year before. Further cuts took 
place on other personal income, supplies and services, as well as on regular maintenance 
and capital expenditure. However, two major expenditure lines recorded significant 
expansion compared to last year: Gross salaries sharply increased by EUR 78 million (or 
2.4% of GDP) as a result of the reclassification of health sector workers wages from 
'transfers' into 'gross salaries'. In addition, pensions expanded by almost 8% due to the 
adjustment of military pensions, but also due to a higher than expected increase of the 
number of beneficiaries from restructured industries. Capital spending also registered 
cuts for additional 1% of GDP. 
General government net borrowing missed the original budget target by 1.7% of GDP in 
2011. The revenue side appears to account for most of the shortfall. Proceeds from the 
corporate income tax and local taxes recorded a better outcome than expected, the latter 
contributing to the small surplus of the local government budget. However, VAT, real 
estate taxes, excises and social security contributions underperformed against the plan. 
On the expenditure side of the budget, the annual increase of gross wages was one 
percentage point lower when compared to the original design, despite the substantial re-
allocation of transfers related to health workers. By contrast, the 4% increase of pensions 
above the original budget plan suggests some slippage on this item. Once more, capital 
expenditures served as fiscal buffer, with unplanned cuts of almost 18%. Overall, when 
considering a deteriorating international environment, contingent liabilities from state 
guarantees as well as tax arrears (which increased by 0.5% of GDP in 2011), it seems 
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unlikely that the primary balance, as foreseen in the programme, may become positive as 
of next year. 
5.5.2 Near-term and medium-term budget strategy 
The parliament adopted on 22 December 2011 the budget law for 2012, envisaging a 
fiscal deficit of -1.25% of GDP in 2012, compared to -1.05% foreseen in the PEP. The 
authorities expect real GDP growth of 2%. One of the main objectives is to continue the 
consolidation of public finances, bringing the level of public expenditures close to 40% 
of GDP. However, the budget also plans further rise of pensions, social benefits, and 
interest payments, to be partially balanced by a 25% reduction on discretionary spending, 
subsidies, as well as travel and representation costs. 
The implementation of the 2012 budget appears like a major challenge given the poor 
outcome of the previous year. Total revenues should remain flat at 39% of GDP, 
assuming that tax revenue will remain in line with the pace of expansion of the economy, 
while non-tax revenues are expected to grow according to inflation rates. Public spending 
should further contract by 2.5 percentage points of GDP in 2012 compared to 2011. One 
of the main fiscal measures consists on the freezing of public sector wages in real terms. 
Pensions and social benefit spending should increase by additional 0.7% of GDP as a 
consequence of industrial and public sector restructuring. In 2012 the second and final 
phase of the accounting reclassification of health workers salaries from transfers into 
gross wages should be completed. Capital expenditure will be marginally reduced by 0.3 
percentage point of GDP. 
At first sight, the 2012 budget is an attempt to continue further consolidation. However, 
the deficit target of 1% of GDP seems at present unrealistic when considering the 
weakness of fiscal revenues performance against the plan, and the banks call in early 
2012 of the state guarantees extended to the aluminium plant. In response, the 
Montenegrin authorities prepared in April a budget rebalancing with additional revenue 
and expenditure measures adding around one percentage point of GDP above the original 
2012 budget measures. On the one hand, more than 80% of total spending is non-
discretionary and their reduction mainly depends on the effective implementation of 
structural reforms, like the recent amendments to the pension or labour laws. However, 
the full impact of these reforms will not be immediate. On the other hand, the programme 
confirms the authorities' fiscal stance to maintain the current low tax rates in order to 
attract investors. Overall, the Commission forecast estimates a higher deficit of some 
2.6% of GDP, resulting from tax arrears and the servicing of state guarantees, which the 
programme presents only as a potential risks. 
 
Box: The budget for 2012 
 
* The draft budget for 2012 was presented to the State Audit Institution and to the parliamentary 
Committee for Economy, Finance and Budget in the first week of December 2011, and finally adopted 
by the Assembly on 22 December. 
* The target for the general government balance in 2012 is a consolidated deficit of -1.25% of GDP, 
compared to -1.05 foreseen in the PEP. 
* The main fiscal measures include an increase of excise duties on tobacco, alcohol, as well as new 
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excises on coffee and carbonated drinks. Public sector wages should remain broadly constant, at 21.2% 
of GDP like in 2011. Other measures, like tax exemptions for personal and corporate income taxes for 
underdeveloped municipalities, or the adoption of a higher base for social security contributions are not 
presented in the PEP. 
* Industry restructuring will also have an impact on the budget, resulting in new pensions and social 
transfers for redundant workers. However, the PEP does not include some 1% of GDP of costs deriving 
from the servicing of state guarantees of the aluminium plant.  
* Finally, the PEP foresees a marginal loss in revenues from the decision in 2011 to remove some minor 
administrative and custom fees in order to eliminate business barriers. 
 Table: Main measures in the budget for 2012  
 Revenue measures* Expenditure measures**  
 • Amendments to the Law on Excise Duties 
(+0.4% of GDP) 
• Tax exemptions (PIT, CIT) for underdeveloped 
municipalities (N/A) 
• Higher base for social security insurance (N/A) 
• Amendment to the law on administrative fees 
(-0.03% of GDP) 
 
• Contention of public sector wages  
• Reduction of current spending (goods and 
services) (-1% of GDP) 
• Increase of pensions and social transfers to 
former workers of restructured industries and 
public sector (+0.7% of GDP) 
 
 
 
* Estimated impact on general government revenues. 
** Estimated impact on general government expenditure. 
Sources: PEP 2012 
 
 
The baseline scenario applies a cautious approach, foreseeing a constant share of 
revenues at 39% of GDP for the outer years (2013-2014), notwithstanding an expected 
acceleration of growth. On the contrary, consolidated public expenditures are expected to 
further decline to 39% of GDP in 2013 and 38% in 2014. However, the projections for 
2013 and 2014 lack a comprehensive description of underlying fiscal measures to support 
the reduction of the spending ratio in each year. The PEP also presents a low-growth 
fiscal scenario, where public spending would increase as a percentage of GDP compared 
to the baseline scenario, due in part to higher social security payments as automatic 
stabilisers play during the downturn, but also the political decision not to adjust further 
the level of expenditures to lower revenues. This fiscal stance in the low-growth scenario 
would result in a deficit close to 2% of GDP in 2014, compared to a 1% surplus in the 
baseline. On this scenario the PEP considers the possibility of adjusting fiscal policy in 
response to adverse developments, by introducing new taxes or raising their rates, but 
without detailing which ones and their expected impact on the budget. 
The programme identifies several risks related to the uncertain international environment. 
In addition to negative impact on commodity exports, FDI and tourism, an externally 
driven credit squeeze could also result in rising tax arrears. On the domestic side, the risk 
of liquidation of the aluminium plant would bring a temporary contraction of GDP and 
employment. Yet, the servicing of state guarantees would have an overall impact on 
public debt of some 6% of GDP, adding pressure on external refinancing needs. 
Furthermore, the programme insists on the reliance of domestic growth on uncertain FDI 
inflows, and their impact on fiscal revenues. In order to reduce the risk of public wages 
slippage under social pressure, the government and the trade unions signed end-2011 an 
agreement on wage policy valid until 2015. It presents a first attempt to link salaries to 
productivity, rising public workers' wages only in case that the economy expands by 
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more than 3.5% or annual average inflation exceeds 2%. However, in case GDP contracts 
by more than 2%, the social partners will negotiate a cut in public sector salaries 
Change:
2011-14
Revenues 42.3 39.4 39.4 39.2 39.0 -0.4
- Taxes and social security contributions 34.5 33.6 34.2 34.2 34.2 0.6
    - Other (residual) 7.8 5.8 5.2 5.0 4.8 -1.0
Expenditure 47.2 42.6 40.5 39.1 38.0 -4.6
- Primary expenditure 46.2 41.2 38.7 37.3 36.2 -5.0
of which:
Gross fixed capital formation 4.7 3.4 3.1 3.1 3.1 -0.3
Consumption 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Transfers & subsidies 14.9 15.4 14.6 14.4 14.2 -1.2
Other (residual) 26.6 22.4 21.0 19.8 18.9 -3.5
- Interest payments 1.0 1.4 1.8 1.8 1.8 0.4
Budget balance -4.9 -3.2 -1.1 0.1 1.0 4.2
- Cyclically adjusted -6.4 -2.4 -0.6 0.5 1.4 3.8
Primary balance -3.9 -1.8 0.7 1.9 2.8 4.6
Gross debt level 40.9 43.8 46.9 45.4 42.9 -0.9
Sources: Pre-Accession Economic Programme (PEP) 2012, ECFIN calculations
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Composition of the budgetary adjustment  (%  of GDP)
 
Structural balance (cyclical component of deficit, one-off measures and temporary 
measures, fiscal stance) 
The programme presents a first attempt to calculate structural balances, albeit focussing 
on the revenue side only. The analysis could be further extended to the expenditure side 
of the budget in next exercises.  According to this preliminary analysis, Montenegro tax 
revenues present a highly pro-cyclical pattern. During boom periods revenues are far 
higher than potential structural outcome, resulting in strong budget surpluses. The PEP 
runs three different estimates for direct, indirect and other taxes. A simple regression on 
GDP is applied in all three cases, with direct taxes (CIT, PIT, excises) corrected for past 
changes of tax rates occurred in 2009 and 2010, and indirect taxes (VAT, excises and 
custom duties) adjusted for imports trends. The analysis shows that, mainly due to tax 
arrears, revenues are significantly lower in the lower growth part of the economic cycle. 
The cyclically adjusted revenues suggest marginal net lending positions once GDP 
reaches growth rates of 3.5% (considering the estimated annual potential growth rate at 
3.2%). However, given the lack of longer and more consistent time-series and the 
absence of estimates of the structural expenditure side, these results should be considered 
with caution.  
Budgetary implications of "major structural reforms" 
The reforms agenda is to a large extent a continuation of past measures, their focus 
shifting from the design phase to implementation and development. The PEP's efforts to 
gauge the fiscal impact of these reforms are to some extent more complete that previous 
year's EFP. However, the evaluation of the impact is still basically focused on the 
budgetary cost of the measures rather than their net impact, with the exception of labour 
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market, pension system, transport, and environment reforms. On the expenditure side, the 
pension reform is one of the most important given the influence of the social security 
balance on the deficit, and should contribute to enhancing fiscal sustainability by 
increasing retirement age, changing the indexation formula and strengthening the 
incentives against early retirement. Eradicating subsidies to the aluminium and steel 
companies will be difficult without a successful restructuring of these companies that 
increase their profitability. The reform of the public sector, merging several agencies and 
common services, should alleviate the costs of the public sector while improving public 
administration could improve expenditure allocation and management in the medium 
term. Once efficiency gains are exhausted on the expenditure side, either further cuts in 
public sector or some structural changes in revenues (i.e. hiking some tax rates) might be 
needed to ensure fiscal sustainability. On the revenue side, the programme only foresees 
the increase of some excise duties in 2012, which should raise total revenues by 
additional 0.4% of GDP. Yet, fiscal revenues could also improve in the case of 
successful privatisations of some large companies. Meanwhile, the labour and pension 
reforms should also provide additional fiscal revenues from a higher number of workers 
as a result of the new laws. 
General government debt 
Montenegro's public debt has been increasing since the outbreak of the global financial 
crisis in 2008, when it had been at levels below 30% of GDP. The rapid acceleration of 
the debt stock since then has been mainly driven by deficit financing needs. Most of the 
deficit has been financed by external borrowing, with the exception of local governments 
which ensure financing through domestic borrowing. According to the programme, total 
public debt will reach a peak at 47% of GDP in 2012, driven by a surge in the stock-flow 
of foreign debt to finance the budget gap. Public debt should decline gradually afterwards 
in the wake of consolidation efforts on public expenditures and subsequent primary 
balance surpluses. Although the external debt also reflects the financing of major 
infrastructure projects, mostly through loans from international financial institutions, 
these represent a small part of the net stock-flow compared to borrowing for budget 
financing. Meanwhile, domestic debt (of which 43% relate to legacy issues of restitution 
and frozen foreign currency savings) is set to decline, from 10% of GDP in 2010 down to 
7.3% in 2014. 
Out of total issued guarantees, amounting to 12% of GDP, the state guarantees extended 
in favour of the aluminium factory (KAP) represent the most immediate risk, and 
represent some 5% of GDP including interest. The factory has already failed servicing 
some loan instalments due to liquidity problems. The decision of the government in early 
2012 to take over the ownership of the aluminium plant should facilitate servicing this 
debt as scheduled instead of being called-in at once. However, the payment of the state 
guarantees stock risks to be ineffective if KAP continues running daily losses in the 
meantime. Another risk identified in the low-growth scenario would be a further 
deepening of the economic crisis, driving public debt close to 50% of GDP in 2013, 
although set to decline afterwards. Yet, even in the worst-case scenario, the sustainability 
of the public debt does not raise immediate concerns, although risks prevail. The debt 
stock's currency composition and maturity structure remain relatively favourable. Euro-
denominated debt accounts for some 92% of total public debt, while debt denominated in 
US dollars and Swiss francs represent 2% of total debt each. The public debt remains 
primarily on concessional terms, with average interest rates at about 3.9% and maturity 
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of 6.7 years. The structure of credit also has long repayment and grace periods of up to 
10 years. 
2010 2011* 2012 2013 2014
Gross debt ratio [1] 40.9 43.8 46.9 45.4 42.9
Change in the ratio 2.7 2.9 3.1 -1.6 -2.4
Contributions [2]:
1. Primary balance -3.9 -1.9 0.7 1.9 2.8
2. “Snow-ball” effect -0.5 -0.7 0.1 -0.7 -0.8
Of which:
Interest expenditure 1.0 1.4 1.8 1.8 1.8
Growth effect -0.9 -1.0 -0.8 -1.6 -1.7
Inflation effect -0.6 -1.1 -0.8 -0.9 -0.9
3. Stock-flow -0.7 1.7 3.7 1.0 1.2
[2]  The snow-ball effect captures the impact of interest expenditure on 
accumulated debt, as well as the impact of real GDP growth and inflation on the 
debt ratio (through the denominator).
Source: Pre-Accession Economic Programme (PEP) 2012, ECFIN calculations
Composition of changes in the debt ratio (%  of GDP)
Notes:
[1]   End of period.
* PEP data corresponds to debt stock until September 2011.
 
Debt management focuses on securing financing from external sources to refinance the 
general government budget; on enforcing the more transparent and detailed set of rules 
adopted in May 2011 which defines more precisely the guidelines for local governments 
borrowing; and on carrying out a stricter control on future government guarantees, 
limiting these to infrastructure or added-value projects. The amended fiscal framework 
will deepen fiscal consolidation, move towards fiscal surpluses and reverse the debt 
dynamics, setting the public debt on a downward trajectory. 
5.5.3 Sensitivity analysis and comparison with previous PEP 
The present PEP is based on lower than expected GDP growth and a reduction in current 
revenues compared to last year's programme. Therefore, budget rebalancing has been 
postponed by one year compared to the EFP projections. The sensitivity analysis is 
presented as the low-growth scenarios, and the programme identifies the main fiscal risks 
and fall-back positions which however remain rather vague. The main concern is the cost 
of debt servicing, worsened by additional borrowing for deficit financing. The baseline 
foresees that fiscal consolidation will lead to a balanced budget and thus to put an end to 
these borrowing requirements as of 2015. Other fiscal risks are related to the 
accumulation of tax arrears, the rigidity of the budget structure, contingent state 
guarantees, and the current difficulties to access capital markets at reasonable cost. To 
mitigate such risks, the government intends, amongst others, to rationalise the number of 
employees, to reschedule state guarantees, and to secure funds outside European capital 
markets, including the possibility of a precautionary arrangement with the IMF. 
5.5.4 Quality of public finances and institutional features 
The programme argues that as a result of past tax reforms the level of revenue collection 
in terms of GDP as well as per capita is higher than in the majority of regional peers. In 
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order to attract investment, the revenue side of the Montenegrin budget is characterised 
by low tax rates. The programme does not envisage any major new tax measures except 
the increase of some excises and of the marginal top ceiling for social security 
contributions. Other measures, like the rescheduling of payments for some corporate 
taxes, can be considered more as measures to ease liquidity constraints of companies 
rather than a proper tax reform on itself. On the expenditure side, the main objective is to 
reduce current spending levels in order to preserve sufficient fiscal space for increasing 
future capital investments, though the programme is lacking details on the concrete 
measures to rationalise spending.  Cuts in current expenditures have been made in recent 
years, but further reduction may not come as easily. The programme does not foresee 
capital investment to drop below 3% of GDP. In order to ensure the prioritization of 
investments, the medium-term budget framework includes in the 2012 budget a detailed 
evaluation of policy priorities of spending units. 
As in previous programmes, the PEP presents its projections on deficit, current and 
capital spending as well as on public debt as fiscal anchors. However, the objective set 
for capital spending is higher than the one presented in the fiscal scenario. Moreover, 
these objectives are not supplemented by any corrective legal measure in case of 
deviation. So far, institutional improvement in public finances concern the harmonisation 
of tax and custom legislation with the EU Acquis, or the reinforcement of administrative 
capacities to deal with future EU funds for agriculture, regional and human development. 
The Ministry of Finance has also reorganised one department to deal with public 
revenues projections separately from expenditures. Further improvements and alignments 
of accounting and auditing standards have been planned for 2012. In March 2012 the 
government adopted the IMF General Data Dissemination System (GDDS). 
5.5.5 Sustainability of public finances 
The programme contains an analysis of the long-term sustainability of public finance by 
comparing estimated effects of the 2010 law on pension reform to an estimated no policy 
change scenario. Assuming constant productivity and unemployment rates, the new law 
which rises compulsory years of service to 40 and the retirement age to 67, will start 
reducing the number of eligible beneficiaries as of 2011, decreasing the cost of pensions 
by 1% of GDP until 2013, when workers aged 65 in 2011 will reach 67. This reduction 
of pension costs will continue, although at a slower pace after 2013, until pensions 
expenditure would stabilise at around 9% of GDP by 2040. In addition, the former 
indexation formula was revised to a more favourable ratio for the public finances, with a 
higher weight on inflation than wages. In a no-policy-change scenario, pension costs 
would instead have kept increasing above 13% of GDP by 2050. 
The programme also provides some information on the reforms of the education and 
health systems. In order to contain expenditure on education, efforts would focus on the 
reduction of the costs per student, although these measures are not well described. Other 
reports17 point to the need of rebalancing the number of schools and students. The 
reforms to improve efficiency in the public health system include the introduction of 
diagnosis-related payments according to average costs which are expected to reduce the 
                                                   
17  More detailed information on pensions, education and public health reforms is available at the World 
Bank's Public Expenditure and Institutional Review report of 12 October 2011. 
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outlays of total primary healthcare by 14%. A new basic package for secondary and 
tertiary care will also be defined. The increase of excises on alcohol, tobacco and 
carbonated drinks mentioned earlier, is also considered to create long-term savings on 
treatment costs while contributing to public finances in the interim. 
5.6 STRUCTURAL REFORMS 
5.6.1 Obstacles to growth and the structural reform agenda 
The programme does not identify and discuss the main structural obstacles to growth and 
the structural strategy and priorities envisaged to tackle them as requested by the 
Commission. There is a broad consensus in recognising the need for improvement in 
energy provision and infrastructure to support higher growth rates. Yet, the financing of 
such projects depends on an uncertain international environment, which could result in 
delays or external shocks to tourism or metal prices. The restructuring of the metal 
industry and the continuation of privatisation is also necessary to improve industrial 
diversification, freeing resources, now spent on subsidies and state guarantees. Potential 
for further investments still remains high, especially on tourism, which relies heavily on 
foreign investment inflows. However, further efforts are still required to improve the 
business environment, notably to avoid contradicting rules between local and central 
authorities which unnecessary delay project developments. 
5.6.2 Key areas of structural reform 
The PEP covers a broad range of structural reform areas, following up on last year's 
measures and consistent with the programme's policy priorities.  The presentation of 
measures tends to be rather backward and future plans focused on the short term (2012). 
Several measures presented in the programme relate to the continuation of previous 
initiatives, like further development of secondary legislation following the adoption of 
several new laws in 2011, and the focus is on their implementation. The quality of the 
different sections varies markedly, although the various contributions are better 
coordinated than in last year's programme. Again, some additional efforts are required to 
estimate the budgetary effects for all reforms. The budget impact is very high, although it 
is far from accurate, as the impact of the reforms, especially on the budget revenues, is 
largely underestimated. 
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2012 2013 2014
Privatisation 18.0 18.0 18.0
Competition policy and state aid -0.1 -0.4 -0.4
Business environment and Tax policy 11.5 n.a. n.a.
Network industries -8.0 n.a. n.a.
Labour market -14.7 -15.8 -16.3
Education and Research -8.9 -7.1 -6.5
Pension system -124.1 -107.5 -87.1
Healthcare system -7.4 -9.4 -9.0
Social protection -65.1 -67.8 -70.1
State administration n.a. n.a. n.a.
Other measures -110.6 -107.0 -102.7
Total impact on the budget -309.3 -297.0 -274.0
Total impact on the budget (in % of GDP) -9.1 -8.3 -7.2
Source: Economic and Fiscal Programme (PEP) 2012, ECFIN calculations
Net direct budgetary impact of key reform commitments (in EUR million)
 
Product and capital markets 
The privatisation process recorded little progress in 2011, opening successfully just two 
tenders for the sale of the state-owned newspaper and some property from one agro-
company. The plans for 2012 lists thirteen companies for sale, whose total value is 
estimated at 247 million (or 7% of GDP), although given the uncertainty of investors' 
interest, its impact on budget revenues is not presented18. The list includes the railways, 
the airlines, the harbour's cargo terminal, the national post, as well as some smaller 
companies. Apart from the injection of funds into the budget, the motivation for their sale 
is rather to improve their competitiveness through new investments. The restructuration 
of the two large metal industries remains uncertain. The steel mill has been declared 
bankrupt and offered for sale, while the future of the aluminium industry remains unclear 
after the parliament decided in early 2012 to end the privatisation deal. 
The business environment continued to improve during 2011 with the introduction of 
one-stop-shop for business registration, the adoption of new laws on bankruptcy, the 
enforcement and securing of claims and the simplification of building permits and 
procedures (administrative guillotine). Further activities are planned with respect to 
electronic company registration, continuing the simplification of procedures and 
developing a new legislation for building permits. However, while progress is being 
achieved at central government level, additional efforts are still needed by local 
governments. The overall situation of domestic banks seems to improve slightly, 
although credit tightening appears to remain one of the main obstacles for growth. While 
this situation seems difficult to alleviate until the situation of international financial 
markets improves too, the Investment Development Fund is broadening its range of 
activities in support of local businesses, for example by introducing export insurance and 
factoring. 
                                                   
18  The budget medium-term framework foresees, however, annual revenues from privatisation of just half 
a percent of GDP per year until 2014. 
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The ongoing reform of the electricity market, heading for an improvement of the 
transmission network and new interconnections, resulted in some export diversification. 
Electricity represented the second largest export item in 2011, accounting for 11% of 
total commodity exports compared to nil two years earlier. 
Labour market 
The labour market has been characterised by its rigidity, namely within the heavy 
industry sectors, and the restrictive collective agreements, resulting in low wage 
flexibility, high unemployment and low activity rates among the old and young. To 
soften these rigidities the labour law was amended in December 2011. The new 
legislation addresses excessive employment protection by simplifying the procedure of 
individual dismissals. It also introduces temporary employment agencies. It also limits 
fixed-term contracts to no more than 24 months, while they had an unlimited duration 
before, being the primary vehicle for private sector job creation in recent years, 
presenting a dilemma between weakened labour market performance and the search of a 
sustainable long-term solution. Additional amendments were also implemented to the 
law on employment of foreigners, of disabled persons, as well as on recognition of 
foreign qualifications. These reforms are complemented by those implemented in 
education, with a focus on improving its quality, by adopting a system of external 
graduation and vocational exams at the end of high school. Another issue of the labour 
market is the lack of mobility and the substantial development gap between the North 
and the rest of the country. Overall, the employment policy remains fragmented, mostly 
consisting in isolated active labour market measures. However, the programme 
announces a reduction of these active measures in 2012, which raises concerns given the 
still high level of unemployment and skills mismatches. 
Other reform areas 
The chapter on structural reforms also describes many other reform areas, like public 
administration, agriculture, environment, financial sector, etc.  The programme would 
generally benefit from establishing a closer link between the outlined reform measures 
and the achievement of core objectives of the programme. This would also require the 
setting up of a clear timeline and sequencing of reform implementation. 
5.7 OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF FORMAL REQUIREMENTS 
Macro framework 
The programme presents a rather clear and succinct picture of past economic 
developments and covers all relevant data available at the time of submission. The 
presentation of past economic developments has overall improved compared to last 
year’s programme. This year's PEP includes two scenarios: a relatively cautious baseline 
and a lower growth scenario. It offers a preliminary evaluation of the output gap, as well 
as a detailed projection of contributions to value added by economic sector. Furthermore, 
the quality and coverage of data has generally improved. For the first time estimates on 
labour market developments have been provided. However, additional efforts are still 
needed to complete the statistical annex, in particular the long-term sustainability of 
public finances. A shortcoming of the programme is the lack of an analysis of the, the 
sustainability of the external position, and of competitiveness issues, as explicitly 
requested by the Commission. 
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Fiscal framework 
The fiscal programme is broadly consistent with the macroeconomic framework, and 
sufficiently comprehensive, with the key measures on the revenue and expenditure side 
well identified and articulated in the budget for 2012. However, the level of explanation 
is less detailed or inexistent as regards outer years. The analysis of the sustainability of 
the pension reforms presents a particular qualitative improvement compared to previous 
programmes. However, there is still room for further improvement of other sections, like 
the structural components of public expenditures. The programme does not include any 
reference to the Progress Reports; even if the outline encouraged the authorities to 
include cross-references to the Commission's assessment. Fiscal data is not in line with 
ESA 95 standards, although the programme announces a project with the Slovakian 
authorities to assist with this conversion. Montenegro did not present a fiscal notification 
in 2011. However, it is expected to fully participate in the next exercises. 
Structural reforms 
The programme does not present the main structural obstacles to growth or a summary 
introduction to the chapter, which could articulate the interaction of macroeconomic, 
fiscal and structural policies. The presentation starts directly with each reform section, 
presenting a backward looking introductory part followed by comments on planned 
activities largely focused on 2012. Still, the quality of the different sections varies 
significantly. Some additional efforts are required to estimate the budgetary effects for all 
reforms. For instance, there are no quantitative estimates in the area of state aid reform, 
although data on subsidies is available in the budget's medium-term framework. 
* * * 
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Annex: Structural indicators
Montenegro EU 27
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
General economic background
Real GDP 1 10.6 6.9 -5.7 2.5 2.7f 3.2 0.3 -4.3 2.0 1.6f
Labour productivity 2 29.1 37.0 34.2 37.1 37.7 100 100 100 100 100
Real unit labour cost 3 15.0 7.0 -3.3 6.1 -3.3f -0.8 1.0 2.8 -1.6 -0.5f
Real effective exchange rate 4 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 121.4 123.2 118.3 109.0 113.1
Inflation rate 5 4.3 7.4 3.4 0.5 3.1 2.3 3.7 1.0 2.1 3.1e
Unemployment rate 6 19.3 16.8 19.1 19.7 19.7 7.2 7.1 9.0 9.7 9.6
Employment
Employment rate 7 42.7 43.2 41.3 40.3 39.0 65.3 65.8 64.5 64.1 n.a.
Employment rate - females 8 21.5 17.9 20.4 20.7 18.4 58.2 58.9 58.4 58.2 n.a.
Employment rate of older workers 9 n.a. 3.0 2.3 1.8 n.a. 44.6 45.6 46.0 46.3 n.a.
Long term unemployment 10 38.1 35.6 41.1 40.4 33.6 3.1 2.6 3.0 3.9 n.a.
Product market reforms 
Relative price levels 11 55.7 60.3 61.4 59.3 n.a. 100 100 100 100 100
Total trade-to-GDP ratio 12 97.2 97.8 65.9 65.4 69.0 10.7 11.6 9.8 11.7 n.a.
Net FDI  13 21.2 18.9 35.8 17.5 11.9 3.9 2.2 2.1 1.0 n.a.
Sectoral and ad-hoc state aid 15 0.5 0.7 1.7 1.3 1.4 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 n.a.
Business investment 16 25.4 30.6 19.2 16.4 15.2f 18.7 18.4 16.2 15.9 n.a.
Knowledge based economy
Tertiary graduates 17 3.6 6.8 8.8 n.a. n.a. 13.8 14.5 14.3 n.a. n.a.
Spending on human resources 18 4.3 4.7 4.5 4.5 n.a. 5.0 5.1 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Educational attainment 19 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 78.1 78.5 78.6 79.0 n.a.
R&D expenditure 20 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.0 n.a.
Broadband penetration rate 21 2.6 5.5 9.0 12.0 12.5 18.2 21.7 23.9 25.7 n.a.
Source:  Commission services, national sources
1. Growth rate of real GDP in %.  2. Labour productivity per person employed - GDP per person employed relative to EU-
27 (EU-27=100).  3. Growth rate of the ratio: compensation per employee in current prices divided by GDP (in current 
prices) per total employment.  4. Vs IC36 (1999 = 100), current year's values are based on Commission's forecast deflator 
figures, nominal unit  labour cost deflator.  5. Annual average rate of change in Harmonized Indices of Consumer Prices 
(HICPs), tFYRoM, Montenegro = CPI.  6. Unemployed persons as a share of the total active population.  7. Employed 
persons aged 15-64 in % of total population of the same age group.  8. Employed women aged 15-64 in % of total female 
population of the same age group.  9. Employed persons aged 55-64 (EU27) or 50-64 (tFYRoM)) in % of total population 
of the same age group.  10. Long-term unemployed (over 12 months) in % of total active population.   11. comparative 
price levels of final consumption by private households including indirect taxes (EU-27=100).  12. Trade integration - 
Average value of imports and exports of goods divided by GDP.  
f: forecast, e: estimated value, p: provisional value, b: break in series, s: Eurostat estimate, r: revised value,
13. Average value of inward and outward FDIs flows in % of GDP.  14. Market share of the largest generator (% of total 
net generation). 15. In % of GDP. 16. Gross fixed capital formation by the private sector in % of GDP.  17.Total tertiary 
graduates in science and technology per 1000 of population aged 20-29.  18. Public expenditure on education in % of GDP. 
19. Percentage of the population aged 20 to 24 having completed at least upper secondary education.  20. GERD (Gross 
domestic expenditure on R&D) - in % of GDP.  21. Number of broadband access lines per 100 inhabitants.
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6 SERBIA 
6.1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
Serbia submitted its Economic and Fiscal Programme covering the period 2012-2014 on 
31 January 2011. The country's key medium-term challenge remains to ensure a stable 
macroeconomic and financial environment conducive to stronger growth, more jobs and 
an improvement of living standards. The economic recovery continued in 2011, with 
GDP growth of 1.6%, mainly fuelled by a pick-up in investment activity. However, in the 
second half of the year growth came under pressure due to the difficult global economic 
environment. In the face of slowing export growth, the current account deficit widened to 
above 10% of GDP, but inflation began to subside gradually. 
Although the programme's macroeconomic scenario was revised downwards against the 
background of an uncertain international environment, its growth projections appear still 
optimistic, especially for 2012 when economic growth is projected to reach 1.5% before 
it accelerates quite markedly to 4% in 2014. The authorities have indicated upon 
submission of the programme that the on-going economic developments called for a 
further downgrading of the macroeconomic assumptions. A comprehensive revision is 
expected by mid-2012, after the 6 May general elections. The programme would have 
obviously benefited from presenting alternative growth scenarios, also to avoid that its 
macroeconomic framework becomes quickly outdated. 
The fiscal responsibility legislation, adopted in 2010, compels the authorities to a gradual 
consolidation of public finances, in line with a set of numerical fiscal rules. Although the 
medium-term fiscal strategy presented in the programme follows the general guidelines, 
there are major risks to the realisation of the planned outcomes, not least due to the 
optimistic underlying macroeconomic scenario. According to the EFP, in 2011 the 
budget deficit reached 4.6% of GDP, which was higher than initially targeted, due to 
substantial revenue shortfalls amid slowing economic activity. Preliminary actual 
budgetary figures point to even higher deficit. 
Over the medium term, a gradual deficit reduction to just below 3% of GDP by 2014 is 
projected. Compared to last years' programme, the pace of adjustment has been slowed 
down and is more back-loaded. The fiscal strategy foresees as of 2013 an expenditure-led 
fiscal adjustment through a reduction in the share of general government current 
expenditures as a percentage of GDP, resulting mainly from restraining pension outlays 
as well as public consumption, including the wage bill. However, the programme does 
not provide detailed information on the envisaged fiscal policy measures that will rein in 
current expenditure. The anticipated savings on current spending will be difficult to 
foster, as the social situation remains weak. From 2013, the general government revenue 
ratio is projected to fall despite the anticipated strengthening of private consumption and 
imports. A rigorous implementation of the fiscal responsibility provisions is key in 
fostering the country's long-term sustainability of public finance. However, the design 
and implementation of an appropriate set of policy measures to improve the composition 
and efficiency of general government expenditure, notably in the pension, healthcare and 
education systems as well as public administration will have to be urgently addressed. 
The fiscal framework presented in the programme reflects the efforts made to provide 
more in-depth analysis, notably as regards public debt and the medium term debt 
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management strategy which is supported by a sensitivity analysis of alternative 
borrowing options. The programme also presents for the first time estimates of potential 
output growth and structural fiscal balances. 
In 2011, a more subdued foreign demand weighed on the external position, which has 
been maintained in the aftermath of the 2009 crisis. In view of the slowdown ahead, the 
current account gap is expected to widen further, but should stay well below the pre-
crisis levels as long as import growth lags export growth. Although the external 
imbalances have been significantly reduced since the 2009 crisis, dependence on external 
financing remains high. Foreign loans are likely to remain sizeable due to higher 
government borrowing abroad, but the sustained deleveraging by the private sector is 
poised to offset the negative impact on external indebtedness. In view of the ample 
foreign exchange reserves and gradually declining gross external debt relative to GDP 
coupled with a shift towards borrowing mostly long term, Serbia’s external sustainability 
appears relatively stable. However, it remains subject to a number of risk factors and 
uncertainties with respect to inter alia export capacity, FDI inflows, interest and 
exchange rate. Vigilance is required, as foreign financial resources could become scarce 
due to the sovereign debt problems and the on-going balance sheet repairs in the EU. The 
programme presents a comprehensive overview of past developments based on relevant 
indicators as regards the country's external sustainability but would benefit from a 
forward looking assessment including a discussion of the country's competitive position, 
as requested by the Commission. 
Serbia has taken important steps towards transforming its economy, but a number of 
structural weaknesses persist and hamper the economic performance. Broad consensus 
has been reached on the need to shift to more balanced and sustainable growth, driven by 
exports and investment, which will bolster export expansion and create new jobs. So far, 
progress has been limited and further efforts will be necessary for restructuring the 
economy and improving the business environment, in particular by strengthening the rule 
of law and removing red tape, enhancing competition and the role of the private sector as 
well as tackling rigidities on the labour market. In line with the Commission's request, 
the programme would have benefited from a more thorough analysis of structural 
bottlenecks to growth and from the definition of a more elaborate strategy. To that end, 
the authorities will have to substantiate the reform agenda with the implementation 
roadmaps, timetables and budgetary impact assessments of the most important measures. 
To sum up, the plausibility of the programme targets is constrained by an outdated 
macroeconomic scenario. The programme duly recognises that there are uncertainties 
stemming from both external and domestic environment, but the assessment of the 
potential impact is constrained by the absence of quantitative analysis of the various risk 
factors. Given the signals that the macroeconomic scenario presented in the programme 
has become unattainable, the credibility of the proposed fiscal plan has been undermined. 
This is further marred by the lack of details on the fiscal policy measures. It is also not 
clear from the programme which policies and measures would forge a structural shift to 
more sustainable growth based on exports and investment. It remains to be seen how this 
strategy would unfold, given the absence of binding plans for implementing structural 
reforms. 
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6.2 INTRODUCTION 
Serbia's Economic and Fiscal Programme for the period 2012-2014 was submitted on 31 
January 2012, following its adoption by government on 19 January. Contrary to past 
practice, this programme has not been endorsed by parliament as the country's strategic 
economic policy document setting out the medium-term macroeconomic and fiscal 
policy framework. According to the fiscal responsibility legislation, the parliament 
adopts annually a fiscal report covering the three-year budgetary cycle, but the authorities 
did not attempt to establish a link with the programme. 
6.3 KEY POLICY CHALLENGES 
In the medium term, Serbia's main challenge remains to establish a fully-fledged market 
economy, capable of coping with macroeconomic shocks and competitive pressures in 
the international environment. The programme recognises that further efforts are needed 
to that end. 
The onus remains on a policy mix of monetary and fiscal measures. Among the 
economic policy guidelines defined in the programme for the period 2012-2014, sound 
public finances anchored by a set of specific numerical fiscal rules, defined in the revised 
Law on the budget system, have a predominant role. This revised fiscal framework, 
adopted in 2010, is an important step towards improving the sustainability of public 
finances. However, as the augmented growth-based rule for the fiscal deficit allows for 
deviation from target when GDP growth is below potential, the deficit remained 
relatively high in 2011 and is projected to decline only slightly in 2012, against the 
background of weak economic activity. A process of gradual and continued fiscal 
consolidation would require the design and implementation of specific cost saving 
measures with a view to reduce the relatively high ratio of current public spending. The 
programme acknowledges the need to address structural weaknesses and rigidities, which 
are significant obstacles to economic growth. In particular, an unfinished agenda of 
privatisation and incomplete enterprise restructuring as well as labour market weaknesses 
remain key challenges for policy makers. 
6.4 ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS AND OUTLOOK  
6.4.1 Recent macroeconomic developments  
The programme presents a concise description of the state of the economy until the third 
quarter of 2011, using data available at the time of preparation of the programme. 
Serbia's economy bounced back from the 2009 recession, with GDP up by 1% in 2010 
and strengthening further by 1.6% in 2011. However, the export-driven recovery began 
to lose momentum in the second quarter of 2011 amid the looming downturn in Serbia's 
main trading partners. Private consumption remained constrained by eroded disposable 
incomes due to a jobless recovery and high inflation, but the stimulus from domestic 
demand strengthened owing to a pick-up in investment, mainly based on a revival of 
construction, the first time since 2009. Driven by imports of intermediate and capital 
goods in support of a rally in investment activity, import growth soared towards the end 
of the year. At the same time, export expansion withered with softening external demand 
despite the depreciation of the dinar later in the year, which led to a marked widening of 
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the current account deficit, to around 10.7% of GDP. Inflationary pressures, which had 
been building up from the middle of 2010 and peaked in April 2011 at close to 15%, 
subsided thanks to the fading base effect, easing of commodity and food prices and 
contained domestic pressures given the limited impact of hikes in administered prices 
and subdued private consumption. By the end of 2011, CPI inflation declined to 7% from 
10.3% in 2010, but was still well above the upper boundary of the 3-6% target band for 
the end of the year set by the National Bank of Serbia (NBS). Despite an economic 
upturn in 2011, the situation on the labour market deteriorated further. The 
unemployment rate soared to 24.4%.19 Following a two-year nominal freeze, indexation 
of public sector salaries (and pensions) was re-introduced as of January 2011, and three 
adjustments were carried out during the year. Nevertheless, overall growth of net wages 
remained contained, up by 0.2% in real terms. 
Box: Anchoring macroeconomic stability with economic programmes supported by IFIs 
Serbia's macroeconomic stability has been broadly sustained owing to an economic recovery plan 
supported by the IMF under a 27-month Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) worth close to EUR 3 billion, out 
of which Serbia drew around EUR 1.5 billion. Following its expiry in mid-April 2011, a new precautionary 
SBA agreement was signed in September. Covering 18 months, effective as of September 29, the new deal 
was intended to commit the policy-makers to long-delayed structural reforms. However, the initial 
benchmarks mainly bound the authorities to the implementation of the new fiscal responsibility framework 
and further development of local financial markets to entrench macroeconomic stability against the 
backdrop of a deteriorating global environment. In the case of an economic slump, Serbia could resort to 
financial aid in the amount of EUR 1.1 billion. Following a review mission in November 2011 and a staff 
visit in early February 2012, the programme was put on hold due to the deviations in the 2012 budget bill 
from the underlying SBA agreement, in particular with regard to higher planned issuance of public debt 
(including government guarantees) and domestically-financed projects. Central to the agreement was the 
commitment by the authorities to make additional efforts in order to safeguard macroeconomic stability 
against the background of the global slowdown and the deepening sovereign debt crisis in the euro area. 
In the context of the first IMF SBA, the EU committed its financial support to help the government address 
residual external and budgetary financing needs. In July 2011, the EU released upon a satisfactory 
fulfilment of condition requirements EUR 100 million, the first tranche of a macro-financial assistance loan 
facility (MFA). The provisional amount, granted at the end of 2009 in view of the adverse impact of the 
global crisis on the Serbian economy, was EUR 200 million, but the MFA funds were halved in the light of 
the lower foreign financing requirements and subsequently the need for emergency assistance by 
International Financial Institutions (IFIs). 
6.4.2 Medium-term macroeconomic scenario  
Compared to the previous years' submission, the macroeconomic scenario was revised 
downwards against the background of a worsening international environment, in line 
with the projections by external forecasting institutions available at the time of preparing 
the programme. Upon the submission, the authorities have agreed that the deterioration in 
the economic climate called for a further downgrading of the macroeconomic 
assumptions. The GDP growth projection for 2012 is likely to be significantly reduced 
and its fiscal consequences addressed. However, a comprehensive revision is unlikely to 
be forthcoming due to imminent elections on 6 May. 
                                                   
19 This rate refers to the age group 15-64, in line with the international methodology. According to the 
Labour Force Survey (LFS); the unemployment rate for people aged 15 and above stood at 23.7% at 
end-November 2011. 
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The programme's macroeconomic outlook projects real GDP growth to reach 1.5% in 
2012 and to accelerate to 3% in 2013 and 4% in 2014 which is optimistic, especially for 
2012. Exports and investment would be the key drivers of growth as the programme 
continues to anticipate a shift to a more sustainable growth pattern. Employment growth 
is projected to turn positive in 2012 and pick up over the period 2013-2014 while average 
annual inflation is set to decelerate to 4.1% in 2012 and stabilise thereafter. 
How this strategy would unfold remains unclear. The programme does not identify the 
policies and measures that would underpin the envisaged scenario, notably as regards 
productivity and employment growth. In the light of the elevated global uncertainties, the 
new election cycle, with a general vote in the spring and presidential elections in the 
autumn, and also given the absence of binding plans for structural reforms the medium-
term macroeconomic outlook is exposed to substantial risks. The programme would have 
benefited from presenting an alternative low growth scenario. 
Real GDP (% change) 1.0 1.6 1.5 3.0 4.0
Contributions:
- Final domestic demand -2.7 1.2 0.2 1.6 2.3
- Change in inventories 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
- External balance of goods and services 3.7 0.4 1.3 1.4 1.6
Employment (% change) -8.4 -6.6 0.5 1.0 1.5
Unemployment rate (%) 19.2 23.2 22.9 22.0 20.8
GDP deflator (% change) 3.3 7.9 4.2 3.7 4.0
CPI inflation, annual average (%) 6.1 11.2 4.1 3.7 4.0
Current account balance (% of GDP) -7.9 -10.7 -8.4 -7.7 -7.4
Sources: Economic and Fiscal Programme (EFP) 2012, for 2010 and 2011 the latest 
official national statistics where possible.
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Macroeconomic developments
 
Real sector 
Compared to the previous programme, the growth trajectory has flattened as a result of 
the anticipated temporary slowdown in 2012. The programme projects real growth to 
moderate to 1.5% in 2012, down from an estimated 2% in 2011, and to accelerate to 3% 
in 2013 and 4% in 2014. The stimulus to growth is expected to be initially driven by 
investments and exports in 2012 while becoming more broad-based over 2013-2014, 
with positive contributions from both external and domestic demand,  assuming that 
exports remain robust despite more subdued foreign demand, and are further 
strengthened by sustained investment in the export-oriented sectors. As the improving 
economic performance gradually translates into new jobs and higher wages, the 
economy's output is seen to be supported by private consumption growth that would turn 
positive (1.1%) in 2013 while government spending is projected to remain entrenched 
over the medium term. The macroeconomic scenario is overly optimistic, as the key 
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drivers of growth – export expansion and investment activity, increasing at an average of 
10.9% and 4.5% respectively over the programme's period, are exposed to significant 
risks. On the production side, the new growth paradigm implies that economic activity 
would be increasingly driven by export-oriented industrial sectors. Yet, the contribution 
of agriculture to GDP growth is projected to remain high, at 0.4 percentage points per 
year. 
The programme presents for the first time the official calculations of cyclical conditions 
(as measured by the difference between the potential and actual growth rates – the output 
gap) in the period 2002-2014, based on a Cobb-Douglas production function. In step with 
the installation of new production facilities, particularly in the tradable goods sectors 
including the agricultural sector, the potential output of Serbia's economy is set to 
increase to around 3% in 2014, the level reached before the 2009 recession. The risk of 
overheating is identified towards the end of the programme period as the output gap turns 
positive, which could lead to inflationary pressures. 
Inflation 
According to the programme, inflationary expectations will stay broadly anchored 
throughout the medium term within the existing inflation targeting policy.20 The 
National Bank of Serbia (NBS) maintains a target band for the end-year CPI inflation 
rate at 4.5±1.5% in 2012 and 2013. Inflation fell below the upper limit of the range in the 
first quarter of 2012 thanks to the fading base effects of earlier commodity price shocks 
and weak consumer spending, and is expected to stabilise around 4% over the 
programme period. 
The projection of a stable inflation assumes a conservative monetary policy and 
restrictive fiscal stance, exercising restraint in hikes of public sector wages and pensions 
as well as of administered prices and excise duties.21 However, achieving price stability 
will be challenging in the face of volatile global commodity prices and structural 
shortcomings,22 in particular the substantial state control over prices23 and the knock-on 
effect of the exchange rate fluctuations. The programme acknowledges the risks to the 
inflationary path, but does not define risk mitigation measures. 
Monetary and exchange rate policy 
The presentation of monetary policies in the programme is very brief and does not 
comply with the outline. The NBS remains committed to price stability as its main 
objective. It has been gearing its monetary course through regular adjustments of the 
                                                   
20 While the NBS has been pursuing inflation targeting since 2006, the current framework was put in place 
on 1 January 2009, when the NBS began setting a broad band around the targeted consumer price index 
(CPI) inflation instead of core inflation, as previously. 
21 To keep price growth under control, the government adopted a decree, effective until June 2012, by 
which it put an administrative cap on trade margins. 
22 Inflation in Serbia remains much higher than in countries with comparable income levels. The inflation 
pattern points to relatively high sensitivity of prices to common external shocks as well as failures in the 
market formation of prices, which prompted occasional state interventions, e.g. as in 2010, following the 
shortage of food items. 
23 Administered prices account for more than 20% of the CPI inflation basket, with regulated energy prices 
accounting for around half of this share. 
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two-week repo interest rate in line with price developments. From mid-2011, the stance 
has been relaxed, as the NBS abandoned tightening of monetary conditions in the face of 
signs that inflation is slowing and the dinar is strengthening. The reference interest rate, 
which had been hiked to 12.5% in April 2011, was slashed to 9.5% by the end of 
February 2012. 
The NBS takes into consideration exchange rate stability in pursuing its policy 
objectives. Within the existing monetary setting, foreign exchange operations on the 
interbank market are undertaken to prevent excessive exchange rate volatility, with the 
view of limiting pass-through effects to inflation and safeguarding financial stability 
given the high degree of euroisation of the economy. In 2010, the three-month swaps of 
foreign currencies were introduced as a regular monetary instrument to facilitate 
transactions between the NBS and commercial banks. However, the NBS continued to 
resort to extensive selling of currency reserves on the foreign exchange market, which is 
largely motivated to buffer depreciation pressures on the dinar. In 2011, the NBS's 
interventions on the interbank market were less frequent as the exchange rate stayed 
relatively stable.24 They were stepped up in early 2012 to avert the major slide of the 
dinar's value in the face of a looming standstill in economic activity and the spike in risk 
premia throughout the region.25 
In the medium term, the effectiveness of monetary policy will be tested against the 
effective pursuit of dual objectives by the NBS, namely preserving financial stability 
while being committed to inflation targeting. Limiting dinar volatility, amid the 
mounting economic and fiscal pressures, with monetary easing underway, will be a 
particular challenge. 
External sector 
In response to the Commission's request to substantiate the analysis of the country's 
external sustainability, the programme presents a more comprehensive overview of the 
past developments based on sustainability indicators, but it falls short in providing a 
forward looking assessment, including a discussion of the country's competitiveness 
position. External imbalances have been significantly reduced since the 2009 crisis. The 
current account deficit narrowed to around 7% of GDP in 2010, down from over 20% 
before the crisis, and the merchandise trade deficit fell to around 18% of GDP, down 
from 26%. The current account gap is expected to temporarily widen in 2012 before 
declining in the outer years, staying well below the pre-crisis levels over the programme's 
period. The underlying improvement in the trade balance (goods and services) to a deficit 
of 12.6% in 2014 assumes that export growth will significantly outpace that of imports, 
although the latter are expected to accelerate in line with increased investment and the 
recovery of private consumption. If the underlying assumptions fail to materialise, either 
due to a suppressed export activity or a rally of imports as a result of a strong domestic 
demand and/or a global commodity price shock, the balance of payments projections 
could be significantly undermined. 
                                                   
24 Although the dinar was on a depreciating trend in the second half of 2011, over the year the RSD/EUR 
exchange rate strengthened by about 1.5%, also as result of higher capital inflows. 
25 In March, the RSD/EUR exchange rate hit the historic low, trading at over RSD111 per EUR 1. 
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The dependence on external financing has remained high. The programme assumes that 
over the next three years around 40% of the trade deficit will be covered by a surplus on 
the current transfers account, while the rising interest payments would incur deficits on 
the current incomes account. The current account deficit is expected to be financed 
through inflows of both FDI and portfolio investment, estimated to average around EUR 
2 billion per year. Foreign loans are likely to remain sizeable due to higher government 
borrowing abroad, but the sustained deleveraging by the private sector is poised to offset 
the negative impact on external indebtedness. Against the background of the expected 
foreign currency inflows, official foreign exchange reserves are expected to remain 
largely stable and sufficient to cover more than eight months of imports of goods and 
services throughout the programme period. 
In view of the ample foreign exchange reserves and gradually declining gross external 
debt relative to GDP (forecast to drop to around 70% of GDP in 2014) coupled with a 
shift towards borrowing mostly long term, Serbia’s external sustainability does not cause 
immediate concerns. However, it remains subject to a number of risk factors and 
uncertainties with respect to export capacity, FDI inflows, and interest rates. A 
substantial private savings-investment gap remains to be closely monitored. The 
exchange rate volatility is also a point to watch, especially in the face of the recent 
depreciation pressures. Given the high level of 'euroisation' of the Serbian economy, the 
negative impact of dinar depreciation on debt could be considerable, notwithstanding the 
assumed beneficial effects to Serbia's export competitiveness. In order to avoid the risk 
of the appreciation of the real effective exchange rate, it will be crucial to keep 
inflationary pressures contained. 
Financial sector 
The programme does not elaborate on the medium-term prospects regarding the financial 
intermediation role of the sector. In the light of the substantial increase in NPLs and 
subdued credit growth, a more in-depth discussion of the financing of the real economy 
would have been welcomed. 
Main risks to the macroeconomic scenario 
The Serbian economy has a potential to strengthen in the medium term. However, the 
anticipated pace of the recovery is overly optimistic against the background of the fragile 
international environment and the delays in economic restructuring. The programme duly 
recognises that there are uncertainties stemming from both external and domestic 
environment, but the assessment of the potential impact is constrained by the absence of 
quantitative analysis of the various risk factors on the main macroeconomic aggregates. 
In that sense, the programme would have benefited from presenting alternative growth 
and risk scenarios. 
There are significant risks related to the developments in the external environment. The 
envisaged economic upturn is based on a sustained export expansion and investment 
spending which will depend on the recovery of foreign demand. The availability of 
capital on the external markets at reasonable conditions will be crucial for the financing 
of investment in production facilities and infrastructure projects given the limited 
domestic resources and relatively high interest rates. Exchange rate fluctuations and 
commodity price shocks represent a further threat to the development of the export-
oriented sector and through an adverse wealth effect. In particular, oil price hikes could 
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spur inflationary pressures, exposing the anticipated path of a gradual economic recovery 
and decelerating inflation to a significant risk. 
In the domestic environment, risks remain predominantly on the downside. The 
implementation of structural adjustments, which are necessary for a shift of the economy 
towards a more balanced, resilient and sustainable growth, has been faltering. If, on the 
other hand, political will for reforms is mustered after the elections and also with a view 
to advancing to a further stage in the EU accession process, the medium-term outlook 
may well improve. 
6.5 PUBLIC FINANCE  
The key objective of fiscal policy is to enhance the long-term sustainability of Serbia's 
public finances. The fiscal responsibility legislation, adopted in 2010, compelled the 
authorities to a gradual consolidation of public finances, based on a multi-annual 
budgetary process and on a set of binding numerical fiscal rules with a strong cyclical 
component, formalised in the revised Law on the budget system. It commits the policy 
makers to a medium-term deficit target of 1% of GDP and to keep public debt (without 
restitution costs) below 45% of GDP. Moreover, the framework foresees to cap over the 
medium-term the outlays for public sector wages and for pensions, respectively, to 8 and 
10% of GDP.  The law also defined a new indexation formula for public sector wages 
and pensions, with three adjustments in 2011 and bi-annual indexation thereafter that 
would be modified, should the indexation mechanism threaten the achievement of the 
planned deficit. 
In this context, the medium-term fiscal strategy projects a gradual reduction of the 
general government deficit from 4.3% of GDP in 2012 to 2.9% in 2014, based on an 
expenditure-led adjustment. 
However, in view of the optimistic macroeconomic scenario presented in the programme, 
the proposed fiscal plan may turn out to be unrealistic. Moreover, the credibility of the 
fiscal strategy is further undermined by the lack of information regarding the specific 
measures to bring down the spending ratio. In addition, the downward revision of the 
2011 GDP recently published by the statistical office of Serbia changes ratios to GDP, 
notably increasing deficit and debt, and impacts on the overall medium-term fiscal 
strategy. Revisions of the 2012 budget and of the medium-term fiscal strategy are 
expected by mid-2012, after the general elections of 6 May. As public debt will have 
exceeded the 45% debt/GDP ceiling in 2011, the Budget System Law mandates that the 
government submit a plan for reduction of the debt ratio to the National Assembly 
together with the budget for the following year. 
6.5.1 Budget implementation in 2011 
According to the EFP, in 2011, the general government deficit was kept almost 
unchanged at 4.6% of GDP (preliminary figures, based on the latest GDP data, show a 
deficit of around 5.1% of GDP) from the year before, falling short of the planned 
adjustment to 4.1% of GDP in the previous submission. In October 2011, a 
supplementary budget was passed by parliament, in line with the revised budgetary plans 
in the framework of the new precautionary agreement with the IMF. A higher deficit 
(4.6% of GDP) was justified by a downward revision of growth and in line with the fiscal 
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rules in place, where the underlying formula set the necessary adjustment in relation to 
slower-than-expected GDP growth. Revisions of the budget were also prompted by the 
adoption of the bill on the financing of local governments, which inter alia increased the 
share of personal income tax that municipalities retain from 40% to 80%. 
In 2011, public finances were challenged by a considerable revenue shortfall. In the first 
half of the year, revenue performance was solid notwithstanding the scraping of a 
temporary 10% tax on mobile services26 and the on-going lowering of customs tariffs in 
line with the trade agreement under the Stability and Association Agreement. Pressures 
on the budget mounted since the summer in the face of the dwindling inflows of VAT 
revenue as the gradual economic upturn was losing momentum. Personal income tax 
revenue as well as social contributions have been boosted by the unfreezing of wages in 
the public sector, but still remained subdued given the weak labour market. Against this 
background, the share of revenues as a percentage of GDP is estimated in the programme 
to have fallen by more than 2 percentage points compared to 2010. 
The situation remained tense also on the expenditure side, as a two-year temporary 
nominal freeze of public administration salaries and pensions came to an end.27 
Additional social assistance spending and subsidies were provided in response to the 
weak labour market performance and poor living conditions, yet were contained relative 
to GDP. Against this background, current expenditure stayed entrenched at more than 
90% of total expenditures. Nevertheless, the authorities were able to further a spending 
cut of RSD 15-20 billion in line with the revised budget with some additional savings 
and the expenditure restraint was successfully enforced. Overall, the expenditure ratio is 
estimated in the programme to have decreased by 2 percentage points. 
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26 The tax was introduced in the framework of the 2009-2011 SBA programme as an ad hoc corrective 
measure in order to compensate for the sizeable revenue shortfall in the face of a sharp economic 
downturn. 
27 Nominal public sector wages and pensions were frozen in 2009, as a part of the emergency measures 
agreed with the IMF to limit the fiscal slippage in the aftermath of the crisis. 
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6.5.2 Medium-term budgetary strategy 
The medium-term fiscal strategy presented in the programme projects a gradual reduction 
of the fiscal deficit, by 1.7 percentage points of GDP from 4.6% of GDP in 2011 to 2.9% 
in 2014. Compared to previous years' programme, the pace of adjustment has been 
slowed down, in line with the flexibility enshrined in the fiscal rule with respect to the 
cyclical position of the economy. The programme envisages an equivalent reduction in 
general government expenditure, as a percentage of GDP, resulting mainly from 
restraining current expenditure, in particular pension outlays, public sector payroll, 
public consumption and spending on subsidies so as to maintain public investment at an 
average level of 3.8% of GDP. The general government revenue ratio is projected to 
increase in 2012, but to fall again to the 2011 level by 2014 despite the anticipated 
strengthening of private consumption and imports. 
The adjustment profile of the fiscal strategy is essentially back-loaded, as the spending 
ratio is programmed to increase in 2012 (by half a percentage point), before it is set to 
decline by around one percentage point per year in 2013 and 2014. Total revenues in 
2012 are envisaged to increase by an even larger extent (by 0.8 percentage points), 
resulting in a slight improvement of the fiscal balance compared to 2011. 
In the context of the new precautionary SBA, the authorities had pledged to reduce the 
fiscal deficit in 2012. Due to lower than earlier projected real GDP growth, the initial 
deficit target was raised by 0.3 percentage point, to 4.25% of GDP. This increase was 
smaller than allowed for by the numerical rule and agreed for the sake of safeguarding 
the debt ceiling. The authorities envisaged enhanced revenue mobilisation through better 
tax compliance and, in addition, pledged to ensure expenditure cuts, amounting to 0.75% 
of GDP. However, the budget bill, which was adopted by the parliament in December 
2011, deviates from the initial agreement with the IMF. Higher outlays for investment, 
interest payment as well as subsidies were not compensated for by savings in 
consumption and transfers, leading to an increase in total expenditure by 0.5 percentage 
points of GDP, as shown by aggregate data in the EFP. The first review under the SBA 
has been delayed and putting public finances back on track will need to be a priority of 
the administration after the elections. The programme provides hardly any information 
about the 2012 budget and its underlying policies. Thus, it is difficult to assess the 
precise factors for the planned increase in the spending ratio, in particular with respect to 
public investment and interest costs. Likewise, the strong increase in the revenue seems 
somewhat surprising in view of cyclical developments, and may be based on an 
overestimation of the short-term effects of better tax compliance. Overall, the EFP itself 
does not allow to obtain a clear view about the plausibility of the 2012 budget. 
With respect to the outer years of the programme, the strategy assumes little change in 
the structure of general government revenue, while the revenue ratio is expected to 
decline in 2013 and 2014. No tax rate hikes other than in excises as a part of further 
harmonisation with the EU law have been envisaged. The authorities consider that 
putting a firm grip on tax discipline will buoy revenue collection, but do not provide 
further details on the envisaged measures. 
With respect to the spending side, although the provisions require the fiscal strategy to be 
accompanied by a medium-term expenditure plan, the programme remains silent on the 
details of the fiscal policy measures to be taken to rein in public expenditure. In 
particular, as the social situation remains weak, the anticipated savings on current 
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spending will be difficult to foster, especially as regards the rationalisation of the public 
administration employment. 
The fiscal rules have been designed to ensure that the fiscal adjustment is achieved 
mainly through a reduction as well as rebalancing of general government expenditure 
towards growth-enhancing capital spending. However, it will be difficult to curb 
substantially the share of outlays for the public sector salaries and pensions by 2015 
given the projected growth path and the regular indexation.28 In view of the high share 
of mandatory expenditure, room for increasing capital expenditure is likely to remain 
limited. The available funds are earmarked for priority infrastructure projects, such as the 
Corridor 10 roads and railways. A detailed public investment plan, albeit a vital part to a 
new medium-term expenditure framework, has not yet been divulged. 
 
Change:
2011-14
Revenues 41.0 39.1 39.9 39.4 39.1 0.0
- Taxes and social security contributions 36.1 33.8 34.1 34.1 34.0 0.2
    - Other (residual) 5.8 5.3 5.8 5.3 5.1 -0.2
Expenditure 45.6 43.7 44.2 43.1 42.1 -1.6
- Primary expenditure 44.5 42.3 42.4 41.2 40.1 -2.2
of which:
Gross fixed capital formation 3.5 3.5 4.0 3.8 3.8 0.3
Consumption 19.0 18.1 17.7 16.9 16.3 -1.8
Transfers & subsidies 21.9 20.8 20.7 20.5 20.0 -0.8
Other (residual) 0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
- Interest payments 1.1 1.4 1.8 1.9 2.0 0.6
Budget balance -4.6 -4.6 -4.3 -3.7 -3.0 1.6
- Cyclically adjusted -4.1 -4.2 -3.9 -3.6 -3.1 1.1
Primary balance -3.5 -3.2 -2.5 -1.6 -1.0 2.2
Gross debt level 42.7 42.4 44.0 44.9 44.4 2.0
Economic and Fiscal Programme (EFP) 2012, ECFIN calculations
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Composition of the budgetary adjustment  (%  of GDP)
 
Overall, notwithstanding the fiscal framework based on formulae-based rules, the 
medium-term fiscal consolidation strategy is exposed to major implementation risks. 
Some of these risks are duly acknowledged and their impact on the 2012 deficit 
quantified in the programme (e.g. reduction in the collection of social insurance 
contributions). Thus, a 1% lower collection of social contributions would increase the 
deficit by 0.1 percentage point. The programme, however, tends to underscore the fragile 
political, macroeconomic and social conditions, which may undermine the planned fiscal 
course. 
Pursuing expenditure-based consolidation amid uncertain economic environment will be 
challenging. Freeing fiscal space to make way for higher public investment hinges on the 
                                                   
28 In addition to price developments, the indexation formula also takes into account growth performance: 
the April adjustments in 2012 and 2013 will be topped by half of the GDP growth. 
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authorities' willingness and ability to restrain current expenditure, when the employment 
prospects are not so strong and the social situation is tensed. In particular, the risk of a 
budgetary slippage increased substantially with the recent nationalisation of the country's 
biggest steel mill.29 The full effects of the fiscal decentralisation remain largely unclear, 
as the new law has only been in force since October 2011. There are also uncertainties 
related to the budgetary impact of the recent laws on restitution/denationalization and 
public property. Furthermore, the prospects with regard to budgetary financing might 
falter, as the arrangements with International Financial Institutions have been shelved 
due to the political standstill in the run up to general elections. The lack of firm 
commitments as regards structural reforms, which aim at enhancing cost-effectiveness of 
the public sector as well as improving the overall business climate, raises additional 
concerns about the plausibility of the fiscal targets. 
On a more technical note, the authorities have made remarkable efforts to estimate 
budgetary balances in cyclically-adjusted terms, and thereof assess fiscal policy in terms 
of its stance and impulse. The authorities may consider it equally useful to make fully-
fledged alternative scenarios based on a sensitivity analysis of the fiscal aggregates to the 
main macroeconomic variables an integral part of their medium-term budgetary planning. 
Budgetary implications of "major structural reforms" 
The programme announces structural adjustments in health care, education and social 
welfare, which are expected to curb public spending. In cumulative terms, the planned 
reforms are estimated to foster savings of around 1% of GDP over the next three years. 
In absence of a detailed implementation timetable, the net fiscal effects of measures 
remain to be specified, however. 
6.5.3 General government debt  
Fiscal sustainability has become a major issue of concern, as public debt30 soared and by 
end-2011 exceeded the ceiling of 45% of GDP. The government stepped up the issuance 
of debt securities in the face of the widening budgetary gap. Treasury-bill auctions met 
ample demand, as domestic banks favoured investment in short-term government 
securities owing to higher yield, especially amid the appreciation of the dinar. This paved 
the way to a successful bid for USD 1 billion on the international market; in September 
2011, the first 10-year eurobond was issued, with an annual coupon rate of 7.25%. 
In the programme, the authorities pledge to abide by the fiscal rule and keep public debt, 
excluding restitution cost, below the legal limit throughout the medium term. However, it 
remains to be seen how this can be achieved, as the projected reduction of primary 
balance is challenged by the uncertainties in the macroeconomic outlook. Moreover, the 
planned large-scale infrastructure projects, which are to be partly financed by public 
                                                   
29 The government took over the steel mill with some 5,500 workers in order to mitigate the social impact, 
following the decision by US Steel to close its Serbian subsidiary. 
30 The national definition of public debt deviates from ESA-95 methodology, as it includes all general 
government guarantees, irrespective of whether their actual activation. Contingent liabilities account for 
some 15% of total public debt, of which three quarters represent guarantees to the state road and railway 
companies. 
 105 of 127 
means, may prompt additional government borrowing and led to a further increase in 
public debt. There is also a risk that indebtedness surges as a result of a continued 
depreciation of the dinar. 
The programme provides a very sound and comprehensive discussion of the country's 
debt management strategy. The authorities justify the adopted strategy based on the 
World Bank model, by analysing the cost and risks of four borrowing alternatives against 
a set of macroeconomic shocks. Amongst the options, which blend to varying degrees 
borrowing in domestic and foreign currency, the preferred strategy "S4" aims at issuing 
debt securities with long-end maturities, denominated in dinars. The choice between the 
alternative strategies has been motivated by testing the sensitivity of public debt to a 
dinar depreciation, an interest hike and a simultaneous shock of the two. The sensitivity 
analysis reveals that the impact of the interest rate hike is limited (for the chosen strategy, 
an increase in the domestic interest rate of 5% would lead to an increase in public debt of 
0.5%, to 43% of GDP). The adverse effect is more substantial in the case of a broad-
based depreciation of the dinar (for the chosen strategy, a 15% depreciation of the dinar 
against all currencies results in 5 percentage points higher public debt, to 47.4% of 
GDP). In view of the recent significant depreciation pressures, the debt management 
strategy faces significant implementation risks. 
The plan of the authorities to further extend maturity on domestic treasury bills and 
bonds during the programme period is welcome but could prove difficult, especially 
given the recent lack of investor's interest. Going forward, sluggish economic activity, 
shallow domestic capital markets and exchange rate volatility could discourage investors' 
interest in treasury bills with long-end maturities. Access to financial resources may 
become more constrained and costly, but the financing of the fiscal gap should not come 
under threat, provided that macroeconomic stability is preserved.31 The programme 
remains silent on the plans to raise privatisation proceeds, given that the recent attempts 
to sell the majority stakes in the remaining state owned companies (telecoms incumbent, 
national air carrier, a pharmaceutical firm) were unsuccessful. 
The programme also advocates the development of municipal bond markets. While the 
objective – to raise resources for financing local government investment needs – is 
generally sound, the implementation needs to be tested against threats to overall public 
debt sustainability. 
The issuance of dinar-denominated treasury bills since 2009 has resulted in a steady 
increase in the share of dinar-denominated debt, but foreign debt still accounts for more 
than half of the currency portfolio and is predominantly euro-denominated.32 The 
repayment profile of the total public debt remains largely long-term and evenly 
distributed over time, despite the sustained short-term borrowing through treasury-bills. 
The share of debt with a fixed interest rate has been stabilised at around 70% of the debt 
portfolio. According to the programme, the debt portfolio appears relatively resilient to 
                                                   
31 In 2011, the prospects for budgetary financing became more upbeat after Serbia's sovereign credit ratings 
improved thanks to the efforts to strengthen the macro-fiscal policy framework. In early 2012, Serbia 
keeps a stable outlook on BB by S&P and BB- by Fitch. 
32 At end-December 2011, around 55% of Serbian public debt is denominated in euro, 18% in Serbian 
dinar, 17% in US dollar, 7% in special drawing rights (SDR) and 3% in other currencies (source: 
Bulletin of Public Finance, March 2012). 
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limited exchange rate fluctuations and interest rate hikes. However, the impact could be 
more substantial in case of larger and simultaneous shocks. 
6.5.4 Quality of public finances and institutional features  
Contrary to previous programmes, no information on the institutional features of public 
finances was included. An update of the recent actions would be welcome, given that the 
medium-term fiscal strategy is predicated on improved quality of public finances through 
an on-going strengthening of the legal framework. Against the background of a 
significant fiscal deterioration in the aftermath of the 2009 crisis, the authorities launched 
an overhaul of the budget system in 2010. Putting in place multi-annual budgetary 
programming33 together with binding fiscal rules and procedures, including the setting-
up of a fiscal council, was an important step towards instilling fiscal discipline. A 
consistent implementation of the legislation will be crucial in order to achieve the 
planned fiscal adjustments and thereby help lift the growth potential of Serbia's economy. 
A forward-looking budgetary process, the fiscal responsibility provisions and sustained 
progress in furthering fiscal accountability34 constitute a comprehensive framework for 
sound public finance management. Yet, its effectiveness is being tested against the 
unfavourable economic conditions, which hinder the achievement of the fiscal objectives. 
Capital expenditure is strained by revenue shortfalls and rising debt-servicing payments 
and it is likely to stay squeezed, given that the cost of population ageing is estimated to 
be significant, despite the 2010 pension reform. The new law, which will be phased in 
gradually over the period 2011-2022, extends the working period and age for assuming 
pension rights, tightens up the rules on early retirement and adjusts the indexation 
mechanism to be based partly on inflation and partly on growth performance. 
Going forward, further reforms will be necessary in order to enhance the long-term 
sustainability of public finances. The new government will need to make additional 
adjustments in the pension and healthcare systems, as well in public administration in 
such a way to yield savings as well as to improve efficiency. The key challenge remains 
to restructure general government expenditure in a more flexible way. In the current 
circumstances, it will be essential to strike a right balance between trimming current 
spending to make room for growth-enhancing investment and keeping the appropriate 
social safety nets. To allow additional resources to be channelled towards more 
productive public spending, the authorities will also have to speed up revenue 
mobilisation, including by strengthening administration capacity in tax collection. 
Further Public Finance Management (PFM) reforms and, in particular, implementation of 
some elements of the existing legislation will be necessary to strengthen transparency, 
reliability and efficiency of public finances. 
                                                   
33 According to the revised law, the three-year budgetary planning must be accompanied by a medium-term 
expenditure framework, a public investment plan and a risk assessment. 
34 The State Audit Institution, an independent external audit body, audited the 2010 State Budget and 
extended the audits of the financial statements of public enterprises. Progress has been seen in the field 
of public internal financial control (PIFC),  
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6.6 STRUCTURAL REFORMS  
6.6.1 Obstacles to growth and the structural reform agenda 
Serbia has taken important steps towards transforming its economy, but a number of 
structural weaknesses persist and hamper the economic performance. Although these 
weaknesses are acknowledged, the programme would have benefited from a more 
thorough analysis of structural bottlenecks to growth and from the formulation of a more 
explicit strategy to address them, as requested by the Commission. The authorities 
acknowledge that they will need to step up structural reforms. In particular, they stress 
the importance of further strengthening the rule of law and removing red tape, 
completing privatisation and enhancing the business environment, competition and the 
role of the private sector. However, while the EFP mentions structural weaknesses in the 
functioning of the labour market, it does not present any analysis or plan for structural 
reforms in this area. 
6.6.2 Key areas of structural reform 
The country's 2010 development strategy for the period 2010-2020 outlines the 
objectives of the new growth paradigm – to upgrade the productive capacity of the 
economy and create a climate conducive to increased foreign investment – but yet 
remains to be backed by a concrete action plan. Measures and their sequencing still need 
to be clearly defined and their fiscal impact estimated. The programme provides some 
information on past reforms but tends to only outline main objectives over the medium-
term. 
Product and capital markets  
The state influence in the economy remains high, with the private sector currently 
accounting for around 60% of GDP and total employment. It is largely a consequence of 
the unfinished privatisation and/or liquidation of socially and state owned enterprises and 
local utilities, which has been on-going since 2001. While the completion of the 
privatisation process is considered as one of the key priorities, the programme is not fully 
explicit on future steps and focuses on the description of the situation up to September 
2011. Following the repeal of about 600 sale contracts signed between 2002-2009 due 
non-compliance with some or all of the five standard contract obligations, there are still 
500 socially owned firms to be sold through auction/tender procedures or filed for 
bankruptcy.35 Privatisation of the state owned companies is largely incomplete, since the 
tenders for sale did not attract the expected demand. The state retains the majority 
shareholding in the large network industries, such as the national electric power 
company, the telecoms incumbent operator, the capital's airport, and the air carrier. More 
recently, furthermore, a wave of re-nationalisations has been underway. In January 2012, 
the state repurchased the country's biggest steel mill from US Steel for a symbolic price 
                                                   
35 The bankruptcy law, which entered into force in 2010, has improved market exit procedures, including 
by establishing automatic bankruptcy in cases where the firm's accounts had been blocked for more than 
3 years. However, the efficiency of the courts is constrained in view of the considerable backlog of 
bankruptcy cases. The authorities have instituted out-of-court settlements, in order to speed up the 
privatisation process. 
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of USD 1 and also brought back Telekom into full state ownership after buying out the 
20% stake, held by the Greek telecom operator OTE since 1997. According to the 
programme, the objective remains to find strategic investors, but the policy efforts over 
the medium term shall focus – where appropriate – on the reorganisation of the 
companies, including financial consolidation, restructuring and improvement of 
management practices, as well as their corporatisation into closed joint stock companies. 
To facilitate the privatisation of those enterprises in which the state retains a stake, the 
government already decided to distribute free shares worth 15% of the company's equity 
to those citizens who have not benefited from any free share distribution in the past.36 
Privatisation of the companies in the infrastructure sectors and public utilities, of which 
500 are operated by the local communities, are to remain an outstanding issue, as the 
strategies towards their liberalisation have still to be defined.37 However, the programme 
rules out the possibility that natural monopolies on local level will not be privatised. 
Apart from the heavy state involvement, market mechanisms remain hampered by legal 
uncertainty, red tape, insufficient competition, sectoral distortions and infrastructure 
bottlenecks. While important steps were taken towards establishing legal predictability, 
including by the recent adoption of a law on restitution, the business environment 
continues to be constrained by weak enforcement of the rule of law. A number of barriers 
to doing business persist, due to the delays or flaws in the implementation of a 
comprehensive regulatory reform, dubbed the regulatory guillotine.38 The programme 
recognises that further effort is needed to improve the business environment, but falls 
short of proposing a concrete implementation plan. Likewise, no details are available as 
regards the pledge for an overhaul of the system of fiscal incentives, which aim at 
supporting businesses in upgrading the productive capacity of the economy. 
The programme's main goals in the financial sector are to preserve stability, reduce costs 
of banking intermediation and expand the range of financial sources also with a view to 
contribute to the financing of investment. In the banking sector, foreign banks account 
for around 70% of the total assets and the subsidiaries of Austrian, Greek and Italian 
banks are in the top five banks. Against potential risks stemming from deleveraging 
pressures in the parent banks, the Serbian banking sector continues to be adequately 
capitalised and liquid, thanks to a prudent monetary policy. However, the banks are 
exposed to credit risk, in the light of the substantial exchange rate risk related to the high 
degree of 'euroisation' as well as the impaired banks' balance sheets.39 The monetary 
authorities have taken steps, including a 'dinarisation' strategy, with the aim of 
diversifying financial instruments and improving investors' protection. Further 
                                                   
36 The distribution of the remaining state shares was carried out in the oil company NIS in 2010 and in the 
airport operator Nikola Tesla in 2011. The government announced that a 21.5% stake of Telekom would 
be given away in the first quarter of 2012, but did not disclose any plans regarding the national electric 
power company EPS. 
37 By 2012, oil derivatives imports and fixed telephony have been fully liberalised, while the process is still 
on-going in the electricity sector. 
38 Since its launch in 2009, around two thirds out of 304 recommendations have been adopted and around 
36 recommendations are still the subject of parliamentary procedure, while 73 recommendations have 
not yet been implemented. According to the programme, estimated savings have reached EUR 121 
million out of EUR 183 million planned. 
39 At end-2011, gross non-performing loans (NPL) as a percentage of total loans exceeded 19%, largely 
due to an increase in the corporate NPL ratio. 
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adjustments in the legislative and regulatory framework of the financial system are 
envisaged to forge financial stability as well as to support the deepening of Serbia's 
capital market. The programme announces the finalisation of the privatisation process in 
the banking sector,40 the development of investment and pension funds and public-
private partnerships as well as the establishment of a national development bank, with the 
aim of mobilising resources to boost investment. 
Labour market  
While poor labour market performance is one of the main concerns, the programme does 
not elaborate on the planned policy actions over the medium term. Despite a rebound in 
economic activity since the 2009 crisis, the situation continued to deteriorate in 2011, 
with the unemployment rate soaring from 14% to above 24%, the employment rate 
barely reaching 50% and the activity rate at just under 60%. Structural unemployment, in 
particular among educated young people, and widespread informal employment are 
exacerbated by persistent systemic rigidities. Changes in the institutional arrangements, 
including of wage bargaining, as well as adjustments of the pension and tax/benefit 
systems will need to be addressed. 
In the face of modest and jobless growth, the biggest challenge in the medium term is 
however to improve substantially employment opportunities. The large share of unfilled 
job vacancies, despite high unemployment, points to a shortage of skilled labour and a 
major mismatch of qualifications. Further reforms of the education and vocational 
training systems, along with lifelong learning, would help to respond better to labour 
market needs. 
Other reform areas  
The programme underscores as priority those actions which will lead to a rationalisation 
of public spending over the medium term, either through parametric adjustments or by 
way of strengthening discipline and control. Reforms of the pension, health care, 
education, social welfare and state aid systems are announced. The authorities have 
already initiated an overhaul of the social welfare system due to a precarious social 
situation, with a significant rise in both absolute and relative poverty rates since 2009. 
The reform aims at targeting better social transfers and improving protection for the most 
vulnerable groups, but concrete measures are not elaborated in the programme. 
Decentralisation of provision of social welfare services and capacity building are deemed 
to further strengthen social inclusion. The revisions in the pension, healthcare and 
education sectors, which have been identified with the help of the World Bank, are 
mentioned as reform priorities, but the presentation lacks detail about planned policy 
measures, timeline for implementation and fiscal impact. There are some indications of 
savings from the rationalisation of schools and improvement of the collection of health 
contributions. The same holds true for the announced reduction of subsidies to firms. It 
appears that a defined strategy for implementation of key policies remains outstanding; a 
challenge that will need to be tackled without delay. 
                                                   
40 However, the state has assumed majority ownership over local lender Privredna Banka, raising the stake 
to almost 65% following a capital injection in March 2012. 
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6.7 OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF FORMAL REQUIREMENTS  
Having regard to the EU standards for presenting a medium-term economic policy plan, 
Serbia's programme is a largely suitable document. Effort was made in responding to the 
calls for further improvement, in particular as regards substantiating the fiscal policy 
strategy with a more in-depth analysis. More information was provided also as regards 
the sustainability of the external position. The authorities are encouraged to further 
streamline the document, by enhancing partnership and co-ordination between all 
relevant stakeholders in the area of economic policies, with a view of ensuring 
consistency in the implementation of fiscal, monetary and structural strategies. 
As regards the macroeconomic framework, the programme gives a clear and concise 
overview of past economic developments, based on the relevant data available at the time 
of submission. In the light of the current unstable environment, the authorities may 
consider it useful to further complement the macroeconomic projections with alternative 
scenarios, as this will highlight the impact of potential shocks/risks through the entire 
spectre of macroeconomic aggregates. 
As regards the fiscal framework, the programme largely adheres to the requirements 
specified in the programme guidelines. Fiscal data are presented according to the IMF 
General Financial Statistics (GFS) methodology. In response to the previous assessments, 
the authorities have improved data coverage, in particular as regards the provision of up-
to-date information and a more structured analysis of public debt. Significant effort was 
made in setting out more clearly the medium-term debt management strategy, and 
supporting it with a robust sensitivity analysis of the borrowing alternatives. The 
programme also presents for the first time the calculations of potential output growth and 
structural fiscal balances, which allows a better insight into the interaction between 
cyclical conditions and fiscal developments for the Serbian economy. On the other hand, 
the three-year fiscal programming based on the medium-term expenditure framework 
remains to be fully reflected in the programme. The programme would largely benefit 
from specifying the adopted/planned revenue and expenditure measures together with 
their expected fiscal effects for each year over the programme period. 
As regards the structural reforms framework, the programme fails to provide fully 
convincing action plans as regards the medium-term policy priorities. Roadmaps and 
timetables for the implementation of the most important reform measures over the 
medium-term, as well as full-fledged assessments of their budgetary impacts, are largely 
missing. The programme announces as a general guideline a move towards a 
performance-based financing in the provision of public services, but does not provide the 
implementation schedules for the planned adjustments. By spelling out concrete 
roadmaps and timetables, the authorities will improve credibility of their medium-term 
economic and fiscal strategy, geared towards enhancing growth, competitiveness and 
employment. 
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7 TURKEY 
7.1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
Turkey submitted its eleventh Pre-accession Economic Programme in January 2012. The 
programme covers the period 2012-2014 and represents an update of the previous years' 
submission. It builds on earlier policy documents, such as the Medium Term Economic 
Programme adopted in autumn 2011, including its Medium Term Fiscal Framework. The 
document largely complies with the content, form and data requirements.  The 
Commission's requests for additional analyses made in mid-2011 and the Commission's 
suggestions in last years' PEP assessment have not been taken on board. In particular, the 
specific information related to key macroeconomic imbalances and the sustainability of 
the external accounts as well as an assessment of the main structural growth bottlenecks 
would have been highly relevant and useful under the current circumstances. The PEP is 
supported by a sufficiently comprehensive and broadly consistent macroeconomic 
framework, which appear however somewhat optimistic, in particular with respect to the 
balance-of-payments and inflation scenarios.  
Similar to last year's PEP, the programme’s key objectives are to strengthen macro 
economic stability so as to ensure sustainable growth leading to convergence of per 
capita income towards the EU-average. To this end, the monetary and fiscal policy mix 
aims at continued fiscal prudence while structural reforms are to enhance the role of the 
private sector, and to improve financial sector intermediation and increase the value of 
human capital. However, the recent track record and the implementation of structural 
reforms have been slow and progress has been uneven. The PEP did not sufficiently 
elaborate the structural reform strategy in 2012-2014. 
 As recently evidenced by the global financial crisis and the risks of sovereign debt crisis 
in the euro area, the Turkish economy has increased its resilience. In 2010 and 2011, real 
GDP growth amounted to respectively 9% and 8.5%. The general government budget 
deficit has fallen from 3.7% in 2010 to about 1.5% in 2011 and the gross debt stock to 
GDP ratio is estimated to have retreated to 39% by the end of 2011.The unemployment 
rate declined by one percentage point to 9% in December 2011. However, the current 
account deficit edged up rapidly from 6.4% of GDP in 2010 to about 10% of GDP in 
2011, in tandem with the widening trade deficit. In addition, headline inflation started to 
rise markedly in the second half of 2011, from about 6% in mid-2011 to 10% by the end 
of the year. 
Over 2012-2014, the programme estimates that the Turkish economy will grow at rates 
around potential, i.e. at around 4-5%. Growth would become more balanced, albeit still 
driven by gross fixed capital formation (7% annually on average) and to a lesser extent 
private consumption (3.5%). Exports of goods and services are projected to accelerate 
gradually from about 5% annually in 2012 to 8.5% in 2014, compared with a major 
slowdown of imports in 2012 (from 10.8% the previous year to 4.3%) and a rather stable 
increase in the following years of over 6%. The macroeconomic scenario tends, however, 
to ignore some major risks such as the widening of external imbalances and the 
intensification of inflationary pressures. It foresees a reduction of the current account 
deficit from 9.4% in 2011 to 7% of GDP by 2014. Over the past two years, not only has 
the current account deficit rapidly and substantially increased but its significant 
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narrowing seems unlikely. Although weaker domestic demand may reduce imports 
somewhat, energy prices remain high and the outlook for Turkish exports remains weak 
given the mild recession  forecasted in the euro area in 2012, the destination of about 
45% of the country's exports. Furthermore, the quality of the current account financing 
has deteriorated, increasingly shifting towards potentially volatile short-term capital. 
These developments, together with mounting inflationary pressures, may pose an 
additional threat to internal and external stability in 2012-2014 and may call for a more 
restrictive monetary and fiscal policy mix than what is presented. In particular the 
complexity of the present monetary policy stance has been subject to major criticism and 
would therefore deserve some more explanation. In sum, the PEP would greatly benefit 
from a more in-depth analysis and quantification of risks.  
In 2011, the general government budget deficit narrowed to about 1.4% of GDP- 
compared with 1% in the PEP - from 3.5% in 2010, thereby performing better than the 
2.1% deficit envisaged in the budget, mainly due to strong growth which resulted in 
higher budget revenues than originally anticipated, and the proceeds of a major tax 
restructuring scheme (about 1% of GDP). The PEP's medium-term fiscal programme 
envisages an improvement of the consolidated general government balance, from a 
projected deficit of 1.0% of GDP in 2011 to 0.8% in 2012 and 2013 and 0.4% in 2014, in 
part due to lower interest payments in 2013 and 2014. The public debt to GDP ratio is 
anticipated to fall gradually from 39.8% of GDP in 2011 to 32% by 2014.  In the light of 
the programme's growth projections, the fiscal policy objectives appear realistic, albeit 
not very ambitious. As in previous years, the document does not sufficiently elaborate on 
the policy measures which could support achieving the fiscal targets and therefore lacks 
some transparency. Turkey has accomplished a remarkable effort of fiscal consolidation 
in previous years, but ensuring a high-quality fiscal adjustment will be a key challenge in 
the coming years. In addition, the Turkish government has, on several occasions, turned 
to ad-hoc measures to achieve its fiscal targets. To prevent this in the future, a stronger 
fiscal anchor and an acceleration of key structural reforms would be highly beneficial, in 
particular given Turkey's dependence of foreign savings.  
Like last year, the programme's structural and institutional reform agenda, which appears 
fragmented and covers a broad range of issues, is insufficiently linked to the fiscal 
scenario, and only partly aligned with the reform requirements in view of the country's 
EU accession perspective, as spelled out in the latest Progress Report and the European 
Partnership. The Turkish economy has benefited from reforms in areas such as banking, 
energy and education. However, reforms still have to be pursued in several important 
areas, such as labour markets and the investment climate. The programme would benefit 
from a more thorough analysis of the key structural weaknesses and bottlenecks to 
growth and an elaboration of a comprehensive strategy including precise measures on 
future reforms and a timeline for their implementation. 
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2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Real GDP growth (% change) COM 9.0 7.5 3.0 4.1 n.a.
PEP 2012 9.0 7.5 4.0 5.0 5.0
Consumer price inflation (%) COM 8.6 8.5 7.2 7.2 n.a.
PEP 2012 8.6 5.9 6.6 5.0 4.9
General government balance (% of GDP) COM -3.5 -2.4 -2.4 -2.5 n.a.
PEP 2012 -2.9 -1.0 -0.8 -0.8 -0.4
Primary balance (% of GDP) COM 1.4 2.4 2.7 2.8 n.a.
PEP 2012 1.6 2.5 2.8 2.7 2.9
Government gross debt (% of GDP) COM 43.2 39.7 38.7 37.8 n.a.
PEP 2012 42.2 39.8 37.0 35.0 32.0
Sources: Pre-Accession Economic Programme (PEP) 2012, Commission autumn 2011 forecast
Comparison of key macroeconomic and budgetary projections
 
7.2 INTRODUCTION 
Turkey's eleventh Pre-Accession Economic Programme (PEP 2012-2014), submitted in 
January 2012, is consistent with other economic policy documents, such as the ninth 
National Development Plan (2007-2013). It presents a rather optimistic medium term 
macroeconomic and fiscal framework prepared on the basis of the Medium Term 
Programme (MTP, 2012-2014) published in October 2011 and elaborated upon already 
in summer 2011.  The programme largely complies with the requested standards in terms 
of content, form and data and demonstrates a high degree of familiarity with the technical 
tools and analytical requirements of this exercise. At the same time, some updating in the 
light of recent developments and further analysis in some key areas would be welcome. 
In particular, the programme does not address a request by the Commission to present an 
in-depth analysis on the external sustainability and competiveness issues of the Turkish 
economy as well as on the key structural growth bottlenecks. A further elaboration of the 
fiscal and structural strategies would enhance its role in guiding economic policy. 
Similar to previous year's PEP, the programme’s key objectives are to create 
employment, sustain fiscal discipline, increase domestic savings, and reduce the current 
account deficit in order to strengthen macroeconomic stability and to ensure a more 
stable growth path and increase welfare.  
7.3 KEY CHALLENGES 
The PEP has been prepared in an environment of high uncertainties and risks in the 
global economy. Turkey's economic growth performance over the past two years was 
remarkable. However, in part due to strong economic growth in 2011 - on the back of 
robust domestic demand and higher imports in combination with high commodity prices 
– pressures have accumulated. In particular, the current account deficit has increased 
dramatically, and inflationary pressures have intensified. Under such circumstances, the 
main challenge for Turkey is to design and implement a balanced monetary and fiscal 
policy mix which preserves macroeconomic stability and ensures a sustainable growth 
path conducive to labour market improvements. The 2011 Progress Report had already 
emphasised that macroeconomic stability still remained fragile and needed to be carefully 
monitored, and that in particular a stronger fiscal anchor and a more transparent 
monetary policy may be beneficial. Key structural reform challenges persist, including 
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the need to boost employment levels and reduce labour market rigidities, to implement 
tax reforms and advance on privatisation in the energy and financial sectors.  
7.4 RECENT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS AND MEDIUM-TERM SCENARIO 
7.4.1 Recent macroeconomic developments 
The strong economic recovery continued in 2011, supported by stronger credit growth 
and higher employment. The pace of GDP growth slowed slightly to 8.5% year-on- year 
from 9% in 2010, but exceeded the PEP's forecast of 7.5%. The robust overall growth 
reflected more buoyant private and public consumption than anticipated in the PEP, as 
these expenditure categories grew by respectively 8% and 4.5%. However, gross fixed 
capital formation growth remained the driving force behind this robust growth, and rose 
by about 18% in 2011. Primarily due to a weaker Turkish lira, export competitiveness 
has improved and exports of goods and services outpaced imports as from mid-2011. In 
tandem with the robust economic expansion, unemployment fell by over 1 percentage 
point on an annual basis, and stood at 9% as of December 2011. As a key concern, youth 
unemployment remains at high levels of about 18%.  Substantial gender disparities in 
labour markets persist and female employment remains particularly low, at about 20%, 
compared with over 60% for men. 
The current account deficit has been ballooning faster than foreseen in the PEP, in 
tandem with a large and widening merchandise trade deficit, driven in particular by the 
impact of strong domestic demand and higher oil prices. Turkey's current-account deficit 
practically doubled in one year and reached 10% of GDP in 2011.  
A weaker lira, base effects from unprocessed food prices and indirect tax increases are 
putting strong upward pressure on consumer price inflation, which went up from about 
6% in mid-2011 to 10.4% in the year to December 2011. This compares with an official 
target of 5.5% for the end of 2011, with a tolerance band of ±2 percentage points, and 
5.9% in the PEP. In spite of the rising inflation, the central bank kept its main policy rate 
unchanged at 5.75% citing the risk of recession owing to the problems of the world 
economy. At the same time, the bank left the overnight borrowing and lending rates at 
5% and 12.5%, thereby maintaining the wide corridor established in October. To stem 
the lira's fall of about 20% vis-à-vis the euro in 2011, the central bank has opted for hefty 
foreign exchange interventions. As a result,  total gold and foreign exchange reserves fell 
to €67bn, the lowest level since early 2011, but still significantly higher than the €55bn 
early 2010. Thanks primarily to cyclical factors, Turkey reports strong fiscal results, with 
the overall budget balance improving. Turkey's general government budget recorded a 
deficit of 1.4% of GDP in 2011, compared to 3.6% a year earlier. Since 2009, public debt 
fell significantly and amounted by the end of 2011 to less than 40% of GDP.  
7.4.2 Medium-term macroeconomic scenario 
The PEP 2012-2014 presents a rather optimistic growth scenario (in particular in 2012) 
with a soft landing of the Turkish economy, with growth being driven by private 
consumption, exports and chiefly investment. The external assumptions are based on the 
Commission's autumn forecast and on autumn IMF and OECD forecasts. On this basis, 
the PEP expects the euro area's GDP to rise by 1.1% in 2012, 1.5% in 2013, and 1.7% in 
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2014. Since then, conditions have significantly worsened, and as of February 2012, the 
Commission forecasts a growth decline of 0.3% in 2012. As the euro zone absorbs over 
45% of Turkey's exports, this may have a major impact on Turkish trade and growth at 
large.  
 
COM PEP COM PEP COM PEP COM PEP COM PEP
Real GDP (% change) 9.0 9.0 7.5 7.5 3.0 4.0 4.1 5.0 n.a. 5.0
Contributions:
- Final domestic demand 10.9 10.9 11.5 9.6 1.3 4.1 2.5 5.2 n.a. 5.0
- Change in inventories 2.4 2.4 -0.1 0.2 -0.1 0.1 0.0 -0.1 n.a. -0.1
- External balance of goods and services -4.4 -4.4 -4.1 -2.3 1.6 -0.1 1.3 -0.1 n.a. 0.1
Employment (% change) 6.2 6.2 1.6 5.9 1.0 1.4 1.4 2.0 n.a. 2.1
Unemployment rate (%) 11.9 11.9 10.2 10.5 10.3 10.4 10.4 10.2 n.a. 9.9
GDP deflator (% change) 6.3 6.3 7.7 8.0 6.0 7.0 5.2 5.0 n.a. 5.0
CPI inflation (%) 8.6 8.6 8.5 5.9 7.2 6.6 7.2 5.0 n.a. 4.9
Current account balance (% of GDP) -6.6 -6.4 -9.8 -9.4 -8.8 -8.0 -8.6 -7.5 n.a. -7.0
Sources: Pre-Accession Economic Programme (PEP) 2012, Commission Autumn 2011 forecast (COM)
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Comparison of macroeconomic developments and forecasts
 
Real sector 
The real sector scenario used in the programme is somewhat more optimistic than the 
Commission autumn 2011 forecast. The PEP projects a significant growth slowdown as 
from mid-2011. Real growth is projected to average 4-5% over the medium-term, 
boosted by robust private sector demand, primarily investment and higher exports. 
Private consumption is foreseen to grow by about 3% on average over the programme 
horizon, supported by rising incomes and employment. Although its growth rate is more 
than halved on average over the period 2012-2014, as compared to 2011, investment 
remains   the main driver of growth, increasing by 6.5% in 2012 and accelerating to 
almost 9% in 2013-2014.  Growth in exports is expected to gradually accelerate from 
4.7% in 2012 to 8.5% in 2014, while the major slowdown in domestic demand, expected 
in 2012 will be driving down imports growth to 4.3%. Imports are thereafter projected to 
rise by 6.2% in 2013 and 6.7% in 2014. As a result, the external trade deficit is set to 
decrease from 11% of GDP in 2011 to 9.3% of GDP in 2014. 
The PEP growth scenario appears slightly optimistic, and is subject to major downside 
risks, some of which being briefly listed in the PEP and mainly related to slower than 
projected growth of Turkey's export markets. Based on four methods used to estimate 
potential output, the programme considers that the output gap will be gradually 
narrowing as actual output will gradually move towards potential by 2014. There are 
upside risks to this growth pattern given the much better than anticipated growth 
performance in 2011 (real growth of 8.5% compared with 7.5% in the PEP). Therefore 
overheating may occur much earlier. Downside risks include lower global growth, higher 
commodity prices and slowing capital inflows, which may stem from interest rates hikes 
in advanced economies, or an increased risk aversion towards emerging markets in 
general, or towards Turkey specifically.] 
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Regarding the contribution of the various production factors to growth, Turkey’s output 
will be mainly driven, as in the past, by capital deepening, and to a much lesser extent by 
employment growth while the increase in TFP is expected to be limited, and less than 
1%. Throughout the programme period, the value added generated in the industrial sector 
is expected to increase by an average 5% annually. By 2014, the services sector, the 
industry and agriculture would represent respectively 64%, 27% and 9% of the overall 
value added in the Turkish economy. 
Inflation 
Base effects, a weaker lira and tax hikes imply that Turkey's inflation has yet to peak and 
will remain above the central bank's comfort zone 5% +/-2% for the bulk of 2012. 
Against this background, the inflationary outlook projected in the PEP appears benign. It 
expects inflation to decline below the 5.0% mark by 2013, which is notably below 
market expectations (currently about 7% for end-2012). The central bank's 
unconventional monetary policy has not yet succeeded in curbing above-target rate of 
inflation, in sufficiently restoring policy credibility and, along with fiscal measures, in 
helping rein in the widening current account deficit. At the end of 2011, the annual rate 
of headline and core CPI stood at 10% and 8%, respectively, significantly above the 5% 
year-end target of the central bank. Inflationary pressures have risen since mid-2011 due 
to pass-trough effects stemming from a TRL trade weighted depreciation of about 20%, 
as well as high food prices and oil and other commodity prices. Going forward, stronger 
inflationary pressures could also result from stronger wage increases, if public sector pay 
increases continue to spill over to the private sector. Moreover, necessary alignments of 
indirect taxes (e.g. excises) as well as further adjustments of administrative prices or 
pressures stemming from growth above potential in 2010 and 2011 could add to prices 
increases. Considering that Turkish price stability is challenged by structural issues that 
render it vulnerable to external and supply-side shocks, coupled with a compressing 
output gap, bringing inflation sustainably down would likely require structural efforts 
and a much tighter mix of monetary, fiscal, and prudential policies. At the same time it is 
reasonable to assume that a more conventional and stability-oriented monetary policy 
framework may help preventing a significant re-acceleration of inflation in the medium-
term. 
Monetary and exchange rate policy 
Growing inflationary pressures, and high credit growth (about 25% annually) fuelling 
domestic demand and imports, and culminating in a growing current-account deficit 
continued to make the central bank of Turkey's task of setting monetary policy highly 
challenging. The key objective of monetary policy is to ensure price stability, or – in 
other words – to support the disinflation process. The 2012 PEP presents a short 
description of the framework of monetary and exchange rate policy.  As in previous 
years, Turkey's central bank will target inflation in the 2012-2014 period. By the end of 
2012, the inflation target would have fallen to 5% from 5.5% in 2010. In 2013, the 
inflation target amounts to 5%, while the 2014 target has not yet been decided. These 
targets remained unchanged from the 2011 PEP. The ultimate, long-term target is to 
decrease inflation rate to levels complying with the Maastricht criteria.  
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Besides enhancing the overall transparency and predictability, a more credible 
management of expectations and more confidence are seen as key factors aiming at 
further improving monetary transmission.  The free floating exchange rate regime 
remains in place.  The interventions made so far, and in particular at the end of 2011, 
aimed at smoothening excessive exchange rate volatility. More transparency in the 
central bank’s operational targets may be needed to re-establish credibility of its inflation 
target. The bank uses a rather complex policy mix, and keeps the policy rate low, while 
utilizing the wide interest rate corridor as its main policy tool, with the bank borrowing 
costs fluctuating between the repo rate and the lending rate (5.75-11.5% range). Some, 
albeit minor success could be observed in the first two months of 2012, as the pace of 
bank lending has fallen in combination with an increase in the nominal exchange rate of 
the lira.  
External sector 
In 2011, Turkey's current account balance has deteriorated dramatically as imports rose 
proportionally much faster than exports. For the programme period, a decline of the 
current account deficit is expected. The underpinning scenario comprises a rather 
optimistic evolution of exports (gradually up from 5% to 8.5% growth over 2012-2014 as 
compared to 3% in 2010-2011), due to accelerating growth in main partners and thus in 
external demand, which seems rather unlikely. At the same time, the pace of merchandise 
imports seems very subdued against the foreseen - rather benign - fall of domestic 
demand, and the continuously high energy prices  are likely to affect overall import 
prices - and import values -  significantly. The scenario is also - albeit to a lesser extent- 
upbeat on tourism revenues.  The expected volume of workers remittances is forecasted 
to stabilize around USD 1 billion.  As a result, the current account deficit is expected to 
decrease gradually from 9.4% of GDP in 2011 to 7% by 2014. This appears optimistic as 
the outturn for 2010 was 10% of GDP and pressures have not been abating very much. 
The programme does not anticipate any difficulties in financing the current account 
deficit, despite proportionally, much more volatile capital inflows (mainly portfolio, bank 
credits and an observed tripling of errors and omissions) than in 2010.  
Furthermore, the PEP expects some rebalancing between FDI and portfolio investment. 
FDI is projected to increase gradually from USD 11.4 billion in 2011 to USD 13.2 billion 
by 2014, while portfolio investment is forecasted to fall by one third - from USD 19.7 
billion in 2011 to USD 13.3 billion in 2014.  No alternative scenarios are included on 
energy imports.  Given the high sensitivity of the Turkish current account to oil prices, 
the programme would have benefited from an in-depth analysis of the effect of a shift in 
oil demand combined with energy price volatility. In addition, and like in previous years, 
the programme does not include a scenario whereby the TRL real exchange rate shows 
significant instability relative to the baseline scenario and its effect on the current 
account. Finally, the PEP does not sufficiently comply with the Commission's request to 
present an in-depth analysis of external sustainability based on a set of relevant 
indicators. 
Financial sector 
As in previous years, the PEP presents a brief overview of the recent developments in the 
financial sector. However, it lacks an in-depth assessment of the sector's financial 
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stability, in particular as the central bank's policy to curb the very high credit growth, and 
the overall volatility in financial and money markets had significant consequences for the 
sector's profitability and soundness. More specifically, public banks and participation 
banks seem not to have adapted as well as private banks to the changes in market 
conditions.  
Macro-prudential measures enacted in mid-2011 by the Turkish banking regulator have 
led to a sharp rise in lending rates and there are recent signs of slowing credit growth. 
The banking regulator's discretionary, targeted macro-prudential measures appear to be a 
step in the right direction. The increase in provisioning, higher risk-weights and reserves 
placed on new consumer loans is increasing the cost of lending and borrowing, and  
slows household credit growth. However, the experience of other countries that used 
similar measures point to mixed results. While the measures often slow the pace of credit 
growth, it remains challenging for regulators to determine the “right” level for loan-to-
value ratios, provisioning and/or risk-weights needed to curb credit expansion and ensure 
financial stability, and soundness of the sector. 
Main risks and challenges 
The PEP focuses on preserving macroeconomic stability and sustainable growth, 
maintaining price stability and sound public finances, improving competitiveness, and 
enhancing the labour market performance. It mentions as sources of risks the recent 
developments in the world economy, including the sovereign debt crisis and problems in 
Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italy, as well as a potential oil price shock. 
However, the programme only very briefly touches upon these risks, all considered to 
stem from the external environment. It would benefit from a more systematic analysis of 
risks, possibly under the form of alternative macro scenarios. 
The main risks to the macroeconomic framework are also clearly associated with the very 
strong recent growth and the major imbalances emerging in the Turkish economy. 
Overheating pressures could emerge earlier and more rapidly than suggested by various 
methods to measure the output gap. Due to the strong economic growth - on the back of 
robust domestic demand and higher imports in combination with higher commodity 
prices - the current account deficit has increased significantly, and inflationary pressures 
have intensified. At the same time, the quality of the external financing has deteriorated 
which could also imply more elevated refinancing risks forwarding the future. Under 
those circumstances, the main challenge for Turkey is how to design and implement a 
more balanced monetary and fiscal policy mix. 
7.5 PUBLIC FINANCE 
The fiscal framework of the PEP 2012-2014 is presented as an integral part of - and 
supportive to - the overall medium-term economic policy framework. The overall 
objective of Turkey’s fiscal policy continues to be the establishment of a sustainable 
growth environment while at the same time supporting disinflation.  The gradual 
reduction of the budget deficit is the main fiscal tool in this respect, contributing to 
ensuring debt sustainability. The programme would have gained from a more in-depth 
discussion of the policies and tools to achieve the announced fiscal targets.  
 119 of 127 
Main revenue-related measures are an improvement of efficiency in tax collection and a 
broadening of the tax base. On the expenditure side, emphasis is put on reducing the 
social security (mainly health) deficits. Like in previous years, no quantitative estimates 
of the budgetary effects of the individual measures are given.  
The 2012 programme comprises cyclically adjusted budgetary balances. It benefits from 
some clarifications on the methodology used in the individual sections. In particular, it 
includes a box to explain the adjustments made to consolidate general government and 
ESA95 based data.   
7.5.1 Budget implementation in 2011 
Turkey does not publish consolidated general government budget reports on a regular 
basis. Furthermore, the 2012 PEP does not describe any budget execution developments 
in 2011 which is a major shortcoming. Other official sources suggest that budget 
developments throughout 2011 were strong, which helped the current account balance in 
terms of public savings, and also limited the burden on interest rates, already under 
pressure from global turbulence and the central bank's monetary policy. Turkey's central 
government budget recorded a TRY17.9 billion deficit in 2011 (1.4% of estimated GDP), 
thanks to strong revenue growth, a moderate increase in expenditures and low interest 
expenditures. The budget balance was better than Turkey's medium-term fiscal plan 
forecast of 1.7% of GDP and the budget forecast of 2.8% of GDP which did not include 
amnesty related revenues amounting to 1% of GDP.  
Change:
2011-14
Revenues 35.4 36.4 36.8 36.5 36.1 -0.3
- Taxes and social security contributions 27.7 29.2 29.2 29.2 29.0 -0.2
    - Other (residual) 7.7 7.2 7.6 7.3 7.1 -0.1
Expenditure 38.3 37.4 37.6 37.3 36.5 -0.9
- Primary expenditure 33.8 33.9 34.0 33.8 33.2 -0.7
of which:
Gross fixed capital formation 3.4 3.6 3.3 3.4 3.3 -0.3
Consumption 17.0 16.9 16.7 16.5 16.0 -0.9
Transfers & subsidies 6.5 5.8 6.1 6.1 5.9 0.1
Other (residual) 6.9 7.6 7.9 7.8 8.0 0.4
- Interest payments 4.5 3.5 3.6 3.5 3.3 -0.2
Budget balance -2.9 -1.0 -0.8 -0.8 -0.4 0.6
- Cyclically adjusted -2.3 -2.0 -1.8 -1.6 -1.2 0.8
Primary balance 1.6 2.5 2.8 2.7 2.9 0.4
Gross debt level 42.2 39.8 37.0 35.0 32.0 -7.8
Sources: Pre-Accession Economic Programme (PEP) 2012, ECFIN calculations
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Composition of the budgetary adjustment  (% of GDP)
 
7.5.2 Near-term and medium-term budget strategy  
The PEP's fiscal scenario contains a relatively detailed presentation of the operations of 
the central government but fails to present sufficient information about the general 
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government. Fiscal projections –even for 2011– are based on the medium term fiscal 
framework adopted in November 2011.  
For the year 2012 and in line with the budget framework adopted in late 2011, the 
programme projects an increase in spending of 0.2 percentage points of GDP in tandem 
with increasing revenues (by 0.4 pp of GDP). Accordingly, the general government 
deficit will decrease by 0.2 percentage points to 0.8% of GDP. The 0.4% increase in the 
share of revenue to GDP appears to be optimistic and inconsistent with the projected fall 
in GDP growth, assuming that the tax elasticity does not improve in the short term. The 
increase of the expenditure-to-GDP ratio in 2012 is largely driven by higher current 
transfers (up by 0.8 percentage point), which appears to be in part linked to the 
increasing social spending commitments and social security deficits while the share of 
GFCF declines.  
In 2013 and 2014, several expenditure categories (interest payments, current expenditure, 
as well as transfers) are programmed to be somewhat reduced as a share of GDP and so 
is the revenue-to-GDP ratio. The slight decline in interest payments does not appear to be 
entirely consistent with current expectations for interest hikes by the central bank over 
the medium-term.  
In 2013, the general government deficit is projected to remain at 0.8% of GDP, before 
declining to 0.4% of GDP by 2014. Although appropriate, the programme itself does not 
elaborate in more detail on the spending adjustment. 
Risks 
Fiscal risks are clearly related to the downside risks to growth assumptions of the 
programme, in particular in 2012. A stronger cyclical downturn is likely to worsen the 
fiscal balance. In addition to lower growth effects, the revenue base is likely to decrease 
especially for indirect taxes, as a result of the forecasted disinflation process. Altogether, 
a stronger decline in fiscal revenues than projected in the PEP could materialise. 
Additional risks may result from a slower than envisaged implementation of reforms 
which could delay the realisation of budget savings. This refers in particular to current 
spending commitments and social transfers. The authorities may also be confronted with 
continued spending pressures, for example in the public wage bill. Finally, the current 
volatility and sovereign debt crisis in the euro area may lead to pressures to increase 
short-term discretionary spending to counterbalance the negative effects on growth and 
employment. The resulting combined effect of markedly lower fiscal revenues and 
pressures for higher current spending would undermine the envisaged fiscal path. 
Therefore, an appropriate fiscal response under current circumstances would require both 
bold fiscal measures to reign in current spending and the introduction of a binding fiscal 
rule.  
Structural balance (cyclical component of deficit, one-off measures and temporary 
measures, fiscal stance) 
The PEP 2012-2014 provides an overview on the cyclical position of the economy and 
the impact of fiscal policy, using the same methodology in estimating cyclically adjusted 
primary balances as in last year's submission. On this basis, actual output would exceed 
its potential in 2014, the negative gap being gradually reduced over the 2012-2013 
period. As of 2011, the structural and actual primary budget balances start to converge 
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and the actual primary budget surplus increases. It is estimated that the structural primary 
budget surplus which was around 1.4% of GDP in 2011, will gradually increase to 2.1% 
by 2014. On this basis, the PEP concludes that fiscal policy is broadly neutral in 2011-
2014. Given the methodological weaknesses, the statements on the effects of fiscal policy 
certainly need to be taken with caution.  
Budgetary implications of "major structural reforms" 
The programme provides only piecemeal information and is largely backward looking 
about the budgetary impact of structural reforms. Some information is provided on 
reforms in regional development, healthcare, energy and transportation. At the same 
time, the programme is silent on various other reforms, which could bring about a cost, 
e.g. the increase in the number of ministries decided in mid-2011 and implemented in 
September. 
General government debt 
The PEP 2012-2014 projects a baseline scenario of a gradual and significant decrease of 
general government debt from 39.8% of GDP in 2012 to 32% of GDP in 2014. 
Projections on the decomposition of changes in the debt ratio appear sufficiently 
comprehensive and consistent with the macroeconomic and fiscal assumptions.  
However, the huge Stock Flow Adjustment in 2011 raises questions. It remains unclear 
where this large contribution is coming from. Furthermore, the PEP could touch on the 
liabilities linked to the recent establishment of various Public Private Partnerships (PPP), 
in particular in the health sector. The Turkish authorities admit that these liabilities are 
significant, and should be taken into account into the risk assessments regarding Turkish 
public finances.  
 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Gross debt ratio [1] 42.2 39.8 37.0 35.0 32.0
Change in the ratio -2.4 -2.8 -2.0 -3.0
Contributions [2]:
1. Primary balance -2.5 -2.8 -2.7 -2.9
2. “Snow-ball” effect -2.9 -0.6 -0.1 0.0
Of which:
Interest expenditure 3.5 3.6 3.5 3.3
Growth effect -6.4 -4.2 -3.6 -3.3
3. Stock-flow adjustment 3.0 0.6 0.8 -0.1
[2]  The snow-ball effect captures the impact of interest expenditure on accumulated debt, as 
well as the impact of real GDP growth and inflation on the debt ratio (through the 
denominator). The stock-flow adjustment includes differences in cash and accrual.
Source: Pre-Accession Economic Programme(PEP); Commission services’ calculations
Composition of changes in the debt ratio (% of GDP)
Notes:
[1]   End of period.
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7.5.3 Sensitivity analysis and comparison with previous PEP 
The public debt sensitivity analysis presented in the PEP shows that the public debt ratio 
could increase by about 5 percentage points more by 2014 under a combined shock 
scenario, i.e. when growth falls by 2%, the TRL depreciates by 10% and real interest 
rates increase by 500 base points. The analysis undertaken in the PEP is useful and 
confirms the need for continued fiscal discipline in order to ensure public debt 
sustainability. However, the current uncertainties regarding growth prospects may justify 
some analysis on the sensitivity of public debt to a larger growth contraction in the next 
programmes, and to subsequently worse fiscal balance outcomes. A similar comparison 
was presented in last year's PEP.  
7.5.4 Quality of public finance and institutional features 
As in previous years, the PEP 2012-2014 refers in a very general way to recent and 
ongoing institutional changes and policies which are deemed to improve the quality of 
public finances over the medium term. It emphasises improvements in budget 
management, revenue collection and expenditure control and a new legal framework for 
public-private partnerships. The programme foresees that, in order to reduce the need for 
ad-hoc measures to reach fiscal targets, efforts to widen the tax base, better capture the 
unregistered economy, and decrease the number of tax exemptions will be continued. 
Turkey has accomplished a remarkable effort of fiscal consolidation but ensuring a high-
quality fiscal adjustment will be a key challenge in the coming years. Indeed, fiscal 
pressures might emerge over the medium term, either as a result of past policy 
commitments, for example in education and access to the universal health insurance, or 
owing to a still pending reform agenda.   
As public expenditures are already relatively high there is limited scope for Turkey to 
increase expenditure in order to meet pressing convergence challenges.  Expenditure will 
also be contained in order to make room for lower taxes   in the long run while 
preserving a sound fiscal framework. Fiscal policy would thus need to focus on trade-offs 
in expenditure allocations, possibly by reducing spending in functional areas  where it 
appears to be oversized in comparison with other similar countries.  At the same time, 
additional reforms will need to be implemented with the aim of improving the efficiency 
of expenditure programmes in areas where expenditure pressures are being increasingly 
felt, such as health care, education, and social protection.  Reforms focused on the 
modernization of civil service pay and employment system and the rationalization of the 
investment programme, would also help contain pressures on the wage bill as well as 
restrain capital transfers and thus contribute to better control public expenditure across 
functional areas. While efficiency considerations are considered to be the main priority in 
public expenditure policies, the basic objective of the tax policies to be implemented is to 
contribute to supporting growth and employment in accordance with macroeconomic 
policies, reducing informality in the economy, and creating a tax system that is simpler, 
fairer and with wider base. Fight against the informal economy has been stepped up in 
accordance with the strategy established thanks to enhanced inter-institutional 
cooperation. 
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7.5.5 Sustainability of public finance 
Like in previous years, the 2012 PEP does not contain a separate section on the long-term 
sustainability of public finances. The lack of long-term demographic and macroeconomic 
projections is a shortcoming. Turkey’s situation differs dramatically from that of EU 
Member States. With its very young population (the average age is just 29), falling birth 
rates, and significant in- and outward migration, some more in-depth analysis would be 
crucial in the context of the PEP. The future costs of the pension and health-care systems 
should be monitored very carefully. 
7.6 STRUCTURAL REFORMS 
7.6.1 Obstacles to growth and structural reform agenda 
The PEP does not comply with the Commission's request to present an assessment of 
structural obstacles to growth. . Although Turkey has made some efforts in recent years, 
more could be done to improve the business and investment climate, to build additional 
capacity of skilled labour, and increase domestic savings so as to be less dependent on 
foreign capital. Conversely, the general aim of the structural reform agenda presented in 
the PEP remains to increase the efficiency in the private sector and the public 
administration and to support the strengthening of market forces. Overall, the structural 
reform agenda should be broadly supportive of further enhancement of Turkey's capacity 
to cope with competitive pressures and market forces within the EU. More emphasis 
should be put on labour market reforms, to support job creation during the economic 
transformation process. The outlined structural reform agenda represents a mere 
continuation of the plans put in place over the last years.   
 
2012 2013 2014
Labour market 0.0 - -
Agriculture and rural sector -0.2 - -
Regional development (GAP) -2.2 -2.1 -2.1
Social security 0.7 0.9 0.9
Transportation -0.1 -0.2 -0.2
Energy -2.0 - -
Other reforms (public administration, knowledge-based 
society, judiciary, environment, public procurement etc) - - -
Total impact on the budget -3.7 -1.4 -5.2
Total impact on the budget (in % of GDP) -0.6 -0.2 -0.7
Source: 2012 Pre-accession Economic Programme (PEP), own calculations
Net direct budgetary impact of key reform commitments (in EUR million)
 
7.6.2 Key areas of structural reform 
Overall, the programme's objectives are broadly appropriate. Some attention is given to 
stimulating innovation, job creation, fostering regional development, transportation and 
reforms in the energy sector. However, the measures presented mainly refer to the recent 
past or at most 2012 and indications on major future measures are scarce and 
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insufficiently developed.  In addition, the timeline, sequencing and links between 
different measures and reforms are either lacking or not sufficiently elaborated upon. 
Product and capital markets 
The PEP 2012 sets out developments in key areas such as the strengthening of 
competition policy, privatisation, improving the investment climate, agriculture and SME 
development. It also envisages a continuation of measures aimed at strengthening the 
legal and institutional framework and a further harmonisation with EU requirements, 
which is welcome. The PEP does not always mentions delays that have been encountered 
in certain sectors compared to what was envisaged in the previous PEP. Privatisation 
efforts are to continue during the programme period, for example in banks, energy, ports 
and activities related to the tobacco industry. There is a risk that further delays will occur 
during the programme period compared to the outlined plans, as after years of intensive 
privatisation, the remaining portfolio of state-owned enterprises is likely to be more 
challenging to privatise: it is concentrated in areas where privatisation can be seen as 
more sensitive. Concerning the area of business law and policies, major progress has 
been achieved as a new commercial code has been adopted that should improve 
transparency and access to finance.  
In the field of banking, the privatisation of the largest state bank, Ziraat Bank, has once 
more been delayed  but  past and planned measures are supportive of the overall positive 
developments in this so far well performing sector. Despite the demonstrated improved 
resilience of the Turkish banking sector to severe market fluctuations, also thanks to a 
number of specific supervisory measures, a continued strengthening of supervision will 
be important to further decrease risks in particular in the context of the still rapidly 
growing banking operations. Concerning capital markets, a new capital markets law is 
under preparation (to be adopted in autumn 2012) and is seen to create a more stable and 
efficient market in line with the EU acquis. The programme gives a thorough overview 
of recent and planned measures aimed at aligning the financial sector legislation and in 
particular prudential regulations with EU requirements. The programme could have 
discussed in more detail the new challenges for domestic financial and capital markets 
stemming from falling profitability as funding has become more expensive along with 
the increase in commercial banks reserve requirement ratios. This appears to be 
particularly relevant for the public and participation banks. 
Labour market 
The programme is a mere update from last year's. It points to the main problems and 
challenges in the Turkish labour market, such as the very low participation rates 
particularly of women, the high proportion of people employed in, and the low 
productivity of the agricultural sector and the growing young population.  It also shows 
that there has been a significant improvement in bringing down the unemployment rate 
since the last PEP. The programme strongly emphasises the link between the labour 
market and the education sector and the need to reduce the skills mismatch between 
labour demand and supply.  The overall educational attainment levels of the labour force 
are still low, despite improvements during the past years.  Looking forward over the 
programme period, the PEP is quite vague on concrete measures that will be taken to 
further improve the educational standards.  There is no information about the planned 
scope for active labour market policies or resources which will be put aside for this 
purpose.  
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The PEP does not refer to the National Employment Strategy under preparation, notably 
to the application of the flexicurity principle. This would deserve further elaboration. 
Overall, it puts only limited focus on the role of labour market regulations and the 
informal sector in addressing the existing problems. The proposed new severance pay 
system should be explained. Non-wage labour costs remain relatively high and the 
regulations of the labour market rigid.  Tackling these issues in a more systematic way 
would help address the identified challenges in the labour market and support the 
creation of jobs in the challenging transformation period ahead.  The programme 
proposes to reduce the cost of employment, but details about the scope and timing of 
measures remain unclear. 
Other reform areas 
The PEP outlines a wide range of areas where reform efforts have been ongoing and are 
foreseen to continue over the programme period.  Further efforts have been made to 
improve public financial management, which has yielded positive results, for example as 
regards the budgeting process and transparency.  However, the PEP does not outline any 
further steps to be taken in this area.  Local governments' reform aims at strengthening 
their role and abilities to perform the needed services.  Legal reforms have proceeded, 
but the PEP acknowledges that there are deficiencies in the capacity to implement laws at 
the local level.  
Further social security reforms are very important, particularly given that the sizeable 
deficits in the social security contributions strongly contribute to Turkey's fiscal 
imbalances.   
7.7 OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF FORMAL REQUIREMENTS  
Macro framework 
The recent macroeconomic performance (higher growth, larger imbalances) is not 
adequately described and some relevant information available at the time of submission 
has not been included. The medium-term scenario is rather optimistic, and some key 
challenges are not properly assessed, for example the external sustainability including the 
large energy dependence of the Turkish economy in a context of high oil prices and risks 
of a much higher current account deficit than anticipated, or the rapidly increasing 
inflationary pressures observed in the second half of 2011. The framework is drawn from 
the MTP which was elaborated in mid-2011 and published in November 2011.The lack 
of updating hampers the analysis and leads to some inconsistencies compared with recent 
developments throughout the document.  
Fiscal framework 
Turkey does not regularly publish consolidated general government accounts. In 
addition, the ESA95 alignment has not been improved in the 2011 fiscal notification.  
The PEP lacks 2011 data on budget execution, and does not mention any detailed and 
concrete fiscal measures conducive to achieving the planned reduction in the spending 
ratio. Future PEP would benefit from more complete data (e.g. on general government 
expenditure by function, long term fiscal projections). A longer term analysis of public 
finance sustainability could be added to the baseline fiscal programme to better 
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understand risks to the scenario, in particular the ones stemming from the demographic 
and labour situation in Turkey.  
Structural reforms 
The PEP does not indicate bottlenecks to growth as requested by the Commission in the 
PEP outline. As in previous years, the objectives that are identified in the programme are 
in general supportive to the fulfilment of the Copenhagen economic criteria, as they aim 
at making some key parts of the Turkish economy more competitive, and the priorities 
appear right. However, concrete implementation measures and timetables remain vague 
and their fiscal impact is not always well elaborated. This part of the PEP would 
definitely benefit from a more strategic assessment, which focuses on the medium-term.  
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Annex: Structural indicators
EU 27
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
General economic background
Real GDP 1 4.7 0.7 -4.8 9.0 7.5f 3.2 0.3 -4.3 2.0 1.6f
Labour productivity 2 64.6 65.9 63.1 63.4 n.a. 100 100 100 100 100
Real unit labour cost 3 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. -0.8 1.0 2.8 -1.6 -0.5f
Real effective exchange rate 4 94.3 95.4 91.0 103.6 70.0 121.4 123.2 118.3 109.0 113.1
Inflation rate 5 8.8 10.4 6.3 8.6 6.5 2.3 3.7 1.0 2.1 3.1e
Unemployment rate 6 8.8 9.7 12.5 10.7 10.2f 7.2 7.1 9.0 9.7 9.6
Employment
Employment rate 7 44.6 44.9 44.3 46.3 n.a. 65.3 65.8 64.5 64.1 n.a.
Employment rate - females 8 22.8 23.5 24.2 26.2 n.a. 58.2 58.9 58.4 58.2 n.a.
Employment rate of older workers 9 27.2 27.5 28.2 29.6 n.a. 44.6 45.6 46.0 46.3 n.a.
Long term unemployment 10 2.3 2.3 2.8 2.8 n.a. 3.1 2.6 3.0 3.9 n.a.
Product market reforms 
Relative price levels 11 70.1 68.2 63.5 71.3 n.a. 100 100 100 100 100
Total trade-to-GDP ratio 12 21.1 22.7 19.8 20.4 n.a. 10.7 11.6 9.8 11.7 n.a.
Net FDI  13 1.9 1.4 0.8 1.0 n.a. 3.9 2.2 2.1 1.0 n.a.
Sectoral and ad-hoc state aid 15 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 n.a.
Business investment 16 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 18.7 18.4 16.2 15.9 n.a.
Knowledge based economy
Tertiary graduates 17 n.a. 7.6 8.0 n.a. n.a. 13.8 14.5 14.3 n.a. n.a.
Spending on human resources 18 3.3 3.0 3.9 3.7 n.a. 5.0 5.1 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Educational attainment 19 47.7 48.9 50.0 51.1 n.a. 78.1 78.5 78.6 79.0 n.a.
R&D expenditure 20 0.7 0.7 0.9 n.a. n.a. 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.0 n.a.
Broadband penetration rate 21 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 18.2 21.7 23.9 25.7 n.a.
Source:  Commission services, national sources
1. Growth rate of real GDP in %.  2. Labour productivity per person employed - GDP in PPS per person employed relative to EU-27 (EU-
27=100).  3. Growth rate of the ratio: compensation per employee in current prices divided by GDP (in current prices) per total 
employment.  4. Vs IC36 (1999 = 100), current year's values are based on Commission's forecast deflator figures, nominal unit  labour cost 
deflator.  5. Annual average rate of change in Harmonized Indices of Consumer Prices (HICPs), tFYRoM = CPI.  6. Unemployed persons 
as a share of the total active population.  7. Employed persons aged 15-64 in % of total population of the same age group.  8. Employed 
women aged 15-64 in % of total female population of the same age group.  9. Employed persons aged 55-64 (EU27) or 50-64 (tFYRoM)) 
in % of total population of the same age group.  10. Long-term unemployed (over 12 months) in % of total active population.   11. 
comparative price levels of final consumption by priva te households inc luding indirect taxes (EU-27=100).  12. Trade integration - 
Average value of imports and exports of goods divided by GDP.  
f: forecast, e: estimated value, p: provisional value, b: break in series, s: Eurostat estimate, r: revised value,
13. Average value of inward and outward FDIs flows in % of GDP.  14. Market share of the largest generator (% of total net generation). 
15. In % of GDP. 16. Gross fixed capital formation by the private sector in % of GDP.  17.Total tertiary graduates in science and 
technology per 1000 of population aged 20-29.  18. Public expenditure on education in % of GDP. 19. Percentage of the population aged 
20 to 24 having completed at least upper secondary education.  20. GERD (Gross domestic expenditure on R&D) - in % of GDP.  21. 
Number of broadband access lines per 100 inhabitants.
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